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UNCERTAINTY OF MORTGAGE TITLE 
ADAM J. LEVITIN† 
ABSTRACT 
  The mortgage foreclosure crisis raises legal questions as important 
as its economic impact. Questions that were straightforward and 
uncontroversial a generation ago today threaten the stability of a $13 
trillion mortgage market: Who has standing to foreclose? If a 
foreclosure was done improperly, what is the effect? And what is the 
proper legal method for transferring mortgages? These questions 
implicate the clarity of title for property nationwide and pose a too-
big-to-fail problem for the courts. 
  The legal confusion stems from the existence of competing systems 
for establishing title to mortgages and transferring those rights. 
Historically, mortgage title was established and transferred through 
the “public demonstration” regimes of UCC Article 3 and land 
recordation systems. This arrangement worked satisfactorily when 
mortgages were rarely transferred. Mortgage finance, however, shifted 
to securitization, which involves repeated bulk transfers of mortgages. 
  To facilitate securitization, deal architects developed alternative 
“contracting” regimes for mortgage title: UCC Article 9 and MERS, a 
private mortgage registry. These new regimes reduced the cost of 
securitization by dispensing with demonstrative formalities, but at the 
expense of reduced clarity of title, which raised the costs of mortgage 
enforcement. This trade-off benefitted the securitization industry at 
the expense of securitization investors because it became apparent 
only subsequently with the rise in mortgage foreclosures. The harm, 
however, has not been limited to securitization investors. Clouded 
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mortgage title has significant negative externalities on the economy as 
a whole. 
  This Article proposes reconciling the competing title systems 
through an integrated system of note registration and mortgage 
recordation, with compliance as a prerequisite to foreclosure. Such a 
system would resolve questions about standing, remove the potential 
cloud to real-estate title, and facilitate mortgage financing by 
clarifying property rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since 2007, an estimated seven-million or more homes have been 
sold in foreclosure or distressed sales,1 a loss in homeownership 
unparalleled in American history. The impact of these foreclosures on 
households, communities, and the macroeconomy is widely 
recognized.2 The foreclosure crisis, however, raises equally weighty 
legal issues. The foreclosure crisis is forcing a reexamination of the 
nineteenth-century commercial- and real-property-law systems that 
continue to undergird critical sectors of the U.S. economy in the 
twenty-first century. This reexamination is occurring in the shadow of 
a too-big-to-fail problem, because a court’s decision to uphold well-
established law could trigger a financial crisis. 
Problems in the foreclosure process have been apparent since the 
start of the foreclosure crisis,3 but the issue burst onto the national 
scene in the fall of 2010 with the emergence of the “robosigning” 
scandal involving banks’ use of fraudulent affidavits to establish 
standing to foreclose.4 Then, in January 2011, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court sent shockwaves through the real-estate- and 
commercial-law world by issuing a unanimous ruling in U.S. Bank 
 
 1. I arrived at the seven-million figure by adding industry extrapolations and metrics from 
July 2007–June 2013 (6.5 million foreclosure sales completed), see Industry Extrapolations and 
Metrics (June 2013), HOPE NOW 5 (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.hopenow.com/industry-
data/2013-06-04-HopeNow.Ful_%20Report_(June).DRAFT.pdf, and my own estimate of 
foreclosure sales from January–June 2007 and July–December 2013 (more than 0.5 million 
foreclosure sales completed). 
 2. See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF FORECLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER SIX MONTHS 5–6 (2009), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT52671/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT52671.pdf (detailing 
the effect of foreclosures on neighboring property values, educational and religious institutions, 
foreclosing banks, and the economy as a whole); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, 
THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 124 
(2011) (partially attributing the national economic woes of early 2009 to skyrocketing 
foreclosures); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 402–10 
(2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (documenting 
the impact of the foreclosure crisis on individual homeowners, housing markets, and financial 
institutions); DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-RISK LENDING, DEREGULATION, AND 
THE UNDERMINING OF AMERICA’S MORTGAGE MARKET 133–66 (2009) (examining the costs of 
high-risk mortgage lending for borrowers, lenders, investors, neighborhoods, cities, renters, and 
the national and international economies).  
 3. See Gretchen Morgenson, Foreclosures Hit a Snag for Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2007, at C1 (reporting on a 2007 federal judicial decision that “rais[ed] questions about the legal 
standing of investors in mortgage securities pools”).  
 4. See Gretchen Morgenson, Banks’ Flawed Paperwork Throws Some Foreclosures into 
Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at A1 (noting banks’ use of “dubiously prepared” affidavits). 
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National Ass’n v. Ibanez.5 Ibanez held that a pair of foreclosure sales 
was invalid because the foreclosing banks were not the mortgagees of 
record at the time of the foreclosure sale.6 
Ibanez was soon followed by two related decisions from the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez7 and 
Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n.8 Bevilacqua held that the 
purchaser at an invalid nonjudicial foreclosure sale did not have title 
to the property,9 while Eaton held that a foreclosure sale was invalid 
because the foreclosing bank did not hold the promissory note at the 
time of the sale.10 
A generation ago, none of these opinions would have been 
controversial. They would have been viewed as straightforward 
applications of well-established commercial and real-property law: a 
party cannot foreclose on a mortgage unless it is the mortgagee (or its 
agent);11 a mortgage can be enforced only by a person who can 
enforce the underlying debt;12 a mortgage is but incidental to the 
 
 5. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011). For some discussion of 
the upheaval that Ibanez caused or was thought likely to cause, see, for example, Gretchen 
Morgenson, Massachusetts Ruling on Foreclosures Is a Warning to Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 
2011, at B1 (noting that Ibanez “open[ed] the door to other foreclosure do-overs” in 
Massachusetts); Chad Bray, Massachusetts High Court Ruling Focuses on Foreclosure 
Paperwork, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 7, 2011, 5:48 P.M.), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/07/
massachusetts-high-court-ruling-focuses-on-foreclosure-paperwork (describing Ibanez as a 
decision that “spooked bank investors”); Felix Salmon, The Ibanez Case and Housing-Market 
Catastrophe Risk, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/01/07/the-
ibanez-case-and-housing-market-catastrophe-risk (predicting a flood of “legal craziness”); Rich 
Vetstein, Apocalypse Now? Will the Massachusetts Ibanez Case Unravel Widespread 
Irregularities in the Residential Securitized Mortgage Market?, MASS. REAL ESTATE L. BLOG 
(Jan. 8, 2011), http://www.massrealestatelawblog.com/2011/01/08/apocalypse-now-will-the-
massachusetts-ibanez-case-unravel-widespread-irregularities-in-the-residential-securitized-
mortgage-market (anticipating that “[o]ther courts across the country will likely be influenced 
by the ruling”).  
 6. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 55. For commentary on Ibanez, see generally Recent Case, U.S. 
Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 827 (2012).  
 7. Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884 (Mass. 2011).  
 8. Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (Mass. 2012).  
 9. Bevilacqua, 955 N.E.2d at 898. 
 10. Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1134. 
 11. See, e.g., New England Sav. Bank v. Bedford Realty Corp., 680 A.2d 301, 309–10 
(Conn. 1996) (holding that the mere holder of a promissory note, if not the owner of the 
underlying debt, cannot exercise the equitable power of foreclosure). 
 12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4(c) (1997) (“A mortgage may be 
enforced only by, or in [sic] behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the 
mortgage secures.”); id. § 5.4 cmt. e (“Mortgage[s] may not be enforced except by a person 
having the right to enforce the obligation or one acting on behalf of such a person. As 
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promissory note;13 and one cannot generally convey better title than 
one has.14 
These cases did not arise because of prior uncertainty about the 
law, but because a too-big-to-fail industry—the housing-finance 
industry—found the prior law inconvenient and both changed and 
disregarded it, banking on its too-big-to-fail status to guarantee 
favorable legal outcomes. The confusion wrought by the conflict 
between housing-finance industry practice and well-established law 
made resolution of such issues so pressing that the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court took these three cases on expedited, direct 
appeal from the trial court, and the Permanent Editorial Board for 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) felt compelled to issue a 
special report on the application of the UCC to mortgage notes.15 
Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s rulings upheld 
well-established legal principles, the Court was also deeply cognizant 
that its rulings risked clouding title across Massachusetts and 
departed from its usual practice by making its ruling in Eaton apply 
only prospectively to future foreclosures.16 
 
mentioned, in general a mortgage is unenforceable if it is held by one who has no right to 
enforce the secured obligation.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 13. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271, 275 (1873) (“All the authorities 
agree that the debt is the principal thing and the mortgage an accessory.”).  
 14. BRUCE A. MARKELL, JOHN DOLAN & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CORE CONCEPTS IN 
COMMERCIAL LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 1 (2004) (discussing nemo dat quod non 
habet as the foundational principle of commercial law). The UCC is replete with provisions that 
allow a good-faith purchaser to take better title than the seller had, but these are distinct 
situational exceptions to the nemo dat rule. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2011) (protecting good-
faith purchasers of goods); id. § 3-203(b) (vesting in transferees “any right of the transferor to 
enforce the instrument, including any right as a holder in due course”); id. § 7-504(a) (allowing 
transferees to retain title and rights that a transferor purported to convey in cases in which a 
document has been delivered but not duly negotiated); id. § 8-302(a) (entitling purchasers of 
even uncertificated securities to “all rights in the security that the transferor had or had power 
to transfer”); id. §§ 9-320(a)–(b) (enabling buyers of goods to take the goods free of security 
interests in most circumstances). Similarly, there are exceptions to nemo dat in property law. 
For example, in the four states that still recognize the fee tail—Delaware, Maine, 
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island—it is possible for someone with an entailed estate to convey 
the estate in fee simple. 
 15. See generally PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, 
REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 
APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO 
MORTGAGE NOTES (2011), available at http://www.ali.org/00021333/PEB%20Report%20-%20
November%202011.pdf. The Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC is a joint committee of 
the American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commission that curates the UCC, issuing 
reports regarding what it believes are the proper legal interpretations of the UCC when 
particular controversies arise, as well as drafting occasional amendments to the UCC.  
 16. Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1132–33 (Mass. 2012). 
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The Massachusetts trilogy is but the most prominent and 
comprehensive group of a growing number of state and federal 
rulings dealing with standing to foreclose.17 There have been nearly 
three thousand reported opinions dealing with this issue in some way 
over the past five years.18 Standing doctrine differs between federal 
 
 17. See, e.g., In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624, 626 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (sustaining an objection to 
proof of a claim when the plaintiff could not prove an enforceable right to the note under state 
law); In re Tarantola, No. 4:09-bk-09703-EWH, 2010 WL 3022038, at *6 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 
29, 2010) (denying a motion for relief from a stay for a lack of real interest in the property when 
the plaintiff could not prove the valid assignment of the note); In re Canellas, No. 6:09-bk-
12240-ABB, 2010 WL 571808, at *5 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010) (finding no evidence of a 
proper assignment of the mortgage nor the note to the foreclosing party prior to foreclosure); In 
re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 405 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (denying a motion for relief from a stay 
for a lack of real interest in the property when the plaintiff could not prove valid assignment of 
the note); In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 370 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009) (holding that the servicer 
for the holder of the note, who had no beneficial interest in the note, was not the real party of 
interest and was not entitled to relief from a stay); In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757, 765 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 2008) (holding that a noteholder plaintiff must join the owner of the note, the real party in 
interest, before it could seek relief from a stay), rev’d, 438 B.R. 661 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010); In 
re Hayes, 393 B.R. 259, 268 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (holding that a putative mortgagee lacked 
standing for failing to provide proof of a valid assignment of the mortgage); Glaski v. Bank of 
Am., 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 452 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that “borrowers have standing to 
challenge void assignments of their loans even though they are not a party to, or a third party 
beneficiary of, the assignment agreement”); U.S. Bank v. Coley, No. CV076001426, 2011 WL 
2734603, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 2011) (dismissing a foreclosure complaint for lack of 
standing because the mortgage assignment was four months subsequent to the foreclosure suit’s 
initiation); Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA, 739 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (holding 
that the foreclosure must be vacated when the bank “did not yet own the indebtedness that it 
sought to foreclose”); Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 286 P.3d 249, 252 (Nev. 2012) 
(requiring the party seeking to foreclose to demonstrate that it was both the holder of the 
promissory note and the beneficiary of the deed of trust); Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. 
Erobobo, No. 31648/2009, 2013 WL 1831799, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (denying a motion for 
summary judgment in a foreclosure because the assignment of the note and mortgage were void 
for not complying with the pooling and servicing agreement (PSA)); Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l 
Ass’n v. Jordan, No. 91675, 2009 WL 625560, at *9–10 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2009) (dismissing 
a foreclosure action for a lack of standing because the putative mortgagee could not prove it 
owned the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. 
Byrams, 275 P.3d 129, 133 (Okla. 2012) (reversing and remanding summary judgment for the 
foreclosure plaintiff because standing did not exist at the time an action was instituted); Niday v. 
GMAC Mortg., LLC, 284 P.3d 1157, 1169 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that a deed-of-trust 
beneficiary who uses the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. (MERS) cannot 
undertake a nonjudicial foreclosure); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087, 1096 (Vt. 
2011) (upholding the denial of standing to foreclose because the bank could not demonstrate 
that it was the holder of the note at the time the foreclosure action was initiated). For citations 
to other cases addressing the issue of standing in foreclosure actions, see supra notes 5–8 and 
accompanying text and infra notes 22, 34, 265 and accompanying text. A sampling of leading 
cases are also collected in the Appendix. 
 18. A search on November 1, 2013, of the Lexis State & Federal Cases database lists for 
“(foreclosure w/s standing) AND (mortgage or “deed of trust” or “trust deed”)” yields 2,999 
cases since 2007. An identical search in the Westlaw ALLCASES database yields 2,781 
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and state courts, but there is broad agreement among courts that 
some sort of standing or similar status is necessary for both judicial 
and nonjudicial foreclosure,19 just as it is for any sort of debt-
collection action.20 There is also broad agreement that the party 
 
decisions since 2007. A search for the same terms in the previous seven-year period yields only 
297 cases on Lexis and 234 cases on Westlaw. This search is both over- and underinclusive, but it 
is nonetheless illustrative.  
 19. See Dale Whitman & Drew Milner, Foreclosing on Nothing: The Curious Problem of 
the Deed of Trust Foreclosure Without Entitlement To Enforce the Note, 66 ARK. L. REV. 21, 23 
(2013) (“While plenty of uncertainty existed, one concept clearly emerged from litigation during 
the 2008–2012 period: in order to foreclose a mortgage by judicial action, one had to have the 
right to enforce the debt that the mortgage secured. It is hard to imagine how this notion could 
be controversial.”). Some states permit only judicial foreclosures. Others allow for either 
judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure, whereas yet others have solely nonjudicial foreclosure 
procedures. See generally MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, JUDICIAL VERSUS NON-JUDICIAL 
FORECLOSURE, available at http://www.mbaa.org/files/ResourceCenter/ForeclosureProcess/
JudicialVersusNon-JudicialForeclosure.pdf. 
 20. The standing issue has also arisen in the context of credit cards. See, e.g., B-Line, LLC 
v. Wingerter, 594 F.3d 931 (6th Cir. 2010) (reversing sanctions against the purchaser of an 
undocumented credit-card-debt claim in bankruptcy); Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs., 285 
F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (certifying a class in a suit against a debt collector for alleged Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO) violations regarding credit-card-debt collection); Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs., 
757 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss in a suit against a debt 
collector for alleged FDCPA and RICO violations regarding credit-card-debt collection); 
LVNV Funding LLC v. Guest, 953 N.Y.S.2d 550 (City Ct. 2012) (sanctioning a plaintiff’s 
counsel in a debt collection lawsuit for failing to provide sufficient documentation to establish 
standing); Midland Funding LLC v. Wallace, 946 N.Y.S.2d 67 (City Ct. 2012) (same); MBNA 
Am. Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 841 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Civ. Ct. 2007) (dismissing the bank’s motion to 
affirm an arbitration award for, among other things, failure to provide a copy of the actual retail 
credit contract); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Sued over Credit Card Debt Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 2013, at B1 (discussing California’s suit against JPMorgan for credit-card-debt-
collection issues); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Problems Riddle Moves To Collect Credit Card 
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2012, at A1 (“Lenders . . . are churning out lawsuits without regard 
for accuracy, and improperly collecting debts from consumers.”); Jeff Horwitz, ‘Robo’ Credit 
Card Suits Menace Banks, AM. BANKER (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:16 A.M.), http://www.
americanbanker.com/issues/177_20/robosigning-credit-card-suits-1046175-1.html (“If banks 
prove unsuccessful in defending themselves from claims that their records are shoddy, they run 
the risk of inviting a new regulatory crackdown and legal battles over the validity of claims 
involving tens of billions of dollars in unsecured debt.”). Some state and local governments have 
adopted their own chain-of-title requirements for debt collection. See Daniel J. Langin, 
Introducing Certainty to Debt Buying: Account Chain of Title Verification for Debt 3 (Jan. 5, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ftc.gov/os/comments/debtcollecttech
workshop/00027-60064.pdf.  
  Credit-card and other consumer loans present somewhat different issues than 
mortgages regarding chain of title, not least because unsecured loans only have a promissory 
note or other credit agreement, not a security instrument. As a result, there will not be 
confusion regarding which title system applies, only questions of what is sufficient proof to show 
standing and prove a debt. Even in these regards, credit-card debt differs from mortgages, as it 
is much less formal. Whereas a mortgage will usually involve an in-person closing and a single 
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bringing the foreclosure action or sale must have standing at the time 
the litigation or sale process is commenced. There is far less 
agreement, however, about what determines who has standing to 
bring the foreclosure.21 
Standing or similar doctrines require the party pursuing a 
foreclosure to have a legally cognizable interest in the mortgage. The 
modern mortgage market is financed largely through securitization, a 
financing method that involves multiple bulk transfers of mortgages. 
If loans have not been successfully transferred to the party seeking to 
foreclose, then that party has no privity with the loan—and therefore 
lacks standing to foreclose. Courts, however, cannot agree even on 
what law governs transfers or determines ownership of mortgages, 
which creates confusion over standing.22 This confusion over standing 
thus stems from confusion about what is required to transfer a 
mortgage loan. Are mortgage loans transferred by negotiation—
meaning indorsement and physical delivery of the promissory note—
or by sale contract, or by recordation in land records? Can mortgages 
 
extension of credit, there is unlikely to be anyone with true personal knowledge of credit-card 
debt, which is applied for remotely, underwritten and repeatedly authorized, cleared, and 
settled through automated systems. Likewise, the small size of credit-card debt may make it 
uneconomical to take greater care documenting chains of title. For divergent views on what is 
sufficient proof of indebtedness in the credit-card context, compare Manuel Newburger, Should 
Sellers of Debt Warrant the Accuracy of Data They Provide?, DBA MAG., Spring 2013, at 16, 42 
(arguing that debt buyers are entitled to rely on warranties), with Dalié Jiménez, Illegality in the 
Sale and Collection of Consumer Debts 25 (June 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2250784 (advancing the opposite argument).  
 21. There is also subsidiary disagreement about what documentation suffices as evidence to 
show standing. This is where the standing issue in general intersects with robosigning. For 
discussion of evidentiary showings in credit-card-debt-collection actions, see supra note 20.  
 22. This is the case, for example, in Arizona. Compare Varbel v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n, 
No. 1 CA-CV 12-0263, 2013 WL 817290, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2013) (holding that a 
nonjudicial foreclosure sale does not require the production of the note or its chain of custody), 
with In re Tarantola, No. 4:09-bk-09703-EWH, 2010 WL 3022038, at *5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 29, 
2010) (denying a motion for relief from a stay for a lack of real interest in the property when the 
plaintiff could not prove the valid assignment of the note). It is also the case in Michigan. 
Compare Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA, 739 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (holding 
that a foreclosure must be vacated when the bank “did not yet own the indebtedness that it 
sought to foreclose”), with Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman, 805 N.W.2d 183, 183 (Mich. 
2011) (holding that MERS had standing to foreclose nonjudicially). Oregon, as compared to 
Michigan and Arizona, does not allow MERS standing to foreclose nonjudicially. See Niday v. 
GMAC Mortg., LLC, 284 P.3d 1157, 1169 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (determining that a deed-of-trust 
beneficiary who used MERS could not undertake a nonjudicial foreclosure). Washington also 
does not give MERS standing to foreclose nonjudicially. See Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 
285 P.3d 34, 36–37 (Wash. 2012) (holding that MERS could not utilize the Washington 
nonjudicial foreclosure procedure because it was not the lawful beneficiary of a deed of trust 
because it does not hold the note).  
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be transferred separately from promissory notes? What is the effect 
of unrecorded mortgage transfers? It is necessary to determine how 
mortgage loans are transferred in order to verify who has title to the 
mortgage, meaning here the right to enforce it.23 
Understanding the emergence of the mortgage-title-system 
problem and how it might be fixed requires spelunking into some of 
the hoariest and most technical minutiae of commercial and real-
property law. These byzantine rules serve as the legal infrastructure 
for critical parts of the economy. A $13 trillion residential mortgage 
market depends directly on clarity of mortgage title,24 but the 
implications of mortgage-title-system problems are further reaching. 
At stake is not only the integrity of the legal system and its insistence 
on the rule of law when dealing with economically vulnerable and 
often unrepresented defendants,25 but also potentially ruinous liability 
for the nation’s largest financial institutions. Also at stake is clarity of 
title to a large part of the real property in the United States, because 
mortgage-title-system problems implicate the alienability of real 
property itself. Clouded mortgage title poses a systemic risk to the 
economy because clarity of property title is a fundamental sine qua 
non of modern economies.26 As the bursting of the housing bubble has 
shown, housing markets are uniquely linked to the macroeconomy.27 
 
 23. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S384–85 
(2002) (describing different types of property-rights verification regimes).  
 24. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL 
RELEASE Z.1, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE 
SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS FIRST QUARTER 2013, tbl.L.216, l. 1 
(2013).  
 25. See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 07CV2560, 07CV2602, 
07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950, 
07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430, *3 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007).  
 26. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM 
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6–8, 46–58 (2000) (arguing that the 
success of Western capitalism depends on the ability of individuals to leverage clear legal title as 
capital); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1395 (2001) 
(arguing that institutional differences affecting the protection of property rights account for 
some of the differences in per capita income among former European colonies); Daron 
Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949, 984 (2005) 
(finding that property-rights institutions are key determinants of economic growth); J. Bradford 
DeLong & Andrei Shleifer, Princes and Merchants: European City Growth Before the Industrial 
Revolution, 36 J.L. & ECON. 671, 692–93 (1993) (finding a negative correlation between 
absolutist regimes with insecure property rights and city growth); Simon Johnson, John 
McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Property Rights and Finance, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1335, 
1352–53 (2002) (finding that private-sector investment is constrained by a perception of weak 
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The mortgage title issue is narrowly a question about the transfer 
of mortgages loans, not the transfer of real estate. There is no real 
question today about how to transfer Blackacre. The conveyance of 
present possessory estates in real property is a matter of state real-
property law. Conveyance procedures vary by state, but these 
procedures are not in doubt. Similarly, there is no question about how 
to mortgage real property. Instead, the issue is one of subsequent 
transfers of mortgages. 
Nonetheless, the mortgage chain of title does affect the ability to 
transfer clear title to real property. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court’s Bevilacqua decision illustrates a concept familiar to a 
generation of property-law students: an invalid foreclosure sale is 
ineffective to pass title.28 If the seller is not the person entitled to 
foreclose, the foreclosure sale is no different from a sale of the 
Brooklyn Bridge. Accordingly, the foreclosure-sale purchaser has no 
ability to transfer title to the property, no matter her equities, because 
she lacks title, just like the hapless buyer of the Brooklyn Bridge.29 
 
property rights, even when financing is available). See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold 
Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16 (1973) (noting that vulnerable 
property rights result in underinvestment); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property 
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (same).  
 27. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Why Housing?, 23 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 
5, 19–20 (2013) (identifying three transmission channels between housing and the 
macroeconomy). The risk is through both clouded title itself and resulting litigation liability for 
financial institutions. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: 
EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR FINANCIAL 
STABILITY AND FORECLOSURE MITIGATION 65 (2010), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.
edu/archive/cop/20110402010313/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-111610-report.pdf. 
 28. See Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 898 (Mass. 2011). The case of Rockafellor 
v. Gray, 191 N.W. 107 (Iowa 1922) (taking back a property sold at an invalid foreclosure sale 
after several subsequent transfers), is included in the leading property-law textbook. See JESSE 
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (1st ed. 1981).  
 29. Judicial foreclosures are generally difficult to challenge postsale even if there was no 
authority to foreclose because of finality doctrines, see GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. 
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 632 (5th ed. 2007), and sometimes specific statutory 
provisions, see, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1509 (West 2011) (limiting the remedy to a 
postsale challenge to the proceeds of the sale, rather than the return of the property); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.45 (West 2004) (providing that the reversal of a foreclosure-sale 
judgment does not affect the title of the purchaser, but instead requires restitution by the 
foreclosing creditor of the former homeowner). But see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2003 (McKinney 2012) 
(allowing a sale to be set aside for up to a year if a substantial right of the debtor was prejudiced 
by a defect in sale procedure). In nonjudicial-foreclosure states, however, finality doctrines do 
not apply, and a postsale challenge is generally possible. See Elizabeth Renuart, Toward a More 
Equitable Balance: Homeowner and Purchaser Tensions in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States, 24 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 562, 579–80 (2012). Some states impose statutes of limitations for 
postsale challenges. See id. at 583 n.95. Moreover, it is not clear whether these limits would 
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This means that there are potentially questions about title to many of 
the millions of properties that have gone through foreclosure sales 
during the past five years. 
The mortgage-title-system problem may reach even farther, 
extending beyond properties that have gone through foreclosure. A 
mortgage lien is a contingent form of ownership. If a property is 
mortgaged, it is difficult to sell unless the mortgage lien is released. 
Absent release of the lien, the buyer takes the property subject to the 
mortgage lien, even though the associated debt remains owed by the 
seller: liens follow property, while debts remain with obligors. 
Therefore if the seller defaults on the debt, the mortgagee may 
foreclose on the mortgage and force the sale of the property now 
owned by the buyer. The question about who has the lien on 
Blackacre can morph into the question of who owns Blackacre. 
Absent clarity about who is the mortgagee, title to Blackacre is not 
marketable. Moreover, unless title to land is clear, it can affect other 
property interests, such as leaseholds, easements, and boundaries.30 
Therefore, problems in determining who is a mortgagee can affect 
title on far more than foreclosure properties. Confusion over 
mortgage transfer methods and thus over rights in mortgages has 
potentially far-reaching consequences. 
This Article examines the legal and market developments that 
have befouled the law of mortgage title. It argues that the current 
confusion in the law is, at its core, the result of competing mortgage 
title systems. This is a novel conceptualization of the problem driving 
foreclosure-standing litigation, but, once the problem is understood in 
this manner, a solution—reconciliation of title systems—is readily 
apparent. 
Both land title systems and promissory note title systems purport 
to cover mortgage title. Article 3 of the UCC provides a little-
remarked title system for promissory notes.31 Local land records 
provide a title system for land and encumbrances upon it, such as 
mortgages. Yet because of the common-law doctrine that “the 
mortgage follows the note,” the UCC Article 3 system has also had 
 
apply if the seller had no right to conduct a sale, as opposed to challenges relating to sale 
procedures.  
 30. See David E. Woolley & Lisa D. Herzog, MERS: The Unreported Effects of Lost Chain 
of Title on Real Property Owners, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 365, 366–68 (2012) (discussing the 
impact of unclear title on boundary disputes).  
 31. For a discussion of the Article 3 provisions that establish this title system for 
promissory notes, see infra Part I.A.3. 
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the potential to serve as a mortgage title system when a note is 
secured by a mortgage. 
There was always a latent tension between these public-law 
mortgage title systems, but it was of little consequence until the late 
twentieth century because mortgages were rarely transferred, and 
mortgages were seldom separated from notes. The formalities of both 
systems were clear and followed, and as a result, there was seldom a 
discrepancy between them. And even if discrepancies existed 
between the title systems, they were rarely of consequence. Title was 
seldom challenged because foreclosures were rare, and default 
judgments and isolated problems usually could be settled quietly. 
The long-dormant tension between these systems became a 
problem as the mortgage finance market developed from balance-
sheet lending to securitization. Securitization transactions require 
multiple bulk transfers of mortgages in order to achieve various credit 
ratings, bankruptcy, tax, accounting, and bank-regulatory-capital 
benefits. Absent clear documentation of these transfers, the various 
transactional benefits are in doubt, which would undermine the 
economic viability of securitization. Title-and-transfer system clarity 
is essential for securitization. 
Both UCC Article 3 and land records provide a high degree of 
title clarity. Despite the potential tension between them, these 
systems have fundamental similarities. Both are property rights 
verification systems that operate through “public demonstration.” 
Both systems require compliance with demonstrative legal formalities 
to achieve property rights. Compliance provides the evidentiary 
certainty of the property rights. Both systems are examples of the 
“paperization principle,” a legal evolution aimed at reducing fraud, 
uncertainty, and adjudication costs.32 Thus, obtaining property rights 
under these public demonstration regimes has up-front costs due to 
formalities, but compliance with the formalities ensures a high degree 
of security in the property rights, both vis-à-vis other competing 
claimants to the property rights and as to the ability to enforce the 
mortgage property rights. These benefits accrue, however, only to 
securitization investors; they have no intrinsic value to the sell-side of 
the securitization industry, which see them as transaction costs to be 
eliminated. 
 
 32. See Robert Charles Clark, Abstract Rights Versus Paper Rights Under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 84 YALE L.J. 445, 476–77 (1975).  
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Accordingly, the sell-side developed alternative mortgage title-
and-transfer systems that dispensed with demonstrative public 
formalities in favor of private, bilateral contracting. Thus, a private 
electronic mortgage registry—the Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. (MERS)—was created, and UCC Article 9 was revised 
to operate as a system for the sale of notes and mortgages. Bilateral 
“contracting” regimes reduced the transaction costs in mortgage 
transfers and hence in mortgage securitizations by dispensing with 
demonstrative legal formalities. These up-front costs savings, 
however, came at the expense of certainty in property rights vis-à-vis 
other competing claimants and a reduced ability to enforce the 
property rights. In other words, the mortgage transfer regime change 
shifted costs from deal formation to deal enforcement. Costs were 
thus shifted from the financial institutions that created securitizations 
to securitization investors, because the investors could not observe 
and price this risk shift because deal documents remained unchanged. 
The cost shift only became apparent with the rise of foreclosures and 
foreclosure litigation in 2007. 
Even now, securitization investors cannot gauge the impact of 
the risk shift in terms of their loss-given-default on a mortgage, which 
is a factor preventing the resurrection of the securitization market.33 
Continued legal confusion about mortgage transfers frustrates deal 
formation in the housing-finance market, which weighs down the 
economy overall. Thus, resolving the legal questions about mortgage 
transfer is critical for restarting the housing-finance market. 
It is important to emphasize that the question of which system 
governs mortgage transfers and title is distinct from compliance. 
Confusion over which system governs can frustrate compliance, but 
compliance problems can exist even with legal clarity, and it is the 
specter of widespread compliance problems that directly pose the 
too-big-to-fail concern. Although this Article focuses on the systems 
question, in many reported cases it appears as if there has been 
 
 33. There have been only a handful of private-label residential-mortgage securitization 
deals since 2008. See Al Yoon, Deal May Signal Thaw in Mortgage Securities, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
20, 2013, 6:47 P.M.), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324373204578372833475791
270.html. In contrast, the private-label commercial-mortgage securitization market has made a 
much more vigorous rebound. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Commercial Real 
Estate Bubble, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 112–13 (2013). 
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compliance with, at best, one, and often none, of the competing title-
and-transfer systems.34 
It is also important to emphasize what is and what is not at issue 
in challenges to foreclosure standing. Foreclosure standing litigation 
does not directly relate to the issue of whether the homeowner is in 
default on the mortgage or even indebted and to what amount.35 The 
mortgage-title-system issue does not generally go to the question of 
the validity of the mortgage loan or its generic enforceability. 
Problems with mortgage title do not mean that a loan is not 
outstanding or that it is not in default. Instead, the mortgage title 
issue is about the specific question of who has the right to enforce the 
mortgage and the consequences of improper foreclosures. 
Insisting that foreclosures be carried out only by parties with 
standing may appear to be a procedural nicety that has little to do 
with moral rights or economic reality.36 Such a view fundamentally 
misunderstands the mortgage contract. The mortgage contract is not 
simply an agreement that the home may be sold upon a default on the 
loan. Instead, it is an agreement that if the homeowner defaults on 
the loan, the mortgagee may sell the property pursuant to the requisite 
legal procedure. A mortgage loan involves a bundle of rights, 
including procedural rights. These procedural rights are not merely 
notional; they are explicitly priced by the market. Mortgage finance 
availability and pricing is statistically correlated with variations in 
procedural protections for borrowers.37 Retroactively liberalizing the 
 
 34. See, e.g., In re Maisel, 378 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (finding no evidence of a 
proper assignment of the mortgage nor the note to the foreclosing party prior to foreclosure); 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione, 887 N.Y.S.2d 615, 620 (App. Div. 2009) (finding no 
evidence of a proper assignment of the mortgage to the foreclosing party prior to foreclosure); 
HSBC Bank U.S.A. Nat’l Ass’n v. Miller, 889 N.Y.S.2d 430, 433 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (holding that a 
mortgagee’s assignee lacked standing to foreclose because the mortgagee did not hold the 
promissory note at the time the complaint was filed). 
 35. See, e.g., U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Moore, 278 P.3d 596, 602 (Okla. 2012) (“[F]or the 
homeowners, absent adjudication on the underlying indebtedness, today’s decision to reverse 
the dismissal of the petition and motion to vacate cannot cancel their obligation arising from an 
authenticated Note, or insulate them from foreclosure proceedings based on proven 
delinquency. This Court’s decision [that the plaintiff lacks standing to foreclose] in no way 
releases or exonerates the debt owed by the defendants on this home.”).  
 36. Tamara Keith & Renee Montaigne, Sorting out the Banks’ Foreclosure Mess, NPR 
(Oct. 15, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130582451 
(quoting JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon as saying that “for the most part by the time you 
get to the end of the process, you know, we’re not evicting people who deserve to stay in the 
house”).  
 37. See Lee J. Alston, Farm Foreclosure Moratorium Legislation: A Lesson from the Past, 
74 AM. ECON. REV. 445, 456 (1984) (pointing out the consequences of laws preventing the 
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rules for mortgage enforcement creates an unearned windfall for 
mortgagees. Moreover, enforcement of bargained-for procedural 
requirements such as standing gives homeowners leverage to achieve 
negotiated solutions to loan defaults, such as a loan modification. 
Alternatively, enforcement of the bargained-for procedural leverage 
can buy the homeowner time to relocate, enabling a softer landing 
with fewer social dislocations and externalities. 
At the same time, however, we should recognize the economic 
costs from lack of clarity in mortgage title. When it is not clear who 
can foreclose, the result is a defaulted loan sitting in limbo. Someone 
is still owed money on the loan and is not being paid. If the 
homeowner has abandoned the property, the result is deadweight 
loss. If the homeowner remains in residence, the result is a substantial 
transfer of wealth from the real lender to the homeowner. The 
homeowner has functionally secured a rent-free dwelling, but it is 
with uncertain tenure and little alienability, as the house is still 
encumbered. This situation is bad for both the ultimate economic 
lender on the loan and for the economy as a whole, as part of the 
housing market is unable to clear. Thus, although the rule of law is 
part of the microeconomic bargain, insistence upon it may be less 
than optimal from a macroeconomic standpoint. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the traditional 
mortgage title-and-transfer systems: UCC Article 3 and land records. 
It emphasizes how these systems required demonstrative formalities 
of transfer but created high degrees of certainty in the property rights 
transferred. Part II explains how the change in mortgage financing 
from balance-sheet lending to securitization affected the demands 
made on mortgage title-and-transfer systems. Part III examines the 
 
foreclosure of farms); Quinn Curtis, State Foreclosure Laws and Mortgage Origination in the 
Subprime, J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 19 (2013), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11146-
013-9437-9 (“The provisions that make foreclosure easier—nonjudicial process and readily 
available deficiency judgments—lead to increased applications and accepted applications in the 
subprime market . . . .”); Lawrence D. Jones, Deficiency Judgments and the Exercise of the 
Default Option in Home Mortgage Loans, 36 J.L. & ECON. 115, 126–27 (1993) (noting the lender 
response to default rates); Mark Meador, The Effects of Mortgage Laws on Home Mortgage 
Rates, 34 J. ECON. & BUS. 143, 146 (1982) (estimating a 13.87 basis-point increase in interest 
rates on new homes as a result of antideficiency laws); Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on 
Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 177, 180 (2006) (noting 
that the availability—and hence, the cost—of mortgages in states with judicial foreclosure 
proceedings is greater than in states with nonjudicial foreclosures); Michael H. Schill, An 
Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 491 (1991) (arguing that 
“the relatively modest costs associated with state mortgagor protection laws do suggest that 
mortgagor protections may indeed promote economic efficiency”).  
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additional mortgage transfer methods created to facilitate 
securitization: MERS and revised UCC Article 9. It suggests that the 
securitization sell-side and the securitization buy-side may have had 
different understandings of how transfers were to occur in 
securitizations, which the sell-side exploited to capture the cost 
savings from regime change and increase the volume of its fee-based 
business and hence its profits. 
Part IV reviews existing reform proposals and considers how 
mortgage title systems could be reconciled. It proposes the creation of 
a registration system for mortgage notes that would be linked via 
unique identifiers to mortgages recorded in the land records. 
Registration would create a rebuttable presumption of ownership, 
and matching mortgage recordation and note registration would be a 
precondition of foreclosure. Linked note-and-mortgage title systems 
would preserve borrowers’ interest in keeping the terms of notes 
private, resolve questions about foreclosure standing, remove the 
potential cloud to real-estate title, and facilitate mortgage financing 
transactions generally by clarifying property rights. 
The Article concludes with some observations about the lessons 
that the mortgage-title-system confusion holds out for commercial 
law more generally and the problem of too-big-to-fail in the courts. 
The title-system problem stands as a reminder of the problems that 
can arise when certainty of property rights is eroded to reduce 
transaction costs and of the toll that too-big-to-fail problems take on 
the judicial system. 
I.  TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE TITLE SYSTEMS 
The obligation colloquially referred to as a “mortgage” is usually 
embodied in two separate instruments: a promissory note and a 
security instrument.38 The promissory note is what creates the debt 
obligation, whereas the security instrument is what makes real 
property the collateral securing performance on the note. The 
security instrument is what enables the remedy of foreclosure—the 
forced sale of the collateral property—upon default on the note. The 
note is enforceable without the security instrument, as an unsecured 
 
 38. The name and operation of the security instrument vary by state, but the differences 
are not essential for our purposes. Sometimes the security instrument is called a “mortgage”; 
other times, a “deed of trust” or “trust deed.” In some states the mortgage transaction is a two-
party transaction, whereas in other states a three-party escrow arrangement is used.  
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debt. The security instrument, however, has little meaning without 
the note. 
Traditionally, mortgage title and transfer was governed by 
Article 3 of the UCC and land recordation systems. UCC Article 3 is 
generally thought of as payment-system law, but it is also property law 
for certain payment and debt instruments. UCC Article 3 is a title-
and-transfer system for notes. Although a few scholars have 
recognized this feature of Article 3,39 a further corollary has gone 
unremarked: not only is UCC Article 3 a property-law system for 
notes, but it is also a property-law system for mortgages. This is 
because of the common-law doctrine providing that “the mortgage 
follows the note,” meaning that a transfer of the note effectuates a 
transfer of the associated security interest. Thus, UCC Article 3 is a 
mortgage title-and-transfer system too, despite the word “mortgage” 
never appearing in Article 3. This point bears particular emphasis 
because UCC Article 3 has never been understood as a mortgage title 
system, even though it functions as one. 
Mortgages are also understood as conveyances of interests in real 
property. Accordingly, both their creation and their transfer are 
potentially subject to state law on real-estate conveyance. Moreover, 
mortgages and their transfers are typically recorded in land 
recordation systems, and it is land records that are typically thought 
of as the system of mortgage title. 
Yet, once UCC Article 3 is understood to cover not just notes, 
but also mortgages, it becomes clear that there have long been two 
separate—and possibly conflicting—title systems for mortgages: title 
per the UCC Article 3 system might not correspond with title as 
evidenced in the land records. In such a case, which system controls? 
Can title to the mortgage and note be split? And if so, what are the 
enforcement rights that go with each instrument by itself? 
This Article argues that both UCC Article 3 and land 
recordation systems are what it terms “public demonstration” regimes 
for establishing property title, as opposed to what it terms 
“contracting” regimes. Public demonstration regimes establish 
property title through the use of demonstrative formalities that are 
publicly observable. This is akin to establishing title through physical 
markers like cattle brands and tags or signs noticing ownership, be 
 
 39. See Neil B. Cohen, The Calamitous Law of Notes, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 177–81 (2007) 
(discussing the obtainment of good “title” to notes). See generally James Steven Rogers, 
Negotiability as a System of Title Recognition, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 197 (1984). 
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they copyright indications or private-property signs on real property. 
These demonstrative formalities are potentially cumbersome and 
costly, but they engender a high degree of certainty in property rights 
because they are more easily verified by third parties. 
A contracting regime, in contrast, is a completely private set of 
bilateral arrangements for the transfer of property rights. Because it 
is a bilateral contracting arrangement, the requirements are whatever 
the parties agree to so long as the transfer agreement is sufficient to 
support a simple contract.40 Contracting regimes sacrifice the easy 
verifiability by third parties in favor of potentially lower transaction 
costs for property transfer. To the extent that the property transfer is 
unlikely to affect third parties, a contracting regime would seem to 
sacrifice relatively little to obtain greater efficiency. Thus, if Somerset 
sells Gloucester a cake, there seems relatively little purpose to 
requiring public formalities beyond what the parties themselves want 
to feel comfortable with the enforceability of their transaction. If 
Gloucester is worried Somerset will try to reclaim the cake, he may 
insist on greater formalities to the extent they are cost effective, but 
the decision is entirely between the contracting parties. 
If the transfer implicates third parties’ rights, however, then a 
contracting regime may in fact impose negative externalities on the 
third party by muddling their rights. A mortgage would seem the 
classic case of a transfer that is likely to affect third parties. Not only 
are there the third-party obligor on the note and potentially tenants 
on the property, but there are also potentially other lienholders, 
beneficiaries of servitudes, and taxing authorities that are affected. 
Accordingly, it makes sense that traditional mortgage title systems 
were public demonstration regimes because public demonstration 
regimes helped clarify the legal rights of third parties. 
UCC Article 3 and land recordation systems are both types of 
public demonstration regimes. Both have their origins in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the case of UCC Article 3, 
this means that the use of integrated, formalized writings transferred 
through indorsement and physical delivery and enforced via 
presentment. In the case of real-estate conveyance, this means the 
 
 40. Historically, contracting regimes involved some level of demonstrative formality, such 
as the requirement of either seal or consideration. Modern contract law has dispensed with the 
seal and reduced consideration to a legal fiction. The Statute of Frauds—another historical 
requirement of demonstrative formality—may still apply, potentially imposing some minimal 
requirements of demonstrative formalities for a transfer of property by contract to be legally 
enforceable.  
LEVITIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2013  5:55 PM 
2013] THE PAPER CHASE 655 
recording of conveyances in public records and possibly other 
requirements, such as witnesses and notarization. 
Establishing clear property title means, at its core, freedom from 
competing claims to the property and the ability to fully exercise 
dominion over the property. Freedom from claims means that there is 
superior title to that of other transferees, such as prior or subsequent 
purchasers and lienholders, as well as bankruptcy trustees vested with 
the powers of hypothetical purchasers and creditors.41 Freedom from 
claims also means superior title to that of transferors and those 
subrogated to transferors’ rights, most importantly, again, bankruptcy 
trustees.42 Full exercise of dominion means, in the case of a right to 
payment such as a mortgage, the ability to successfully enforce the 
right to payment. This would include freedom from defenses to 
enforcement. The critical common feature of the UCC Article 3 and 
land recordation systems as mortgage title systems is that they require 
compliance with demonstrative public formalities in order to achieve 
a high level of certainty in property rights in mortgages. 
A. UCC Article 3 
1. Scope.  UCC Article 3 applies only to negotiable instruments.43 
For a promissory note to be negotiable under Article 3, it must 
comply with specific statutory requirements. The note must be “an 
unconditional promise . . . to pay a fixed amount of money.”44 The 
note must be payable on demand or at a definite time45 and not 
contain additional undertakings by the obligor other than a few that 
do not concern us here.46 And finally, the note must be payable to 
bearer or order when first issued.47 This final requirement means that 
the instrument must contain language along the lines of “payable to 
 
 41. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2012) (addressing the rights and powers of bankruptcy 
trustees).  
 42. Id. § 541 (defining the property of a bankruptcy estate); id. § 704 (listing the duties of a 
trustee in bankruptcy).  
 43. U.C.C. § 3-102(a) (2011).  
 44. Id. § 3-104(a); see also id. § 3-106 (defining an unconditional promise). The note may 
provide for interest and other charges as well. Id. § 3-104(a). 
 45. Id. § 3-104(a)(2).  
 46. Id. § 3-104(a)(3). 
 47. Id. § 3-104(a)(1). 
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the order of [a name]” or “payable to bearer.” If the note simply said, 
“Payable to John Doe,” it would not be negotiable.48 
Most mortgage notes purport to be negotiable and are generally 
assumed to be so by courts and litigants. Although scholars have 
questioned whether mortgage notes are in fact negotiable,49 there is 
no question that they are supposed to be negotiable. Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) guidelines restrict Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) insurance to mortgage loans made with 
negotiable notes.50 The Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform note, which 
is used for most mortgage loans, purports to be negotiable.51 Fannie 
and Freddie—the largest purchasers of mortgage loans—will not 
purchase mortgages that do not use their uniform note unless the 
note is negotiable.52 Until recently, there were no reported decisions 
regarding the negotiability of the Fannie/Freddie uniform note or the 
HUD model note,53 but the modern mortgage finance market is built 
upon an assumption of negotiability.54 
 
 48. Historically, the obligor would only have to pay John Doe, but in most jurisdictions, 
choses in action are now freely assignable, even in the face of language to the contrary. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322 (1981) (limiting the effect of contractual 
prohibition of assignment). 
 49. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 951, 968–73 (1997); Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the 
Secondary Mortgage Market, and What To Do About It, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 737, 749–57 (2010).  
 50. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., HUD 4155-2, LENDER’S GUIDE TO THE 
SINGLE FAMILY MORTGAGE INSURANCE PROCESS 6-B-7 (2011), available at http://portal.hud.
gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/administration/hudclips/handbooks/hsgh/4155.2.  
 51. Bruce D. Bolander & Mark C. Suchman, Sale and Lien Perfection Under the U.C.C., in 
PRACTICING LAW INST., STRUCTURED MORTGAGE AND RECEIVABLES FINANCING 623, 665 
(R.S. Dayan ed., 1989).  
 52. See FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 22–23 (2013), 
available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/sel040913.pdf (noting that a lender selling 
a mortgage loan not closed on a uniform instrument warrants that the note constitutes a 
negotiable instrument). 
 53. See e.g., In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271, 283–84 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012) (holding a note to 
be negotiable and collecting other cases). Although not noted in the opinion, the note in 
question was the Fannie/Freddie Multistate Fixed Rate Note for Single Family, Form No. 3200 
1/01. Motion for Summary Judgment Exhibit A, In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271 (No. 10-bk-12592). 
The mortgage was a Fannie/Freddie uniform instrument for Pennsylvania for Single Family, 
Form No. 3039 1/01. Motion for Summary Judgment Exhibit B, In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271 (No. 
10-bk-12592). 
 54. See Jeffrey P. Naimon, Jacob Thiessen & Jennifer Beall, Assignee Liability in 
Residential Mortgage Transactions, 19 REV. BANKING & FIN. SERV. 89A, 89D (2003) 
(“Institutions and practices that we take for granted would be far different without the holder in 
due course rule, if they could exist at all.”). 
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Even if the notes are not formally negotiable, the UCC 
contemplates that in appropriate circumstances, such as when 
indicated by custom and usage, the notes should still be governed by 
Article 3.55 For the purposes of this Article, there is no need to resolve 
the question of whether the notes are in fact negotiable. Instead, it is 
merely enough to observe that this is yet another point on which 
there is a real question about what law applies and how an enormous 
market rests on legally uncertain underpinnings. The following 
analysis treats the notes as negotiable. 
2. UCC Article 3 as a Note Transfer System.  UCC Article 3 
provides a method for transferring negotiable instruments.56 Transfer 
of a negotiable instrument under Article 3 occurs through delivery of 
the instrument to the transferee “for the purpose of giving to the 
person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.”57 Thus, 
for negotiable instruments, transfer is about enforcement rights. 
Indeed, absent enforcement rights, there is very little value in 
possessing a promissory note (negotiable or otherwise); a note that is 
“payable to Donald Trump” is of little use to me. 
A transfer under Article 3 requires delivery.58 Delivery requires a 
voluntary transfer of physical possession.59 Article 3 requires physical 
movement of paper as part of a note transfer.60 The logic for this 
requirement is discussed in the following Section. Some transfers of 
notes are “negotiations,” meaning a transfer of an instrument by 
someone other than its maker to someone who then becomes a 
 
 55. Official Comment 2 to UCC section 3-104 notes: 
[I]t may be appropriate, consistent with the principles stated in Section 1-102(2), for a 
court to apply one or more provisions of Article 3 to the writing by analogy, taking 
into account the expectations of the parties and the differences between the writing 
and an instrument governed by Article 3.  
U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 2 (2011). UCC Section 1-103(a)(2) explains that among the purposes and 
policies of the UCC is “to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through 
custom, usage, and agreement of the parties.” Accordingly, even if a mortgage note does not fit 
the statutory definition of a negotiable instrument, it may still be appropriate to apply Article 3 
to the note because such notes are considered negotiable by custom and usage. If the note is not 
negotiable and Article 3 is not applied by analogy, then the note would be governed by the 
common law of contracts.  
 56. Id. §§ 3-201, 3-203. 
 57. Id. § 3-203(a).  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. § 1-201(15).  
 60. Id. § 3-203(a). 
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“holder.”61 To be a holder, a person must possess an instrument 
payable to either bearer or to himself.62 This means that holder status 
depends in part on to whom the instrument is payable. 
If an instrument is payable to bearer, delivery alone will suffice 
for a negotiation.63 If an instrument is payable to (or to the order of) 
an identified person, however, then the negotiation requires not just 
delivery, but also indorsement by the prior holder.64 An indorsement 
is a signature on the instrument or on a piece of paper affixed to the 
instrument (known as an allonge).65 If the indorsement identifies a 
particular party to whom the instrument is payable, it is called a 
“special indorsement.”66 Any other type of indorsement by the holder 
is called a “blank indorsement.”67 The indorsement need not have a 
blank in it, such as “pay to _____” or “pay to the order of ______.” 
Indeed, the indorser’s signature alone constitutes a blank 
indorsement. A blank indorsement transforms the instrument into 
bearer paper—an instrument that is payable to the bearer—similar to 
cash.68 Either way, indorsement gives the transferee all of the 
transferor’s rights to enforce the instrument.69 
The standard rule in contract and property law is that transferees 
take only those rights that the transferor had—meaning that the 
transferee is subject to any claims or defenses that could have been 
raised against the transferor.70 Negotiability is a deviation from this 
rule, enabling certain transferees to take title superior to that of the 
transferors. This special type of transferee is the “holder in due 
course,” a holder of an instrument who has taken the instrument in 
good faith, for value, and without notice of default or defect in the 
instrument.71 A holder in due course is immune from competing 
claims to the instrument,72 from claims in recoupment,73 and from 
 
 61. Id. § 3-201(a).  
 62. Id. § 1-201(21)(A). 
 63. Id. § 3-201(b). 
 64. Id. § 3-201(b); see id. § 1-201(21)(B) (defining “holder”).  
 65. Id. § 3-204(a).  
 66. Id. § 3-205(a). 
 67. Id. § 3-205(b).  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. § 3-203(b). 
 70. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1981); 6A C.J.S. 
Assignments § 124 (2004). 
 71. U.C.C. § 3-302(a). 
 72. Id. § 3-306.  
 73. Id. §§ 3-305(a)(3), 3-305(b). 
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defenses to enforcement other than infancy, duress, lack of capacity, 
illegality, fraud in the inducement, and insolvency discharge.74 Thus, 
the holder in due course has particularly secure property rights: 
freedom from claims to the instrument and freedom from some 
defenses, thereby enabling easier enforcement of the property rights. 
The ability of a purchaser of a negotiable note to become a 
holder in due course significantly enhances the liquidity and hence 
the value of the instrument. Because a holder in due course is 
immune from some defenses, counterclaims, and competing claims, 
much less diligence is required of a purchaser of a negotiable note. 
Holder-in-due-course status is used to shield mortgage investors from 
assignee liability in the secondary mortgage market,75 which has 
encouraged the funding of more aggressive mortgage lending.76 
3. UCC Article 3 as a Note Title System.  UCC Article 3 functions 
not only as a transfer system, but also as a title system for negotiable 
notes, even though it is seldom conceived of as such.  Article 3 is not 
expressly a title system. Indeed, the operative concept in Article 3 is 
not ownership, but enforcement rights.77 The main rights given by 
UCC Article 3 are to a “person entitled to enforce” an instrument,78 
not to an “owner.”79 A person entitled to enforce is: (1) a holder of an 
instrument, (2) a nonholder in possession with rights of a holder, or 
(3) a person not in possession who is entitled to enforce the 
instrument pursuant to Article 3’s lost-instrument provisions.80 
The first category of person entitled to enforce, a holder, 
requires physical possession of the instrument, which must be payable 
 
 74. Id. §§ 3-305(a)(1)–(2), 3-305(b). 
 75. See generally Naimon et al., supra note 54.  
 76. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 2, at 234–35; Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: 
Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 503, 507 (2002); Christopher Lewis Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2185, 2233–34 (2007).  
 77. The terminology of “title” was used in the original 1951 version of Article 3, which is 
still in force in New York. See N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-417 (McKinney 2013) (warranty of “good 
title” to transferees and payors).  
 78. U.C.C. § 3-301.  
 79. Property law has long recognized that property is a “bundle of rights” that can be 
disaggregated, with enforcement rights as but one of the sticks in the bundle. See Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE 
L.J. 710, 746 (1917) (“‘[P]roperty’ . . . consists of a complex aggregate of rights (or claims), 
privileges, powers, and immunities.”). 
 80. See U.C.C. § 3-301 (referencing sections 3-309 and 3-418(d)).  
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either to the bearer or to the possessor.81 The second category is a 
narrow class of parties subrogated to the rights of a holder, such as an 
insurer.82 It too requires possession of the instrument and carries with 
it the absolute right to require the transferor to indorse the 
instrument to the possessor or in blank.83 The final category, a person 
seeking to enforce a lost instrument, obviously does not require 
current possession of the instrument. But it does require proving that 
the party was otherwise a person entitled to enforce before the 
instrument was lost84—by proving possession upstream in the chain of 
title—as well as proving the terms of the instrument.85 Thus, 
irrespective of how a party qualifies as a person entitled to enforce, it 
is necessary to prove both possession and that the instrument is either 
bearer paper or payable to the order of the party seeking 
enforcement.86 In other words, enforcement rights are contingent 
upon title rights. 
To appreciate how Article 3 functions as a title system, it is 
necessary to consider a key feature of negotiable instruments: under 
the doctrine of merger, the instrument is the reification of the 
payment obligation. This means the physical piece of paper is the 
claim itself, as the duty to pay is merged in the instrument,87 whereas 
 
 81. Id. § 1-201(21). The concept of “person entitled to enforce” is a form of statutory 
standing that predates federal standing doctrine. See generally Ann Woolhandler & Caleb 
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004) (discussing the 
origins of federal standing doctrine). Constitutional and prudential standing may involve 
separate analyses. See Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (“Even 
when a case falls within . . . constitutional boundaries, a plaintiff still may lack standing under . . 
. prudential principles . . . .”). 
 82. See U.C.C. § 3-301 cmt. (“A nonholder in possession of an instrument includes a person 
that acquired rights of a holder by subrogation or under Section 3-203(a).”). 
 83. See id. § 3-203(c) (“[I]f an instrument is transferred for value and the transferee does 
not become a holder because of lack of indorsement by the transferor, the transferee has a 
specifically enforceable right to the unqualified indorsement of the transferor . . . .”).  
 84. See U.C.C. § 3-309(a)(i) (1990). In the 2002 Official Text of Article 3, which has been 
adopted in ten states as of 2012, see PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL 
CODE, supra note 15, at 2 n.6, the lost-note provision has been expanded to cover parties that 
purchased a note from a person entitled to enforce who had lost the instrument, see U.C.C. § 3-
309(a)(1)(B) (2002).  
 85. U.C.C. § 3-309(b) (2011). Query how one can determine whether a lost note was in fact 
negotiable and whether UCC Article 3 therefore even applies.  
 86. Or, technically, that the person entitled to enforce that is not a holder has the right to 
have the instrument indorsed to be payable to it. See id. § 3-203(c) (“[T]he transferee has a 
specifically enforceable right to the unqualified indorsement of the transferor, but the 
negotiation of the instrument does not occur until the indorsement is made.”).  
 87. Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 441, 449 (1979); see U.C.C. § 3-203 cmt. 1 (“An instrument is a reified right to payment. 
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with a nonnegotiable instrument, the writing is merely a 
memorialization of the contract with no more than an evidentiary 
effect. 
The merger doctrine’s origins lie in the original function of 
negotiable-instrument law—monetizing debt instruments in 
economies that lacked paper currency.88 By creating an instrument 
that could be taken free of claims and personal defenses, negotiable-
instrument law created a private form of paper currency. In so doing, 
the merger doctrine transformed intangible contract rights into a 
peculiar form of personality. 
As atavistic as reification may seem, it can actually enhance 
economic activity. Reification turns negotiable instruments into liquid 
assets by enabling some level of freedom from claims and defenses 
for all holders (not just those in due course), and it encourages 
borrowing by eliminating the risk of multiple satisfactions. 
Reification enables the terms of the instrument to be determined 
by looking at the four corners of the instrument. “My face is my 
fortune, Sir,” quipped Professor Karl Llewellyn.89 Indeed, the 
statutory definition of negotiable instrument requires an 
unconditional promise to pay a sum certain and prohibits additional 
undertakings.90 Reification functions like an integration clause, 
keeping out parol evidence, thereby eliminating some possible 
defenses to enforcement. The result is to reduce diligence demands 
 
The right is represented by the instrument itself.”); id. § 3-310(b) (providing that when a note is 
given for an obligation, “the obligation is suspended to the same extent the obligation would be 
discharged if an amount of money equal to the amount of the instrument were taken,” and that 
if a person entitled to enforce an instrument ceases to have possession of the instrument, “the 
obligation may not be enforced to the extent of the amount payable on the instrument”). The 
merger doctrine is, of course, a fiction because an action can still be brought on a lost or 
destroyed instrument. Id. §§ 3-309, 3-312(b) (permitting enforcement of a lost or destroyed 
instrument if the terms of the instrument can be proven). If the debt were truly merged into the 
instrument, it would be definitively discharged with the destruction of the instrument.  
 88. See Cohen, supra note 39, at 182 (explaining that the merger doctrine “is designed for a 
day in which pieces of paper that were not money passed in commerce as sort of a quasi-
currency”); see also Gilmore, supra note 87, at 448–50 (discussing the origins of the merger 
doctrine). National paper currencies are a relatively new invention. The United States lacked a 
national paper currency until the 1862 issuance of “Greenbacks” as a Civil War financing 
mechanism. See Ali Khan, The Evolution of Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 67 
U. CIN. L. REV. 393, 424–26 (1999). Prior to the adoption of Greenbacks and then national bank 
notes during the Civil War, paper currency consisted of private, negotiable bank notes. See id. at 
410–13.  
 89. Karl N. Llewellyn, Meet Negotiable Instruments, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 299 (1944). 
 90. U.C.C. § 3-104.  
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on purchasers of negotiable instruments91 and to ease enforcement of 
the instrument. Instead of having to prove the underlying contract, 
the party enforcing the instrument need only show that the 
instrument has been dishonored.92 If the party enforcing the 
instrument is a holder in due course, enforcement is even easier 
because personal defenses are cut off.93 Irrespective of holder-in-due-
course status, however, reification enhances enforcement rights. 
Reification also enhances security of property rights from 
competing claims. Reification enables title via possession (if the note 
is payable to the bearer94), and possession clarifies title because there 
can be only one possessor at a time.95 Reification also enables transfer 
by indorsement. Indorsement creates a chain of title that travels with 
the instrument and provides an easy, objective manner for 
establishing who has rights to the instrument. The two faces of the 
instrument itself will indicate who has rights in it based on the 
presence (or absence) of indorsements. Thus, to Llewellyn’s “[m]y 
face is my fortune, Sir,” we might add, “and my past is behind me.” 
Clarity of title is furthered by the fact that a holder in due course—
requiring, inter alia, indorsement and possession—takes the 
instrument free of competing claims.96 
By enhancing freedom from defenses and freedom from claims, 
reification increases the liquidity, and hence the value, of negotiable 
instruments. The negotiable instrument is thus “a courier without 
luggage.”97 Increased liquidity may benefit both creditors and 
obligors. Creditors gain an easy-to-enforce, liquid asset. Depending 
on market power, obligors might capture some of this benefit, as 
 
 91. See Adam J. Levitin, Finding Nemo: Rediscovering the Virtues of Negotiability in the 
Wake of Enron, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 83, 100 (2007) (observing that negotiable-debt 
purchasers “do not have to worry about whether there are defenses to the debt beyond those 
involving the legitimacy of the instrument”); see also Edward J. Janger, The Cost of Liquidity 
Enhancement: Transparency Cost, Risk Alteration, and Coordination Problems, 4 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 39, 46 (2009) (“The core doctrines of liquidity enhancement, freedom 
from claims and freedom from defenses . . . facilitate negotiability . . . .”). 
 92. See U.C.C. § 3-308(b) (“If the validity of signatures is admitted [which is assumed 
unless specifically denied] or proved . . . a plaintiff producing the instrument is entitled to 
payment if the plaintiff proves entitlement to enforce the instrument . . . unless the defendant 
proves a defense or claim in recoupment.”); id. § 3-308 cmt. 2.  
 93. Id. § 3-305(b).  
 94. Id. § 3-109(a). 
 95. Rogers, supra note 39, at 205.  
 96. U.C.C. § 3-306; see Cohen, supra note 39, at 179–80. 
 97. Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846). 
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there could be a discount in lending terms for the use of a negotiable 
instrument because of the liquidity benefit to the creditor. 
A final, unappreciated benefit of reification is that it protects 
debtors from multiple satisfactions. Payment made to any person 
entitled to enforce discharges the instrument.98 Historically, the UCC 
and the Negotiable Instruments Law before it sometimes required 
presentment—an actual demand for payment when the note became 
due—as part of the enforcement process.99 The requirement of 
presentment, like most UCC terms, was only a default rule, however; 
it could be altered by agreement.100 Although presentment is no 
longer the default rule for most notes in the jurisdictions that adopted 
the 1991 revision of UCC Article 3,101 it is still the default rule in New 
York.102 When presentment is required as part of enforcement, the 
party to whom presentment is made may require exhibition of the 
instrument, identification of the person making presentment, and 
evidence of that person’s authority if acting as an agent, as well as a 
signed receipt for payment and surrender of the instrument upon full 
payment.103 
By embodying the obligation in the instrument, the exchange of 
the instrument for final payment is made, and the instrument’s 
subsequent destruction or cancellation helps shield against multiple 
satisfactions of the debt. Avoidance of multiple satisfactions is so 
fundamental to developed economies that it is taken for granted. 
Elimination of multiple-satisfaction risk, however, is a major factor 
separating developed and developing credit economies.104 In the 
 
 98. U.C.C. §§ 3-603(b)–(c).  
 99. U.C.C. § 3-501 (1951); Negotiable Instruments Law § 145 (1905). The former UCC 
section 3-501 is still in force in New York, N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-501 (McKinney 2013), and 
South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 36-3-501 (Supp. 2012).  
 100. U.C.C. § 1-302 (2001); U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1991); see also U.C.C. § 3-502 cmt. 2 (2011) 
(“In the great majority of cases presentment and notice of dishonor are waived with respect to 
notes.”). 
 101. See U.C.C. § 3-502(a) (2011) (noting that presentment is not required for notes that are 
not payable on demand or at or through a bank, or if the terms of the note do not require 
presentment).  
 102. N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-505. Presentment and notice of dishonor may still be waived 
contractually under New York law. Id. § 1-102(3). The Freddie Mac Single Family Uniform 
Note (including the New York version) contains such a waiver. FREDDIE MAC, FORM 3233: 
NEW YORK FIXED RATE NOTE para. 9 (2013), available at http://www.freddiemac.
com/uniform/doc/3233-NewYorkFRNote.doc.  
 103. N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-505; U.C.C. § 3-501(b)(2). 
 104. See Catherine S.M. Duggan, Credit and Coercion: Indirect Regulation and the 
Institutional Foundations of Lending Markets 46–50 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
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absence of legal records that can be relied upon to show that a debt 
has been satisfied, creditors will often seek multiple satisfactions of 
debt. If a debtor fears multiple satisfaction of the same debt, the 
debtor will not borrow, thereby chilling economic activity.105 Making 
the physical instrument the avatar of the payment obligation not only 
provides a system of tracking functional title in terms of freedom 
from claims. It also enables verification of the terms of the obligation 
and hence greater ability to enforce as well as provide a mechanism 
for verifying the discharge of the obligation. 
4. UCC Article 3 as a Mortgage Title-and-Transfer System.  UCC 
Article 3 says nothing about mortgages associated with notes. Instead, 
whether the transfer of the note has any effect on the mortgage is a 
question of state common law. In most states there is at least some 
statement in case law to the effect that “the mortgage follows the 
note,”106 but few states have this as a definitive point of law either in 
case law or statute.107 In most states, it exists merely as dicta,108 and in 
some states there is also law that the “note follows the mortgage.”109  
Nonetheless, the “mortgage follows the note” principle was 
incorporated into the Restatement (Third) of Property, which 
provides that “[a] transfer of an obligation secured by a mortgage also 
transfers the mortgage unless the parties to the transfer agree 
otherwise.”110 If the mortgage does indeed follow the note, then 
 
Duke Law Journal) (presenting a game-theoretic model of lending in which the lender pursues 
the borrower after payment and empirical evidence of this model).  
 105. Id. at 175–92.  
 106. See AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM, TRANSFER AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESIDENTIAL 
MORTGAGE LOANS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 16–21 (2010), available at 
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedfiles/asf_white_paper_11_16_10.pdf (detailing 
cases and statutory provisions relating to the mortgage-follows-the-note doctrine); see also 55 
AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 927 (2009) (“The mortgage follows the debt, in the sense that the 
assignment of the note evidencing the debt automatically carries with it the assignment of the 
mortgage.”).  
 107. An important exception is California. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2936 (West 2012) (“The 
assignment of a debt secured by mortgage carries with it the security.”). 
 108. Likewise, the ongoing validity of the Supreme Court decision in Carpenter v. Longan, 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271 (1872), is questionable, as it was decided as a matter of general federal 
common law, which was disavowed by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938). See 
Carpenter, 83 U.S. at 277 (“We think the doctrine we have laid down is sustained by reason, 
principle, and the greater weight of authority.”).  
 109. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. McConnell, 305 P.3d 1, 6 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (“In 
Kansas, it has been the law since 1899 that the note follows the mortgage.”).  
 110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4(a) (1997). Confusingly, section 
5.4(b) states that “[e]xcept as otherwise required by the Uniform Commercial Code, a transfer 
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Article 3 also functions as a mortgage title-and-transfer system. The 
title to the mortgage would track the title to the note, and transfers of 
the note would effectuate transfers of the mortgage. 
Significantly, Article 3 says nothing about the enforceability of 
mortgages. The “mortgage follows the note” concept would seem to 
be about ownership rather than physical possession. Thus, although 
possession of a note may confer the right to enforce the note, it is not 
clear whether it also confers the right to foreclose on the associated 
mortgage. As Article 3 does not address the enforceability of 
mortgages, mortgage enforceability would presumably be a matter of 
nonuniform state law and likely keyed to “ownership” of either the 
mortgage or the note, rather than physical possession of the note. 
B. Land Recordation Systems 
UCC Article 3 is not just a title-and-transfer system for notes, 
but also for mortgages. The problem is that it is not clearly an 
exclusive title-and-transfer system for mortgages because mortgages 
are also governed by real-property law. Real-property law is far from 
uniform, so the following discussion is necessarily generalized, but the 
basic legal contours of real-property law are clear. 
A mortgage is an estate in real property—if the payment 
obligation secured by the mortgage is not made, the mortgagee may 
sell the property to satisfy the obligation. States are split on whether 
the granting of a mortgage is to be understood as creating a present 
or contingent estate in real property.111 States that take the former 
view are called title-theory states, while states that adopt the latter 
view are lien-theory states.112 In a title-theory state, a mortgage (or 
deed of trust) is seen as a sale and repurchase arrangement: title to 
the land is presently conveyed to the mortgagee or deed-of-trust 
trustee and is then reconveyed to the mortgagor upon satisfaction of 
 
of a mortgage also transfers the obligation the mortgage secures unless the parties to the 
transfer agree otherwise.” Id. § 5.4(b). Thus, as the Restatement would have it, the mortgage 
follows the note, but the note also follows the mortgage. It is not clear how this principle fits 
with three-party, deed-of-trust arrangements in which the note goes to the lender, but the trust 
deed goes to the deed trustee, effectuating a split of the mortgage and note.  
 111. See id. § 1.1 (“A mortgage is a conveyance or retention of an interest in real property as 
security for performance of an obligation.”); REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 3.10 (2013), available 
at LexisNexis, 4A-3 Real Estate Financing § 3.10 (listing states by theory adopted). 
 112. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 cmt. a (describing the three 
types of theories of mortgage law recognized by U.S. courts). 
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the debt or sold upon default.113 In a lien-theory state, a mortgage is a 
contingent conveyance, triggered only by default on the loan.114 
Because a mortgage is understood as a conveyance of a present 
estate in real property in a title-theory state, it follows that the 
granting and transfer of mortgages must comply with the formalities 
of land conveyance.115 This may include the requirement of a writing 
to comply with the state Statute of Frauds, and other formalities, such 
as the signature of the conveyor, the signature of witnesses, and 
particular methods of describing the transferred property. Even in 
lien-theory states, however, various formalities may still be required 
for the granting and transfer of mortgages. Thus, land records are 
another type of public demonstration regime for establishing property 
rights. 
Among the formalities associated with land conveyance is 
recordation. Every state has a real-property recordation statute.116 
Recordation of title to real property is not mandatory, as recordation 
itself does not establish title to land. Moreover, it is not recordation 
that creates the right to foreclose, but the security instrument itself. 
Presumably the recordation of a defective security instrument that 
did not include a right to foreclose would not create a right to 
foreclose upon default. Recordation by itself only establishes 
evidence of title and potentially priority of rights vis-à-vis competing 
claimants to the property.117 
 
 113. See id. § 4.1 cmt. a(1).  
 114. See id. § 4.1 cmt. a(2) (“Under [lien] theory, the mortgagee acquires only a ‘lien’ on the 
mortgaged real estate and the mortgagor retains both legal and equitable title and the right to 
possession until foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure.”). 
 115. See 4 RICHARD R. POWELL ET AL., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.27, at 37-177 to 
-178 (2010) (“Because mortgages involve an interest in land, the usual formalities for 
transferring property interests must be met. . . . As with other transactions involving real estate, 
it is always important to record the document creating the real estate interest—in this case the 
assignment.”); see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass. 2011) (“Like a 
sale of land itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in land that 
requires a writing signed by the grantor.”).  
 116. See 14 RICHARD R. POWELL ET AL., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.02[1][b] (2012), 
at 82-15 to -17.  
 117. Cf. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS 
APPROACH 426 (7th ed. 2012) (noting that a certificate of title “is prima facie evidence of 
ownership, but if ownership is with a person other than the person shown on the certificate, the 
certificate is no impediment to proof of that fact”). 
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Property is recorded in county land records. Every county or 
parish in the United States has a real-estate recordation system.118 The 
precise details and operations of these local land records vary, but, in 
most cases, title to land can be determined by a search of local land 
records. 
Local land records also track various encumbrances on land, 
such as easements or liens, but only to the extent that these 
encumbrances have been recorded.119 Most states do not require 
mortgage liens to be recorded in local land records,120 but there are 
exceptions.121 Similarly, statutory liens, such as state tax liens and 
construction liens, are not always recorded. 
Accordingly, mortgage recording is not meant to be a title system 
for mortgages per se. Instead, it is meant to be a notice and a priority 
system, providing potential lenders with information about whether a 
property is encumbered and then ranking competing encumbrances. 
Yet, by serving as a priority system, mortgage recording is a de facto 
title system for mortgages. Compliance with the formalities of 
recording vests the mortgagee with superior rights and locks in the 
mortgage’s priority vis-à-vis competing liens. Lack of recording 
makes a mortgagee vulnerable to becoming subordinated to a 
subsequent recorded mortgage, thereby reducing the value of the 
 
 118. Several states also have additional, nonmandatory Torrens registration systems, usually 
at the state level, which register actual title rather than recording documentary evidence of title. 
See R.G. Patton, The Torrens System of Land Title Registration, 19 MINN. L. REV. 519, 524 
(1934). In a Torrens system, the state investigates title. If satisfied after the investigation, the 
state registers title. Registered owners have indefeasible title. The state provides 
indemnification for any legitimate claimant to superior title, but only monetary relief is possible; 
the property remains with the registered owner. Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, The 
Economics of Land Transfer and Title Insurance, 10 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 81, 81–82 (1995) 
(noting that Torrens systems establish public funds to compensate legitimate claimants to 
registered land who emerge after registration). In a Torrens system, transfer of title is effective 
only upon registration of the transfer.  
 119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 2.1, 5.1 (2000).  
 120. See, e.g., Nevada ex rel. Bates v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 493 F. App’x 872, 
874 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that there is no duty to record a mortgage in Nevada).  
 121. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 44-2-1 (2010) (“Every deed conveying lands shall be 
recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county where the land is located.” 
(emphasis added)); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 765 5/28 (West 2001) (“Deeds, mortgages, powers of 
attorney, and other instruments relating to or affecting the title to real estate in this state, shall 
be recorded in the county in which such real estate is situated . . . .” (emphasis added)); 
Montgomery Cnty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 436, 445 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (holding that 
the “shall be recorded” language in the Pennsylvania recording statute, 21 PA. STAT. ANN. § 351 
(West 2001), requires all real-estate conveyances, including assignments of mortgages, to be 
recorded). 
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unrecorded mortgage. Moreover, lack of recording makes a 
mortgagee vulnerable to having the lien voided because a subsequent 
bona fide purchaser will take the property without being subject to 
the unrecorded lien.122 Lack of recording also makes a mortgage 
vulnerable to being avoided by a trustee in the mortgagor’s 
bankruptcy.123 Priority ultimately means freedom from competing 
claims and security in the property rights. 
Recording may also vest the mortgagee with enhanced 
enforcement rights. Although an unrecorded mortgage is generally 
enforceable against the mortgagor,124 in some states, nonjudicial 
foreclosure—usually a faster and cheaper procedure than judicial 
foreclosure—is only available for recorded mortgages.125 Being able to 
proceed through nonjudicial foreclosure might be analogized to 
freedom from some defenses because defenses are not raised in the 
nonjudicial setting, but only in litigation brought by the homeowner 
to stop or invalidate the nonjudicial foreclosure, in which the burdens 
of persuasion might be different. 
Therefore, there is a strong incentive for a mortgagee to record 
the mortgage in the local land records. This situation is analogous to 
the choice between using a negotiable or nonnegotiable promissory 
note. Neither negotiability nor recording is required, but both confer 
greater legal rights and require greater—and costlier—formalities. 
Nonetheless, because recording is generally not mandatory, land 
records are an incomplete mortgage title system. 
Still, if a mortgage is recorded, then the land records start to 
serve as a title system for that mortgage. Evidence of a transfer of a 
recorded mortgage is created by filing the appropriate notice of 
assignment in the local land records. Typically such an assignment 
 
 122. See Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 
1057, 1083 n.88 (1954) (discussing cases in which a “bona fide purchaser of note and mortgage 
would lose to a bona fide purchaser of the property whenever the mortgage was not recorded”).  
 123. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2012).  
 124. See 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 924 (2009) (“The assignment of a note and mortgage 
does not need to be recorded to be valid.”).  
 125. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2932.5 (West 2012) (“The power of sale may be exercised by 
the assignee if the assignment is duly acknowledged and recorded.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-
162(b) (Supp. 2013) (providing that the security instrument vests the secured creditor with title 
to the security instrument); NEV. REV. STAT. § 106.210(1) (LexisNexis 2013) (“A mortgage of 
real property . . . which has been assigned may not be enforced unless and until the assignment 
is recorded.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735 (2011) (“[T]he trustee may foreclose a trust deed by 
advertisement and sale if . . . there is a default by the grantor . . . and the trustee or beneficiary 
has filed for record in the country clerk’s office . . . .”).  
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requires paying a fee to the county; absent payment of the fee, the 
transfer will not be recorded. Although it is still possible to have an 
unrecorded assignment, the rights of such an assignee are possibly 
inferior to those of a subsequent recorded lienholder or purchaser.126 
The mortgage will remain in the county land records until such time 
as a release of the lien is filed. The release can be filed only by the 
record holder of the mortgage; an unrecorded transferee of a 
mortgage cannot release a recorded lien. Thus, a typical title search as 
part of a real-estate closing will involve a search only for recorded 
mortgages and recorded assignments, as well as recorded releases. 
C. The Uneasy Coexistence of UCC Article 3 and Land Records 
The UCC Article 3 and land record systems emerged and 
remained separate for path-dependent reasons: negotiable-instrument 
law as a means of monetizing debts127 and land records as a means of 
clarifying title to land.128 Neither was primarily designed as a mortgage 
title system. But, because both serve as de facto title systems for 
mortgages, they can potentially produce conflicting title: the 
mortgagee of record may not match with the holder of the note. Few 
states have clear law on how this conflict is to be resolved, 
particularly in regards to who can foreclose. 
Despite the potential tension between the note and land records 
systems for mortgage title, the systems worked together with little 
incident for over a century. Historically, the potential title-system 
conflict rarely mattered because the systems typically matched and 
transfers of either notes or mortgages were relatively rare. When a 
conflict did exist, it was unlikely to be an issue except in the unusual 
event of a foreclosure. Foreclosures were fairly rare, however, prior 
to the bursting of the housing bubble,129 and most foreclosures were 
default judgments.130 Usually there was no question that a payment 
 
 126. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 183, § 5 (2011) (providing that purchasers without 
notice may rely conclusively on real-estate records). 
 127. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text.  
 129. See MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY (2010) (indicating 
foreclosure rates of 2 percent or less in terms of the number of outstanding mortgages from 1979 
until 2007).  
 130. Statistics on default judgment rates are hard to come by, but a 2008 New York State 
Unified Court System study states that default judgments occur in approximately 90 percent of 
foreclosure cases. JUDITH S. KAYE & ANN PFAU, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: 
PROMOTING EARLY COURT INTERVENTION 1 (2008), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/
whatsnew/pdf/ResidentialForeclosure6-08.pdf. 
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default had occurred, and cultural norms dissuaded shamed 
borrowers from litigating based on “technicalities.” In the unlikely 
event a borrower did litigate, settlement was feasible for institutional 
lenders because it would be a one-off occurrence. All of this changed, 
however, as mortgage finance shifted from balance-sheet lending to 
securitization. 
II.  THE SHIFT IN MORTGAGE FINANCING TO SECURITIZATION 
Securitization is a relatively recent development in residential 
mortgage lending.131 Residential mortgages began to be securitized in 
1970,132 but securitization remained a relatively small part of 
American housing finance prior to the 1980s.133 In 1979 only 10 
percent of outstanding mortgages by dollar amount were 
securitized.134 Instead, mortgage lending was primarily a local affair 
conducted through depositaries’ balance sheets,135 so mortgage loans 
were rarely transferred. 
The S&L crisis, however, made clear that depositaries were ill-
suited to manage the asset-liability-duration mismatch risk posed by 
financing long-term, fixed-rate loans through deposits. As a result, 
securitization boomed.136 By 1983, 20 percent of outstanding 
mortgages by dollar amount were securitized, and a decade later fully 
 
 131. There have been several earlier episodes of quasi-securitization financing for farm and 
commercial mortgage loans in U.S. history going back to the 1870s. See Kenneth Snowden, 
Mortgage Securitization in the United States: Twentieth Century Developments in Historical 
Perspective, in ANGLO-AMERICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 261, 274–75 (Michael D. Bordo & 
Richard Sylla eds., 1996) (“[T]he first group of banks financed western city building in the 
1870s, the second provided mortgage credit for agricultural settlement in the Great Plains 
during the 1880s, and the last helped fuel agricultural expansion during and immediately after 
World War I.”). 
 132. See Jonathan Tower, Ginnie Mae Pool No. 1: A Revolution Is Paid Off, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999, at F1 (noting that the sale of the first mortgage-backed security (MBS) 
was in February 1970). Although Fannie Mae has existed since 1938, it did not engage in 
securitization until 1981. Instead, it held mortgages it purchased on a balance sheet and financed 
them through the issuance of corporate debt.  
 133. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 
1177, 1188–89 (2012). 
 134. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE 
STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, 
BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS HISTORICAL ANNUAL 
TABLES 1975–1984, tbl.L.218 (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/
Current/annuals/a1975-1984.pdf (the sum of lines 19 and 20 divided by line 1).  
 135. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance, 46 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1111, 1120–21 (2013). 
 136. Id. at 1165. 
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half of outstanding mortgages by dollar amount were securitized.137 
Today nearly two-thirds of mortgage dollars outstanding are 
securitized.138 
The transformation of the mortgage market from a balance-sheet 
lending market to a securitization market had important implications 
for the documentation of mortgage transfers. Securitizations are 
financing transactions structured as sales. Therefore, securitizations 
require loans to be transferred, often multiple times. Residential 
mortgage securitization also involves a scalar change in mortgage 
transfers. Instead of loans being transferred one at a time, thousands 
are transferred en masse. 
The critical feature of securitization is that it involves the 
issuance of debt obligations against a pool of assets that have been 
segregated from the other assets and liabilities of the securitizer. The 
assets are segregated through a sale to a specially created, legally 
separate entity that issues the debt. The reason for the asset 
segregation is to enable debt obligations to be priced solely on the 
quality of the segregated assets rather than on the total picture of a 
firm’s assets and liabilities. When a firm issues debt, the debt is priced 
based on the debt’s claim to the firm’s assets, which means that it 
would be priced based on the total picture of the firm’s assets and 
liabilities: What assets does the firm have, and what are the 
competing claims (liabilities) to the assets? 
A firm can raise funds on potentially more advantageous terms if 
it can borrow solely against its assets, not its assets and liabilities. 
Securitization enabled such borrowing. To do so, a firm sells assets to 
a legally separate, specially created entity. The legally separate entity 
pays for the assets by issuing debt. Because the entity is designed to 
have almost no other liabilities, the debt it issues will be priced simply 
on the quality of the transferred assets, without any concern about 
competing claims to those assets.139 Therefore, ensuring that the assets 
are transferred and are free of competing claims is central to 
securitization. 
Although residential-mortgage securitization transactions are 
complex and vary somewhat depending on the type of entity 
undertaking the securitization, there is still a core standard 
 
 137. Id. at 1155. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 23–30 (1996) (noting the 
use of asset securitization to shield the transferor, rather than the transferee, from claims). 
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transaction.140 First, a financial institution (the “sponsor” or “seller”) 
assembles a pool of mortgage loans either made (“originated”) by an 
affiliate of the financial institution or purchased from unaffiliated 
third-party originators.141 Second, the pool of loans is sold by the 
sponsor to a special-purpose subsidiary (the “depositor”) that has no 
other assets or liabilities and is little more than a legal entity with a 
mailbox. This is done to segregate the loans from the sponsor’s assets 
and liabilities.142 Third, the depositor sells the loans to a passive, 
specially created, single-purpose vehicle (SPV), typically a trust in the 
case of residential-mortgage securitization. The trustee will then 
typically convey the mortgage notes and security instruments to a 
document custodian for safekeeping. The SPV issues certificated debt 
securities to raise the funds to pay for the loans.143 As these debt 
securities are backed by the cash flow from the mortgages, they are 
called mortgage-backed securities (MBS). 
A typical mortgage securitization thus has a set of transfers of 
both the notes and the mortgages from the originator to the seller to 
the depositor to the trust, with a bailment to the document custodian. 
We might think of this series of transfers as a sequence going from 
ABCD, as indicated in Figure 1, below. Bankruptcy, tax, 
accounting, and bank-regulatory-capital purposes mandate that each 
of these transfers be real and verifiable. If the transfer only goes 
directly from AD or from ABD, without the intermediary 
 
 140. The structure illustrated is for private-label MBS. Ginnie Mae and government-
sponsored enterprise (GSE) securitizations are structured somewhat differently.  
 141. The seller might itself be a special-purpose subsidiary of a holding company; for private 
label securitization, sellers were sometimes themselves special-purpose asset-backed 
commercial paper issuers, such as Countrywide’s Park Granada, Park Monaco, and Park Sienna 
entities. 
 142. This intermediate entity is not essential to securitization, but, since 2002, Statement of 
Financial Accountings Standards 140 has required this additional step for off-balance-sheet 
treatment because of the possibility that if the originator went bankrupt or into receivership, the 
securitization would be treated as a secured loan, rather than a sale, and the originator would 
exercise its equitable right of redemption to reclaim the securitized assets. ACCOUNTING FOR 
TRANSFER AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES, 
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000); 
Learning the Norwalk Two-Step, HEADS UP (Deloitte & Touche, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 25, 
2011, at 1, 1, available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/dt_headsup.pdf. Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 166, effective January 1, 2010, has largely mooted the issue 
of off-balance-sheet treatment in GSE securitizations. See generally ACCOUNTING FOR 
TRANSFERS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 166 (Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd. 2009). 
 143. The procedure works slightly differently in Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac 
securitizations, which are also known as “Agency” securitizations. 
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transfers to B or C, the transaction might not achieve the various 
bankruptcy,144 credit rating,145 tax,146 and accounting and bank-
regulatory-capital147 benefits that are vital to making securitization 
economically viable. Therefore, being able to provide clear evidence 
of the sequences of transfers from ABCD—that is, from the 
originator to the seller to the depositor to the trust—is critical for 
securitizations. 
  
 
 144. For securitizations, it is critical that the trust be bankruptcy remote, meaning that the 
trust’s assets are not affected by the bankruptcy of the depositor, seller, or originator. 
(Bankruptcy remote has a distinct second meaning, namely, that the trust itself cannot file for 
bankruptcy.) In other words, the segregated assets must be free of any claims competing with 
those of the trust. This is accomplished by making sure that the transfers are all “true sales,” so 
that the transferred assets cannot be claimed as property of the bankruptcy estate of the 
depositor, seller, or originator. See infra notes 226–37 and accompanying text.  
 145. Credit rating agencies are particularly concerned about true-sale treatment because of 
the bankruptcy remoteness issues discussed above, see supra note 144, and will not rate, absent a 
true-sale opinion letter.  
 146. Mortgage securitizations are structured for the securitization vehicle to achieve pass-
through tax status. Absent pass-through tax status, the securitization vehicle would be taxed on 
its income from the mortgage loans, and the MBS investors would be taxed on their income 
from the MBS. Two levels of taxation would make the economics of mortgage securitization 
unattractive. Therefore, MBS are typically structured to have pass-through status as either 
grantor trusts or Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMIC). Absent the transfer of 
the mortgages to the pass-through entity, however, there would be two levels of taxation. 
Moreover, REMIC rules require that transfers occur within a limited time period, see 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 860D(a)(3)–(4) (2006) (requiring substantially all assets of a REMIC to be qualified 
mortgages acquired within ninety days of the REMIC’s creation or other permitted 
investments); id. § 860G(a)(3) (defining “qualified mortgage”), or suffer tax penalties, see id. 
§ 860F(a) (imposing a 100 percent tax penalty on net income from prohibited transactions). As a 
result, MBS transactions are carefully designed to prohibit any activities that would jeopardize 
pass-through tax status, and tax opinion letters are used to instill confidence in the pass-through 
status.  
 147. Financial institutions are required to hold regulatory capital and reserve for losses 
against their assets. Regulatory-capital requirements follow from Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles. Sale treatment enables off-balance-sheet accounting treatment, which 
reduces regulatory capital, thereby enabling increased leverage and greater returns on equity, 
all else equal.  
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“private-label” MBS utilize a variety of credit enhancements to 
reduce credit risk, most importantly, senior-subordinate tranching, 
meaning that the MBS are issued in a senior-subordinate structure, 
with the senior MBS being repaid before the subordinate MBS.151 As 
a result, over 90 percent of private-label MBS are rated AAA at 
issuance,152 meaning that both default risk and loss-given-default are 
expected to be negligible. Accordingly, AAA-rated MBS are effective 
investment substitutes for Agency MBS, with comparable risks and 
returns. 
Investors in these AAA-rated, private-label MBS generally 
believed that they were assuming only interest-rate risk, not credit 
risk. Were it otherwise, they would have demanded higher yields than 
treasuries or Agency MBS, which could only be supported by higher 
interest-rate mortgages. Thus, to make securitization a competitive 
method of financing mortgages, it was necessary to convince most 
MBS investors that credit risk—meaning both the risk of competing 
claims and the risk of enforcement of the mortgages—had been 
neutralized. 
Securitization thus reproduces key features of both negotiability 
and mortgage recordation: freedom from claims and enhanced 
enforceability.153 Securitization replicates freedom from claims 
through the creation of a segregated asset pool that is free from the 
claims of creditors of the entity that created the pool. For investors in 
AAA-rated tranches, securitization also reproduces the effect of 
enforcement rights through credit enhancement. The AAA-investors 
can count on getting paid, irrespective of the defenses that can be 
raised to the mortgages or limitations on enforcements. Beyond this, 
securitization creates liquidity in the form of readily transferable 
securities (which may themselves be negotiable under UCC Article 
8). In short, securitization is “synthetic negotiability.” 
The quality of this synthetic negotiability varies depending on 
the level of credit enhancement, but significantly, it is achieved 
without requiring the demonstrative formalities of UCC Article 3 or 
 
implicitly backed by the U.S. government. For the technical workings of these different types of 
MBS, see Levitin & Wachter, supra note 135, at 1144–48, 1159–63.  
 151. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 133, at 1191–92 (detailing credit-enhancement 
structures in private-label MBS). 
 152. See Jie He, Jun Qian & Phillip E. Strahan, Credit Ratings and the Evolution of the 
Mortgage-Backed Securities Market, 101 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCS. 131, 133–34 (2011).  
 153. See Janger, supra note 91, at 41–43 (noting how securitization replicates key features of 
negotiability to enhance liquidity).  
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land recordation.154 For all MBS investors, however, freedom from 
claims is contingent upon being able to prove that the transfer of the 
mortgage loans to the trust was in fact a sale rather than a financing. 
The entire edifice of securitization depends upon being able to show 
that the transfers did in fact occur, which is a matter of mortgage title 
systems. 
III.  SECURITIZATION-ERA MORTGAGE TITLE SYSTEMS 
Public demonstration regimes like UCC Article 3 and land 
recordation fit well with a paper-based economy in which mortgage 
loans did not undergo repeated transfers. They are an uncomfortable 
fit, however, with the twenty-first-century shift in the medium of 
business from paper to electronic.155 Nor do they work well with 
securitization because securitization involves multiple mass transfers 
of assets—at a minimum from the originator to the seller to the 
depositor to the trust. Each separate transfer would require 
compliance with costly formalities in a public demonstration regime, 
including physical movements of paper. 
The securitization industry—meaning the financial institutions 
that package and sell MBS (the “sell-side”)—attempted to evolve out 
of the transaction costs created by public demonstration regimes 
through both private ordering and law reform. The securitization 
industry created a private mortgage registry known as the MERS as a 
means of moving most of its transactions out of the public land-
records system, thereby avoiding recordation fees. And through a 
little-noticed provision included as part of a major revision of 
Article 9 of the UCC, a new mechanism was created for transferring 
mortgage notes. Through the MERS and the UCC revision, the 
securitization industry created a pair of “contracting” regimes for 
mortgage title that substitute for the traditional public demonstration 
regimes. These contracting regimes did not reconcile the tension 
between title systems, and the financial crisis has begun to pull back 
the curtain on a dysfunctional market infrastructure. 
 
 154. See id.  
 155. See Cohen, supra note 39, at 162 (“The worlds of finance and commerce have changed 
dramatically [since the late eighteenth century], but the law of notes has been largely constant. 
This phenomenon—changing commercial practices governed by unchanging law—is the recipe 
for a commercial calamity.”). 
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A. MERS 
1. MERS Background.  MERS operates a private mortgage 
registry known as the MERS System.156 MERS was created in 1993 by 
the major sell-side players in the residential-mortgage market to 
provide an efficient electronic mortgage recording system that tracks 
ownership and servicing interests in mortgages without requiring 
recordation of transfers in local land records.157 The creation of 
MERS was driven by the demands of mortgage securitization.158 
MERS gained such widespread adoption that by 2007, it was 
estimated that 60 percent of mortgages outstanding were held in 
MERS’s name,159 roughly corresponding to the percentage of 
outstanding mortgage dollars that were securitized. 
MERS is a private, contractual superstructure that is grafted 
onto the public land-recordation system. Financial institutions that 
are members of MERS register the loans they service (but do not 
necessarily own) with the MERS System electronic database. Each 
loan receives a unique identifier known as a MERS Identification 
Number (MIN). The MIN is sometimes stamped on the note or 
sometimes simply recorded in the lender’s own records. MERS is 
then inserted in the local land records as the mortgagee, instead of 
the actual lender. Sometimes this involves an assignment of the 
mortgage from the lender to MERS, but the more prevalent 
arrangement has MERS recorded as the original mortgagee, thereby 
obviating any recordation of assignments. MERS serves as the 
mortgagee of record, but only as a nominee for the actual lender and 
supposedly for its successors and assigns.160 The language included in 
MERS mortgages is that MERS is acting “solely as nominee for 
Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.”161 MERS claims no 
beneficial interest whatsoever in the loan. 
 
 156. MERS is a subsidiary of MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., which is in turn owned by a 
consortium of financial institutions. About Us, MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/about-us/about-
us (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
 157. Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs., 826 F. Supp. 2d 352, 368 (D. Mass. 2011); David P. 
Weber, The Magic of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System: It Is and It Isn’t, 85 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 239, 239 (2011).  
 158. Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic Registration 
System’s Land Title Theory, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 111, 116 (2011). 
 159. Kate Berry, Foreclosures Turn up Heat on MERS, AM. BANKER (July 10, 2007, 1:00 
AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/172_135/-316827-1.html.  
 160. Peterson, supra note 158, at 118. 
 161. See Motion for Summary Judgment Exhibit B, supra note 53, at 3. 
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MERS’s goal is to immobilize mortgage title through a common-
agency structure by acting as nominee for the lender and those 
subsequent transferees of the lender that are members of MERS. 
Although legal title remains in MERS’s name, subsequent transfers 
are supposed to be tracked in MERS’s database. Thus, MERS aims to 
achieve the priority and enforcement benefits of public recordation 
while tracking beneficial ownership title in its own database. 
MERS’s operation has two important implications. First, instead 
of paying county recordation and transfer fees, financial institutions 
pay only for MERS membership and MERS transaction fees.162 
MERS thus offers potential cost savings in the securitization process 
through the avoidance of local recording fees. Second, MERS’s 
electronic database, not the county land records, represents the main 
evidentiary source for determining who is currently the real party in 
interest on a mortgage. 
In theory, MERS’s database tracks two distinct characteristics: 
the identity of the party with the rights to service the mortgage (often 
an agent for the trustee for the trust created for the ultimate 
beneficial owners of the mortgage loan) and the legal title to 
mortgages (for example, the trustee for the trust created for the 
ultimate beneficial owners of the mortgage).163 MERS’s publicly 
available records do not track chain of title. It is impossible for 
outsiders to determine if transfers were made in the MERS system 
and when.164 Instead, MERS publicly tracks only the current servicer 
and sometimes the current beneficial owner of a loan.165 
A major problem with MERS as a title system is that it is not 
accurate and reliable in terms of what it reports. MERS’s members 
are nominally required to report transfers of mortgage servicing 
rights to MERS, but MERS does not actually compel reporting of 
servicing-rights transfers, and there is little incentive to be punctual 
 
 162. Peterson, supra note 158, at 117. MERSCORP, Inc.’s parent, MERSCORP Holdings, 
Inc., is owned by the some of the largest banks, servicers, private mortgage insurers, and Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. Shareholders, MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/about-us/shareholders 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
 163. MERS states that it tracks “beneficial ownership interests,” but by this MERS really 
means legal title, rather than ultimate beneficial interests. See FAQ, MERS, http://www.mersinc.
org/information-for-homeowners/faq-information-for-homeowners (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) 
(“The MERS® System is a national electronic database that tracks changes in mortgage 
servicing rights and beneficial ownership interests in loans secured by residential real estate.”).  
 164. Peterson, supra note 158, at 125–30. Internally, MERS is able to track servicing 
transfers and transfers of beneficial ownership, but only to the extent reported by servicers. 
 165. Id. at 129.  
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with reporting.166 Indeed, the lack of record validation combined with 
voluntary reporting has led a federal judge to describe MERS as “the 
Wikipedia of land registration systems.”167 Not surprisingly, the 
information in the MERS database is often inaccurate or 
incomplete.168 
MERS does not even formally require any reporting of legal title 
to the mortgages, much less of transfers of legal title; any information 
about legal title is supplied through strictly voluntary reporting.169 
When MERS does list the legal title, its database typically lists the 
name of the securitization trustee if the mortgage is securitized, but 
not the particular designation of the securitization trust.170 Given that 
these trustees are financial institutions acting not in their own 
capacity, nor even as generic trustees (such a capacity not existing), 
but trustees for particular trusts (for example, Bank of New York 
Mellon as trustee for Countrywide Alternative Loan Trust 2005-
35CB, rather than simply Bank of New York Mellon or Bank of New 
York Mellon as trustee), this disclosure is of limited use for 
determining property rights because the leading trustee banks serve 
thousands of distinct trusts. MERS, then, is really the agent of an 
agent (the servicer) of a trustee for the ultimate beneficiaries of the 
mortgage. In the MERS system, the link between the real economic 
interest in a mortgage and recorded title is long and attenuated. 
MERS’s database functions as a do-it-yourself private mortgage 
recordation system. Historically, MERS itself has had only around 
fifty employees who perform corporate and technology support 
functions.171 Employees of MERS’s members carry out most of the 
tasks done in MERS’s name, including the making of entries in the 
 
 166. See Verified Complaint at 4–5, Delaware v. MERSCORP, Inc., No. 6987-CS, 2012 WL 
1949867 (Del. Ch. May 23, 2012), 2011 WL 5128209. The Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1641(g) (2012), and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(b)–
(c), require that borrowers be notified of changes in ownership or servicing.  
 167. Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs., 826 F. Supp. 2d 352, 368 (D. Mass. 2011).  
 168. See, e.g., Verified Complaint, supra note 166, at 5 (alleging a 21 percent inaccuracy rate 
for MERS recording in a sample of one hundred loans); AEQUITAS COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS, 
FORECLOSURE IN CALIFORNIA: A CRISIS OF COMPLIANCE 13 (2012), available at 
http://aequitasaudit.com/images/aequitas_sf_report.pdf (noting that MERS records matched 
with the deed-of-trust beneficiary only 42 percent of the time); Alan M. White, Losing the 
Paper—Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer Protection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER 
L. REV. 468, 486–87 (2012).  
 169. Peterson, supra note 158, at 117, 127. 
 170. Id. at 129. 
 171. Verified Complaint, supra note 166, at 8.  
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MERS database. These employees of MERS’s members are listed as 
assistant secretaries or vice presidents of MERS, but they have no 
actual employment relationship with MERS. There are over twenty 
thousand of these “corporate signing officers.”172 Accordingly, a 
transfer of either servicing or legal title in the MERS system involves 
nothing more than an employee of a MERS member entering the 
transfer in the MERS database. 
A transfer within the MERS system involves voluntary self-
reporting and nothing more and therefore fails to incentivize timely, 
accurate reporting. There are no formalities to a transfer in the 
MERS system. As a result, MERS may not in fact know who its 
principal is within the common-agency arrangement at any given 
point in time because MERS is relying on reporting from its 
members. 
2. Structural Problems with MERS.  Beyond lack of reliable 
accuracy, MERS’s registry is problematic as a title system because it 
stands on uncertain legal grounds. MERS lacks statutory authority. 
To the extent the MERS suffices to perfect and track interests in 
mortgages, it is on the basis of agency-law principles. But this only 
raises a host of questions: Can a mortgage be perfected by recording 
it in the name of a common agent, or does state law require 
mortgages be recorded in the name of the legal owner? The UCC 
expressly permits financing statements for security interests in 
personalty to be recorded in the name of “a representative of the 
secured party”173 and that failure to indicate this representative 
capacity does not affect the validity of a UCC financing statement.174 
But parallel provisions are not found in state mortgage recordation 
statutes. If recordation in the name of a common agent is allowed, 
what happens when the mortgage is transferred to a party that is not a 
principal of the common agent? And is there a limit to how 
attenuated this agency may be? What is the effect of a sham 
subagency arrangement? These issues are considered below. 
a. Lack of Statutory Authorization.  MERS is designed to operate 
like the Depository Trust Company (DTC), but for mortgage loans 
instead of securities. Historically, securities transactions cleared 
 
 172. Id. at 9–10. 
 173. UCC § 9-502(a)(2) (2011). 
 174. Id. § 9-503(d).  
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physically: the seller of a security had to deliver the physical stock 
certificate—itself a type of negotiable instrument—or bond to the 
buyer.175 This was an obviously cumbersome system, and by the mid-
1960s rising trading volume had overwhelmed Wall Street.176 By 1968, 
over fifteen-million trades were occurring daily, all necessitating 
physical delivery.177 Back offices became overwhelmed and deliveries 
lagged, creating major problems in the market as parties failed to 
meet their delivery obligations.178 In December 1968 alone, no less 
than $4.12 billion in trades failed to meet on-time delivery. The 
liability from these operational deficiencies set off “the greatest rash 
of broker-dealer firm failures in Wall Street’s history.”179 
A critical part of the solution to the “Wall Street Paperwork 
Crisis” was the creation of the DTC. The DTC used a common-
agency structure with a book-entry record system to immobilize 
physical securities.180 In the DTC system, instead of individual 
investors being listed as registered securities’ owners with various 
firms, the DTC is listed in corporate-securities registrations, using the 
name Cede & Co., as common nominee for the investors.181 The 
physical securities are then held in the DTC’s vaults, and the DTC 
tracks the ownership of the securities on its books.182 The DTC now 
immobilizes between 85 and 90 percent of all equities, corporate, and 
municipal bonds issued in paper form in the United States.183 
The DTC acts as a common agent for all parties using its 
services, substituting its own book-entry system for those of the 
individual securities’ issuers.184 Thus, instead of thousands of separate 
book-entry systems, each requiring paper to move back and forth for 
 
 175. Indeed, many bonds were issued in bearer form prior to the 1982 federal prohibition on 
domestic issuance of bearer bonds.  
 176. See Wyatt Wells, Certificates and Computers: The Remaking of Wall Street, 1967 to 
1971, 74 BUS. HIST. REV. 193, 193–200 (2000).  
 177. ALEC BENN, THE UNSEEN WALL STREET OF 1969–1975, at 14 (2000). 
 178. Wells, supra note 176, at 203–06. 
 179. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 452 (3d ed. 2003). 
 180. VIRGINIA B. MORRIS & STUART Z. GOLDSTEIN, GUIDE TO CLEARANCE & 
SETTLEMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO DTCC 6–7 (2009). 
 181. VIRGINIA B. MORRIS & STUART Z. GOLDSTEIN, LIFE CYCLE OF A SECURITY 9–10 
(2010). “Cede” is an acronym for “Central Depository.” Id. at 9.  
 182. MORRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 180, at 6–7. 
 183. MORRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 181, at 10.  
 184. Id. Although MERS is designed to operate as a common agency, one potential 
complication is that the depositor entities in securitizations are almost never MERS members 
and thus have not consented to the common agency.  
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every transaction, the DTC uses a single book-entry system without 
any movement of paper.185 Although the use of the DTC is not 
required for individual investors, its use is virtually mandated for 
institutional transactions.186 
MERS copies the DTC structure by inserting itself, rather than 
the lender, as the mortgagee in the local land records to immobilize 
legal title to mortgages and then by tracking the beneficial ownership 
(or at least the servicing agent of the beneficial owner) of the 
mortgages in its book-entry system.187 MERS was designed to obviate 
the need for paperwork to move for transfers to occur in its book-
entry system. The idea animating MERS is to “[p]rocess loans, not 
paperwork.”188 
Critically, the DTC operates within a statutory framework. It is a 
“securities intermediary” under UCC Article 8.189 This means that 
even though the physical securities are held by the DTC, they are not 
the DTC’s property but the property of the investors.190 The DTC also 
has legal duties to comply with the investors’ instructions,191 and the 
investors’ rights vis-à-vis third parties are set out by statute.192 The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also regulates the DTC 
as a registered clearing agency, so DTC rules must be approved by 
the SEC.193 
 
 185. MORRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 180, at 7. 
 186. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(e) (2012) (requiring the SEC to “use its authority . . . to end the 
physical movement of securities certificates in connection with the settlement among brokers 
and dealers of transactions in securities”). 
 187. Note that because the beneficial owners of a MERS registered mortgage are typically 
trusts, the real economic beneficiaries in interest, the MBS investors, are yet a further step 
removed.  
 188. Michelle Conlin, State Court Ruling Deals Blow to U.S. Bank Mortgage System, 
REUTERS, Sept. 14, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/14/us-foreclosures-
courtcase-washington-idUSBRE88D1OF20120914.  
 189. See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14) (2011). 
 190. See id. § 8-102(a)(9) (defining “financial asset”); id. § 8-102(a)(15) (defining 
“security”); § 8-102(a)(17) (defining “security entitlement”); id. § 8-501 (creating security 
entitlement); id. § 8-503 (providing that “all interests” in a financial asset held by a “securities 
intermediary” are the property interest of the security-entitlement holder, not the securities 
intermediary).  
 191. See id. §§ 8-506, 8-507.  
 192. Id. §§ 8-502, 8-510, 8-511. 
 193. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s, 78q-1 (2012). 
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No equivalent statutory or regulatory framework exists for 
MERS.194 Instead, MERS is a set of private contractual arrangements 
grafted onto a preexisting public legal structure—local land-recording 
offices. The closest MERS comes to a legal authorization is a 
questionable opinion letter from Covington & Burling LLP that lacks 
a fifty-state analysis of MERS’s operations, despite variations in real-
property law that could very well affect MERS’s validity for various 
functions.195 Lacking a statutory framework, MERS stands on 
principles of agency law, but the interaction of agency law with 
mortgage recordation statutes is not well-established. 
To the extent that land records are merely meant to serve as a 
notice system regarding potential claims, rather than as a title system 
defining rights, recordation in the name of an agent should not 
present a problem. But if land records are meant to also perform a 
title function—and they do on a de facto basis, as well as providing a 
de jure presumption of title—then recording a mortgage in the name 
of an agent like MERS seems more problematic. As a positive matter, 
there is a question of the interaction of what state recordation 
statutes provide. But as a normative matter that potentially affects 
judicial interpretation of recordation statutes, there is a public 
interest in having transparency of ownership in society.196 In the case 
of mortgage loans, there is a particular public interest in transparency 
so as to facilitate the restructuring of distressed mortgages. If a 
homeowner cannot figure out whom to contact about the mortgage, 
restructuring is likely to be frustrated, even if it is efficient from a net-
social-welfare perspective.197  
This is not to say that MERS is illegal or invalid, but merely to 
observe that it does not stand on the same sort of legal authority as 
the DTC model. As a result, there are questions about the legal effect 
 
 194. In contrast, the UCC contemplates states using private parties to maintain state UCC 
filing systems. See UCC § 9-501 legislative note. 
 195. Memorandum from Covington & Burling to R.K. Arnold, President and CEO, 
MERSCORP, Inc. (Sept. 1, 1997) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing a legal 
opinion on MERS as an original mortgagee, now the dominant form of MERS operations).  
 196. Although ownership interests could also be masked via the use of subsidiaries, limited-
liability parent-subsidiary relationships are recorded in public records, whereas agency 
relationships (and general partnerships and joint ventures) are matters of private contract. 
 197. See, e.g., Tamburri v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., No. C-11-2899 EMC, 2011 WL 6294472, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011) (describing plaintiff homeowner’s attempts to determine whom to 
contact regarding alternatives to foreclosure on her securitized mortgage). Full disclosure: I was 
retained as an expert witness for the plaintiff in this case, subsequent to the issuance of this 
opinion. 
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of MERS’s records that simply do not exist for the DTC’s records. 
The underpinnings of roughly 60 percent of mortgage titles in the 
United States are based on a questionable opinion letter. A 2012 
federal district court ruling in an unjust enrichment suit by a 
Pennsylvania county recorder of deeds has indicated that mortgages 
assigned in the MERS system are not perfected under Pennsylvania 
law.198 
b. Failure of Common Agency.  Because MERS stands on 
common-law agency principles, its authority is limited to the extent 
that it is an agent. Although recordation in the name of a common 
agent might work in theory, this is not what happened in most 
private-label securitization transactions. (A different story exists for 
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) securitizations, where 
bankruptcy remoteness is not a concern.) In most securitization 
transactions, the sponsor and the servicer are MERS members, but 
not the depositor or the trustee in its role as trustee (the trustee may 
belong to MERS in its corporate identity, but not in its trustee 
identity). To the extent that MERS is not an agent for either 
depositor or trustee, its common-agency structure might not work. 
The depositor in most private-label securitization transactions is 
a special-purpose subsidiary of the sponsor.199 Depositors are typically 
not members of MERS. The depositor is, after all, only a legal-fiction 
entity used to segregate the mortgages from the other assets of the 
sponsor. Often the depositor will have no employees or assets other 
than the mortgages (and associated notes). Therefore, no one ever 
bothered having the depositors be MERS members, because 
depositors are understood to be nothing more than a legal fiction 
required by the rating agencies’ concerns over bankruptcy 
remoteness. Thus, only sponsors and servicers were MERS members. 
MERS’s common-agency structure would seem to break down 
without depositor membership. As stated on its trust deeds, MERS 
“is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and 
 
 198. See Montgomery Cnty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 436, 445 (E.D. Pa. 2012) 
(holding that the “shall be recorded” language in the Pennsylvania recording statute requires all 
real-estate conveyances, including assignments of mortgages, to be recorded); see also Mortg. 
Elec. Registration Sys. v. Sw. Homes of Ark., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ark. 2009) (holding that 
MERS was not required to receive notice of the foreclosure of a junior lien because it had no 
interest in the deed of trust). 
 199. Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13 (2011). 
The depositor will also be the SEC shelf registrant. 
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assigns.”200 But that would be true only to the extent that the 
successors and assigns accept the agency relationship. The most 
obvious indication of acceptance of the agency relationship—MERS 
membership—does not apply to the depositor. Perhaps there is 
apparent authority, but that is certainly not how the common agency 
of MERS is supposed to work. If MERS is not an agent of the 
depositor, it is unclear what, if any, effect there would be from the 
mortgage continuing to be recorded in MERS’s name. 
In most states, there would still presumably be a valid mortgage 
enforceable against the borrower,201 but the mortgage might not be 
perfected as against competing liens and purchasers. If the mortgage 
becomes unperfected upon transfer to the depositor because it is not 
recorded in the name of the depositor (or the depositor’s agent), any 
preexisting junior mortgage on the property would then become the 
senior mortgage, absent a resubordination agreement.202 Similarly, 
any subsequent recorded lien or sale would take priority to the now 
unperfected mortgage. 
In most securitizations, the mortgage is only held by the 
depositor for a nanosecond. The transfer from the sponsor to the 
depositor is deemed to be instantaneously followed by the transfer 
from the depositor to the trust.203 Therefore, if the mortgage were 
subsequently perfected in the hands of the trust, its brief moment of 
lack of perfection would not matter unless there was already a junior 
mortgage on the property; subsequent liens and sale are unlikely to 
be an issue. In many cases, however, there was in fact a junior 
mortgage on the property at the time of the securitization of the 
MERS mortgage. Thus, it is possible that many junior liens on 
 
 200. See, e.g., James v. ReconTrust Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152 (D. Ore. 2012) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 201. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
 202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.3 (1997). 
 203. See, e.g., Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Alternative Loan Trust 2005-35CB 
§ 2.01(a)–(b) (July 1, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1334744/ 
000090514805004294/efc5-1780_5738503ex991.txt (“Each Seller, concurrently with the execution 
and delivery hereof, hereby sells, transfers, assigns, sets over and otherwise conveys to the 
Depositor, without recourse, all its respective right, title and interest in and to the related Initial 
Mortgage Loans . . . . Immediately upon the conveyance of the Initial Mortgage Loans referred 
to in clause (a), the Depositor sells, transfers, assigns, sets over and otherwise conveys to the 
Trustee for the benefit of the Certificateholders, without recourse, all the right, title and interest 
of the Depositor in and to the Trust Fund . . . .”). This particular PSA contains duplicative 
transfer language. See id. § 2.04 (“The Depositor hereby assigns, transfers and conveys to the 
Trustee all of its rights with respect to the Mortgage Loans including, without limitation, the 
representations and warranties of each Seller made pursuant to Section 2.03(a) . . . .”). 
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mortgages in private-label securitizations may be entitled to senior 
priority status because of the depositor lapse in the MERS system.204  
Even in cases in which there is not a preexisting junior mortgage 
on the same property, the depositor lapse in MERS’s common-agency 
system raises questions about perfection in the hands of the trustee, 
meaning whether the trustee’s mortgage will have priority over 
competing interests in the mortgaged property. Does the common 
agency spring again when the mortgage is transferred to the trust? Or 
is a new recording required? There is no clear answer to this, but 
securitization industry practice has not taken MERS common-agency 
structure seriously, in part because doing so would increase operating 
burdens and costs. 
c. Sham Agency.  MERS’s use of corporate signing officers that 
are actually employees of MERS’s members arguably indicates that 
MERS’s entire common-agency structure is a sham and that there is 
not in fact any real agency relationship, but rather simply principals 
dealing directly with each other.205 MERS exercises no control over 
the corporate signing officers.206 MERS’s corporate signing officers 
are not meaningfully acting on MERS’s behalf, as they receive and 
take no direction from MERS, but instead are acting on behalf of 
their actual employers.207 Indeed, as MERS itself notes, “a certifying 
 
 204. A further complication is that securitization trustees are not members of MERS in their 
trustee capacities. Trustees and servicers would seem to have authority for the use of MERS, 
however, as it is clearly contemplated in PSAs. See id. § 2.01(c)(ii) (requiring delivery to the 
trustee “for each Mortgage Loan that is not a MERS Mortgage Loan, the original recorded 
Mortgage or a copy of such Mortgage certified by Countrywide as being a true and complete 
copy of the Mortgage . . . and in the case of each MERS Mortgage Loan, the original Mortgage, 
noting the presence of the MIN of the Mortgage Loans”). 
 205. See Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs., 826 F. Supp. 2d 352 (D. Mass. 2011) (“This Court is 
deeply troubled that, with little to no oversight, individuals without any tie to or knowledge of 
the company on whose behalf they are acting may assign mortgages—that is, they may transfer 
legal title to someone else’s home. Equally troubling is the conflict of interest posed by these 
certifying officers wearing ‘two hats’ simultaneously: that of assignor (as agent for MERS) and 
assignee (as employee of the note holder or its servicing agent). Indeed, a MERS certifying 
officer is more akin to an Admiral in the Georgia navy or a Kentucky Colonel with benefits 
than he is to any genuine financial officer. In its rush to cash in on the sale of mortgage-backed 
securities, the MERS system supplies the thinnest possible veneer of formality and legality to 
the wholesale marketing of home mortgages to large institutional investors.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 206. See Verified Complaint at 4, Delaware v. MERSCORP, Inc., No. 6987-CS, 2012 WL 
1949867 (Del. Ch. May 23, 2012), 2011 WL 5128209. 
 207. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (defining “agency” as requiring 
the agent to be acting on the principal’s behalf); id. § 3.15 (noting that subagency relationships 
are defined by section 1.01). 
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or signing officer is authorized to act on MERS’s behalf only with 
respect to loans and mortgages registered in the MERS® System by 
the Member for which the certifying or signing officer is an officer.”208 
This indicates that the entire use of common agency by MERS is in 
fact a sham that courts might disregard if properly challenged, with 
the result that MERS mortgages would be unperfected.209  
MERS was the creation of the sell-side of the securitization 
industry, not MBS investors (the “buy-side”). MERS’s purpose was 
to facilitate securitization on the front end by reducing the cost and 
time of recording mortgage transfers. Disregard of or corner cutting 
on agency-law principles helped further accomplish these cost and 
time savings. Though MERS accomplished up-front cost and time 
savings, it came at the cost of less clarity in terms of property rights 
 
 208. See Defendants’ Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion To Dismiss the Verified 
Complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure To State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be 
Granted at 11, Delaware v. MERSCORP, Inc., 2012  WL 1949867 (No. 6987-CS), 2012 WL 
168257. 
 209. UCC § 9-313 cmt. 3 (“The fact of dual agency is not of itself inconsistent with the 
secured party’s having taken possession . . . . The debtor cannot qualify as an agent for the 
secured party for purposes of the secured party’s taking possession. And, under appropriate 
circumstances, a court may determine that a person in possession is so closely connected to or 
controlled by the debtor that the debtor has retained effective possession, even though the 
person may have agreed to take possession on behalf of the secured party. If so, the person’s 
taking possession would not constitute the secured party’s taking possession and would not be 
sufficient for perfection.”). As a “secured party” and “debtor” are defined in UCC Article 9 as 
respectively including a buyer and a seller of a promissory note, id. §§ 9-102(a)(72)(D),  
9-102(a)(28)(B), the comment can be read as “The fact of dual agency is not itself inconsistent 
with the buyer of the promissory note having taken possession . . . . The seller of the note cannot 
qualify as an agent for the buyer of the note for purposes of the buyer's taking possession.  And 
under appropriate circumstances a court may determining that a person in possession is so 
closely connected to or controlled by the seller that the seller has retained effective possession, 
even though the person may have agreed to take possession on behalf of the buyer. If so, the 
person's taking possession would not constitute the buyer's taking possession and would not be 
sufficient for giving the buyer superior title to competing parties.” Thus, even if one were to 
take the agency of MERS’s corporate signing officers seriously, they only complicate the agency 
structure underlying MERS. MERS is the common agent of mortgage servicers, but the 
servicers’ employees are then the agents of MERS. Can a principal be an agent’s subagent? Or 
is this recursivity equivalent to the song “I’m My Own Grandpaw”? LONZO AND OSCAR, I’m 
My Own Grandpaw, on THE VERY BEST OF (Vintage Masters Inc. 2012) (1947). A separate set 
of dual agency issues exists with respect to document custodians and bailees in securitizations. 
  There is not an explicit “merger” doctrine in agency law providing that recursive 
agency arrangements can be disregarded, but it is not hard to imagine a court adopting such a 
principle. Similar merger doctrines exist in other areas of law. For example, when a party is both 
an owner and mortgagee on a property, the law treats it solely as an owner. See, e.g., 31 C.J.S. 
Estates § 153 (2008) (“Whenever a greater and a less estate coincide and meet in one and the 
same person, without any intermediate estate, the less is immediately merged in the greater, and 
thus annihilated.”). 
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(not to mention perhaps the most extreme case of stretching 
corporate formalities), resulting in enormous problems on the back 
end for collections, a cost borne by the buy-side, not the sell-side. 
B. Revised UCC Articles 1 and 9 
Since 2001, an additional method of transferring notes and 
mortgages has been available, known only to a handful of cognoscenti 
within the securitization industry. Articles 1 and 9 of the UCC were 
revised in 2001 and now operate to provide a mechanism for a sale of 
promissory notes and mortgages with no more formalities than an 
enforceable written sale contract. 
Lawyers typically think of UCC Article 9 as providing “a 
comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests in 
personal property and fixtures.”210 Article 9, however, also governs 
some types of sales. This is because the definition of “security 
interest,” which appears in Article 1, includes not only liens—
contingent transfers of ownership—but also certain sales—outright 
transfers of ownership.211 
In 1998, the American Law Institute and Uniform Law 
Commissioners approved a model version of a major revision of UCC 
Articles 1 and 9.212 Every state except for South Carolina adopted the 
Article 1 revision, whereas all fifty states adopted the Article 9 
revision. The Article 9 revisions were effective in most states as of 
July 1, 2001, and in all states by January 1, 2002.213 One of the goals of 
the revision was to “bring the commercial law setting for 
securitization into the twenty-first century”214 or, as a history of the 
 
 210. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (2001).  
 211. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2011). UCC Article 9 has always covered sales of chattel paper 
but required filing for perfection. See id. §§ 9-109(a)(3), 9-310(a).  
 212. Harry C. Sigman & Edwin E. Smith, Revised U.C.C. Article 9’s Transition Rules: 
Insuring a Soft Landing—Part II, 55 BUS. LAW. 1763, 1763 n.1 (2000).  
 213. See U.C.C. § 9-701. For example, Article 9 went into effect in Connecticut on October 
1, 2001, and in Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi on January 1, 2002. Rod Clement, The 
Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC and Mississippi Law: Changes to Individual 
Names, Registered Organizations and Trusts, MISS. BUS. LAW. REP., Fall 2011, at 4, 10 n.3, 
available at https://msbar.org/media/268261/Business%20Law%20Reporter%20Fall%202011.
pdf.  
 214. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC Article 9, 74 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 947 (1999). 
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revisions describes the process, it was about “Making Revised Article 
9 Safe for Securitizations.”215 
As revised, Article 1 defines a “security interest” to include the 
interest of a buyer of a promissory note: “‘[s]ecurity interest’ means 
an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or 
performance of an obligation. ‘Security interest’ includes any interest 
of . . . a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a 
promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9.”216 
Revised Article 9 now also defines a “debtor” to include “a seller 
of . . . promissory notes,”217 a “secured party” to include “a person to 
which . . . promissory notes have been sold,”218 and “collateral” to 
include “promissory notes that have been sold.”219 Thus, in this new 
commercial cant, a debtor means a seller; a secured party means a 
buyer; collateral means promissory notes sold; a security interest is a 
sale; and a security agreement is a sale contract. 
The result of these definitions is that the mechanism for creating 
an enforceable security interest is now also the mechanism for the 
sale of promissory notes.220 Article 9 provides that 
a security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties 
with respect to the collateral only if 
(1) value has been given, 
(2) the debtor has rights in the collateral . . . and 
(3) . . . 
(A) the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that 
provides a description of the collateral . . . [or] 
(B) the collateral . . . is in the possession of the secured 
party . . . pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement . . . .221 
On its face, this provision is about the enforceability of security 
interests. Yet when read using the alternative definitions of “security 
 
 215. See Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations: A Brief History, 
73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 167 (1999).  
 216. U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (emphasis added). 
 217. Id. § 9-102(28)(B). 
 218. Id. § 9-102(73)(D). 
 219. Id. § 9-102(12)(B). 
 220. South Carolina is an exception because it has not adopted the revised definition of 
security interest in Article 1.  
 221. Id. § 9-203(b). 
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interest,” “debtor,” “security agreement,” and “secured party,” the 
provision also provides that 
a sale is enforceable against the seller and third parties with respect 
to the promissory note sold, only if 
(1) value has been given, 
(2) the seller has rights in the promissory note . . . and 
(3) . . . 
(A) the seller has signed a sale agreement that provides a 
description of the promissory note . . . [or] 
(B) the promissory note . . . is in the possession of the 
buyer . . . pursuant to the seller’s sale contract. 
Thus, through alternative definitions, the 2001 UCC revisions 
transformed a provision regarding the creation of security interests 
into a provision regarding the sale of promissory notes. All that 
Article 9 requires is that the seller sell a note to the buyer for value 
pursuant to a signed sale agreement with the notes covered being 
indicated either by delivery to the buyer or through description in the 
sale agreement. In other words, Article 9 merely requires an 
enforceable sale contract that complies with the Statute of Frauds. 
The UCC further provides that a “security interest”—here, a sale 
of the note—“attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable 
against the debtor with respect to the collateral.”222 This is important 
because attachment is the term that triggers a separate UCC 
provision specifying that a sale of a promissory note includes a sale of 
any associated mortgage: 
The attachment of a security interest in a right to payment or 
performance secured by a security interest or other lien on personal 
or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the 
security interest, mortgage, or other lien.223 
Translated: 
The enforceability of a sale of a right to payment or performance 
secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real 
property is also an enforceable sale of the security interest, mortgage 
or other lien. 
 
 222. Id. § 9-203(a). 
 223. Id. § 9-203(g). 
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In other words, UCC Article 9 codifies (but only for UCC Article 9 
sales) the common-law doctrine that “the mortgage follows the 
note.”224 Article 9 thus creates a system for transfer and title of both 
promissory notes and mortgages. 
The Article 9 sales provisions are drafted in an unusually 
misleading way that makes it virtually a secret, private law, known 
only to securitization-industry insiders. Article 9 creates a transfer 
method for negotiable notes that parallels, but does not supplant, 
Article 3, all without even labeling itself as a note transfer method. 
Someone searching for the law governing either note or mortgage 
transfers would be unlikely to discover the relevance of UCC 
Article 9. Someone looking for the law of notes would turn to 
Article 3, and one looking for the law of mortgages would turn to 
real-property law, not Article 9. 
If, by chance, this intrepid researcher found the Article 1 
definition as the result of say, a word search of a state code for 
“promissory note,” its effect would not be obvious. The researcher 
would have to know that the UCC Article 1 definition of “security 
interest” is what controls the scope of UCC Article 9 and would then 
have to work through the other nonintuitive definitions in Article 9, 
such as “debtor” meaning “seller.” Even then, the Article 9 
“mortgage follows the note” provision is not obvious on its face. In 
short, although public law, the promissory-note sale provisions of 
UCC Articles 1 and 9 are drafted in a manner that has kept them in 
the private preserve of a small cadre of securitization deal lawyers. 
Beyond these cognoscenti, the Article 9 transfer method is all but 
unknown. Foreclosure lawyers for both banks and consumers 
remained unaware of the provision for nearly a decade. Indeed, prior 
to 2011 there was but one reported opinion that even referenced the 
UCC Article 9 provision for sale of a promissory note, and to date 
there have been fewer than a dozen opinions referencing the 
provision, even though the securitization industry claims that both 
Article 9 and Article 3 are used to transfer mortgage notes.225 
Why would UCC Article 9 be drafted so strangely? Why go 
through linguistic contortions to seemingly reinvent what looks like a 
simple sale contract subject to the Statute of Frauds? 
 
 224. See id. § 9-203 cmt. 9 (“Subsection (g) codifies the common-law rule that a transfer of 
an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also 
transfers the security interest or lien.”). 
 225. AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM, supra note 106, at 3, 10, 15–16.  
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The answer can be found in another part of Revised Article 9, 
namely, the provisions dealing with “perfection” of security interests. 
The rights of a secured party in collateral vis-à-vis competing 
claimants, such as purchasers, creditors, or trustees in bankruptcy 
(who have the rights of various hypothetical purchasers and 
creditors226) are determined by the “priority” of their interests. 
Senior-most priority creates freedom from claims. 
The priority of a security interest is generally determined by the 
earlier of the interest’s filing or perfection.227 Filing refers to the filing 
of a financing statement listing the name of the debtor and the 
secured party or its representative and describing the collateral in the 
appropriate public recording office. The requirements for perfection 
depend on the type of collateral,228 but for security interests in (that is, 
the sales of) promissory notes, perfection is automatic upon 
attachment.229 Perfection of the security interest in (that is, the sale of) 
any mortgage associated with the note is also automatic.230 
All that is needed, then, for the sale of a promissory note and 
associated mortgage to be insulated against competing claims is the 
provision of value sufficient to support a simple contract,231 a signed 
sale agreement, and either delivery or a sufficient description of the 
note. A generic description (for example, “notes”) suffices.232 No 
 
 226. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2012) (detailing the strong-arm powers of a trustee in 
bankruptcy).  
 227. U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1); see also id. § 9-317(a)(1) (“A security interest . . . is subordinate 
to the rights of a person entitled to priority under Section 9-322 . . . .”).  
 228. Id. § 9-308(a).  
 229. Id. § 9-309(4). UCC section 9-312(a) permits perfection by filing for instruments, which 
include promissory notes, whereas UCC section 9-313(a) provides that perfection in an 
instrument may be achieved by taking possession of the instrument.  
 230. Id. § 9-308(e).  
 231. Compare id. § 1-204 (defining “value”), with U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (2001) (defining 
“value” in the same manner).  
 232. The requirements for sufficiency of description are unclear. UCC section 9-108(a) 
requires only that the description “reasonably identif[y] what is described,” and section 9-108(b) 
provides that description by category, quantity, or collateral type is sufficient. U.C.C. §§ 9-
108(a)–(b) (2011). This requirement makes sense for a notice-filing system, but not when there 
is automatic perfection on attachment. Thus, a security agreement that covers simply “mortgage 
loans” would seem to qualify under section 9-108(a)–(b), but it provides no help whatsoever in 
determining which mortgage loans were actually sold, especially if the seller engaged in other 
similar sales. Nor is it clear how this provision interfaces with state law on real-estate transfers. 
In title-theory states, the description of the notes might need to be sufficient to comply with the 
formalities for the transfer of land because the mortgage transaction is understood as a sale and 
repurchase of the land. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass. 2011).  
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filing need actually be made in a public recording office. In other 
words, Article 9 has created “zipless” perfection.233 Article 9 
perfection of a sale of a promissory note jettisons the long-standing 
“paperization principle” for creating certainty in rights as an 
unnecessary transaction cost.234 Thus, the revision of Article 9 is an 
attempt to achieve the bright-line efficiency of a recordation-race 
system without its formalities. 
“Perfection” is a secured-financing term, not a sales term. Sales, 
however, are not always clearly distinct from financings or leases.235 
Economically, a sale-and-repurchase agreement can look identical to 
a secured loan or a finance lease agreement. One might distinguish 
between a sale and a financing regarding the allocation of risk and 
reward on the asset transferred.236 But often there is a less-than-
complete transfer of both risk and reward. For example, in a 
nonrecourse loan, the debtor retains the upside potential on the 
assets, while the creditor assumes the downside risk because the 
debtor will default if the value of the collateral (to the debtor) is less 
than the amount due on the loan. Similarly, both a sale-and-lease-
back transaction and a sale-and-repurchase transaction (a “repo”) are 
often economically equivalent to a nonrecourse secured loan. And 
 
  Notably, the UCC does provide that for certain types of transactions, including 
“consumer transaction[s],” a description only by collateral type is insufficient. U.C.C. § 9-108(e). 
The sale of consumer promissory notes and mortgages, however, is not a “consumer 
transaction,” as defined by section 9-102(26). Although in practice securitization documents that 
purport to effect sales under Article 9 are supposed to include schedules identifying the 
collateral covered, the UCC does not appear to require such schedules, even though absent such 
schedules, it is impossible to say when and if a particular promissory note and mortgage was in 
fact sold under Article 9.  
  Moreover, even when schedules of notes and mortgages exist, they are not necessarily 
integrated into the sales agreement, raising evidentiary issues. Unlike with a negotiable 
instrument, there is no necessary integration of the sale agreement and its schedules, so 
permitting generic descriptions enables latent ambiguity along the lines of the two ships in the 
Peerless problem, see Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ct. of 
Exch.), as we cannot be sure exactly which mortgage loans were sold and when, especially if 
there were multiple sales. 
 233. Cf. ERICA JONG, FEAR OF FLYING 10 (1973).  
 234. See Clark, supra note 32, at 476–79.  
 235. See U.C.C. § 1-203(a) (“Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a lease or 
security interest is determined by the facts of each case.”); § id. 9-318 cmt. 2 (“Neither this 
Article nor the definition of ‘security interest’ in Section 1-201 provides rules for distinguishing 
sales transactions from those that create a security interest securing an obligation.”).  
 236. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (2012) (defining “transfer” to include “the creation of a 
lien” or “the retention of title as a security interest”); Meredith Jackson, Contracting out of 
Article 9, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 281, 285–95 (2007) (discussing the factors that courts have used 
to distinguish between sales, leases, and financings).  
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even a simple sale with warranties shifts some risk back to the seller. 
All of this means that there is some degree of uncertainty regarding 
whether a particular transaction is a sale or a financing. No bright-line 
rules exist. 
Securitization tries to deal with this uncertainty through the use 
of “true sale” and “nonconsolidation” opinion letters from counsel 
attesting that if the transaction is done as described in the letter, then 
courts “should” (or sometimes “would”) deem it a true sale.237 If the 
transferor ends up in an insolvency proceeding and the lawyers are 
wrong, then the transfer would be judicially recharacterized as a 
secured financing.238 The question would then turn to whether the 
financing was perfected. Prior to the 2001 Article 9 revisions, the 
financing would not be perfected unless a financing statement had 
been properly and timely filed.239 Prophylactic filing can be done to 
protect against the contingency of judicial recharacterization, but it 
adds expense and might not be done properly. If unperfected, 
however, then the security interest could be avoided by a trustee in 
bankruptcy or by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), leaving the trust with a general unsecured claim in the 
insolvency proceeding.240 In other words, if recharacterized and 
unperfected, the securitization trust (and thus investors) would not 
have the freedom from competing claims on which they based their 
economic bargain.241 
The Article 9 revisions were designed to protect against this 
potential outcome.242 Under Revised Article 9, even if the transaction 
were deemed a secured financing, rather than a sale, the secured 
financing would be automatically perfected.243 Therefore, if a trustee 
in bankruptcy or the FDIC were to challenge the sale transaction, the 
worst outcome would be the demotion of the securitization trust from 
 
 237. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured 
Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2005) (discussing the function of securitization opinion letters).  
 238. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (“[T]his article applies to . . . a transaction, regardless of its form, 
that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract . . . .”).  
 239. Donald J. Rapson, “Receivables” Financing Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 133, 137–38 (1999). 
 240. See 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS §§ 5.01, 5.06 (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d 
ed. Supp. 2007).  
 241. Id. § 3.04. Whether a transaction is in fact a sale or a security interest is not determined 
by the UCC.  
 242. Id. § 5.02[G][2]; see U.C.C. § 9-318.  
 243. Perfection would also create a perfected security interest in proceeds of the notes. 
U.C.C. §§ 9-203(f), 9-315(a)(2).  
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a buyer to a secured creditor; its claim to the collateral would come 
ahead of that of the trustee in bankruptcy or the FDIC, so freedom 
from competing claims would be preserved. In other words, although 
the sale-versus-security-interest question is still not decided by the 
UCC, the distinction may not particularly matter for promissory 
notes. By defining a “security interest” to include a “sale,” the UCC 
created a legislative safety net for securitizations. 
Article 9 creates freedom from claims without requiring the 
formalities of negotiation or recording. Because of the Article 9 
“mortgage follows the note” provision,244 transfers of mortgages that 
previously would have involved the recording of assignments in land 
records are now automatically perfected along with the perfection of 
the note.245 By avoiding demonstrative formalities, Article 9 reduces 
the transaction costs involved in securitizing mortgages. In short, 
Article 9 created a securitization-friendly procedure that enabled 
freedom from competing claims to be achieved through a simple sale 
contract without requiring either formalities or filing. Significantly, 
however, as we shall see, Article 9 has no provisions for the 
enforcement of a promissory note.246 Thus, although Article 9 
facilitated the transfer of mortgage notes, it reduced the certainty in 
property rights in the notes needed for enforcement. 
The expansion of UCC Article 9 to cover the transfer of 
mortgage notes raises another problem: interaction with state real-
property law. No attempt was made to harmonize Article 9 with state 
law on real-property conveyances. For example, a generic description 
of mortgage notes by category (for example, “mortgage notes”) or 
quantity (for example, “5000 mortgage loans”) would appear to 
suffice under Article 9,247 but state real-property law is likely to 
require a more specific description of property conveyed. Article 9 
does not explicitly supersede other state law.248 Article 9’s interaction 
 
 244. Id. § 9-203(g). 
 245. Id. § 9-308(e).  
 246. Article 9 self-help repossession does not apply because, in Article 9 terms, the 
collateral is the promissory note itself, not the real property. Id. § 9-609.  
 247. See supra note 232.  
 248. The Official Commentary to Article 9—not enacted as law in most states—is of two 
minds. On the one hand, it sets forth that “an attempt to obtain or perfect a security interest in a 
secured obligation by complying with non-Article 9 law, as by an assignment of record of a real-
property mortgage, would be ineffective,” thereby implying that Article 9 controls. U.C.C. § 9-
109 cmt. 7. On the other hand, the UCC itself provides that Article 9 “does not apply to the 
extent that . . . another statute of this State expressly governs the creation, perfection, priority, 
or enforcement of a security interest.” Id. § 9-109(c). Whether the term “security interest” here 
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with state real-estate law is unclear, but it is hard to imagine that 
when states adopted the Article 9 revisions that any member of a 
state’s legislature thought that the revision was changing state real-
property-conveyance law. 
Through its automatic perfection of mortgage assignments, the 
2001 revision of UCC Article 9 purported to radically change real-
estate law as practiced by obviating the need to record mortgage 
assignments to ensure perfection. The revision was done in such an 
under-the-radar manner, however, that only the lawyers who helped 
create securitization transactions—sell-side lawyers—were aware of 
it. Not only does this raise troubling questions about the legitimacy of 
the uniform lawmaking process, and the UCC Article 9 revisions in 
particular,249 but because the UCC revisions were done so 
 
should be read to include a lien on real property is unclear. The Official Commentary states that 
Article 9 “does not determine who has the power to release a mortgage of record.” Id. § 9-308 
cmt. 6. 
 249. There is a large body of literature about the political economy of the uniform 
lawmaking process. See generally, e.g., Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commercial Codification 
as Negotiation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 17 (1998); Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, On the UCC 
Revision Process: A Reply to Dean Scott, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1217 (1996); Larry T. Garvin, 
The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285 (1999); 
Clayton P. Gillette, Politics and Revision: A Comment on Scott, 80 VA. L. REV. 1853 (1994); 
Gail Hillebrand, What’s Wrong with the Uniform Law Process?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (2001); 
Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture and 
the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569 (1998); Fred Miller, Realism Not Idealism in 
Uniform Laws—Observations from the Revision of the UCC, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 707 (1998); A. 
Brooke Overby, Modeling UCC Drafting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645 (1996); Kathleen Patchel, 
Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Law Process: Some Lessons from the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Iain Ramsay, Commentary, The 
Politics of Commercial Law, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 565; Donald J. Rapson, Who Is Looking Out for 
the Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in the Light (and Shadows) of 
Professor Rubin’s Observations, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249 (1994); Edward L. Rubin, Efficiency, 
Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1991); Edwin L. 
Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 11 (1997); Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some 
Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743 (1993); 
Edward L. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of State Law: Some Lessons 
from the Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251 (1989); Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental 
Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909 
(1995); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. 
PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Robert E. Scott, Is Article 2 the Best We Can Do?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 677 
(2001); Robert E. Scott, The Mythology of Article 9, 79 MINN. L. REV. 853 (1995); Robert E. 
Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994); Robert E. Scott, The Truth About 
Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436 (1997); David V. Snyder, Molecular Federalism 
and the Structures of Private Lawmaking, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 419 (2007); David V. 
Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371 (2003).  
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surreptitiously, they also leave unresolved questions about the 
interaction with state real-property law. 
C. Pooling and Servicing Agreements 
We have now seen that there are two possible methods of 
transferring notes250 and four methods for transferring mortgages.251 
The interaction between these different legal methods is not clear, 
but just because multiple methods of transfer might be possible, it 
does not follow that they are all implicated in actual transactions. 
Which method is actually used in deals? 
The key transactional document in a securitization is the Pooling 
and Servicing Agreement (PSA). The PSA is usually a single 
document that (1) creates the securitization trust; (2) transfers the 
mortgage loans from the depositor to the trust (CD, per Figure 1); 
(3) often also transfers the mortgage loans from the seller to the 
depositor (BC); (4) serves as the trustee’s contract; (5) serves as the 
loan servicer’s contract; and (6) provides for the issuance of the MBS. 
PSA language varies, but almost all PSAs contain a section 
dealing with “conveyance of mortgage loans” or the like. This section 
contains two relevant transfer provisions. First, there is a recital of 
transfer. For example: 
Section 2.01. Conveyance of Mortgage Loans to Trustee. (a) The 
Depositor, concurrently with the execution and delivery of this 
Agreement, sells, transfers and assigns to the Trust without recourse 
all its right, title and interest in and to . . . the Mortgage Loans 
identified in the Mortgage Loan Schedule . . . .252 
This language basically tracks the requirements of an Article 9 
sale. The PSA itself serves as the security agreement (the sale 
document). If it is signed by the depositor (the seller of the loans, or 
C) and contains an adequate description of the loans being sold 
(found in the attached loan schedules), it will meet the requirements 
for a sale of the promissory notes under Article 9, and the sale of the 
 
 250. These are Article 3 negotiation and Article 9 sale. There is potentially an additional 
common-law sale method, arguably superseded by the codification of Article 9 sales, which 
need not be of concern here. 
 251. These are Article 3 negotiation of the note combined with the common-law mortgage-
follows-the-note doctrine, recordation of the assignment in land records, entry of a transfer in 
the MERS database, and Article 9 sale of the note.  
 252. Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Bear Stearns Mortg. Funding Trust 2006-AR2, 
§ 2.01 (Sept. 1, 2006), available at http://www.secinfo.com/d1zj61.vvh.c.htm. 
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mortgages will accordingly happen automatically under the UCC 
Article 9 “mortgage follows the note” provision.253 
Immediately following the recital of sale, however, PSAs have 
language stating, “In connection with the transfer and assignment of 
each Mortgage Loan” the depositor has “delivered” or “hereby 
delivers” the original mortgage notes to the trust indorsed in a 
particular manner. The indorsement requirement invokes a UCC 
Article 3 transfer by negotiation. For example: 
In connection with the transfer and assignment of each Mortgage 
Loan, the Depositor has delivered or caused to be delivered to the 
Trustee for the benefit of the Certificateholders the following 
documents or instruments with respect to each Mortgage Loan so 
assigned: 
  (i) the original Mortgage Note bearing all intervening 
endorsements showing a complete chain of endorsement from the 
originator to the last endorsee, endorsed ‘Pay to the order of 
_____________, without recourse’ and signed (which may be by 
facsimile signature) in the name of the last endorsee by an 
authorized officer.254 
Shaun Barnes, Kathleen Cully and Professor Steven Schwarcz, the 
latter two of whom previously worked as sell-side securitization 
attorneys, argue that the recital of sale is what accomplishes the 
transfer and that the delivery instructions are not conditions to the 
closing of the transaction, but merely provisions to protect the trust 
and its investors.255 Therefore, in their view, noncompliance with the 
indorsement and delivery requirements in PSAs does not defeat 
transfers but instead creates a possible breach of contract.256 
This means that even if the indorsement and delivery did not 
occur, the trust would still have standing to foreclose. It would also 
have a breach-of-contract claim against the depositor, but that is not a 
foreclosure issue. Yet if Barnes, Cully, and Schwarcz are correct, why 
would PSAs even contain indorsement language? What work is this 
language doing? 
 
 253. See U.C.C. § 9-203(g). 
 254. Pooling and Service Agreement, Sec. Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-FR3, 
§ 2.01(b) (July 1, 2005), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dRSm6.z1Fa.d.htm#412u (bold 
emphasis added).  
 255. Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully & Steven L. Schwarcz, In-House Counsel’s Role in 
the Structuring of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 521, 529.  
 256. Id. at 529 n. 28. 
LEVITIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2013  5:55 PM 
2013] THE PAPER CHASE 699 
The answer might in part be path dependence. PSAs from post-
2001 are identical to those from pre-2001, which suggests that 
Article 3 is really the transfer provision, as it has been all along. 
Alternatively, the answer might be that post-2001, PSAs became a 
belt-and-suspenders operation with both Article 3 and Article 9 
transfer provisions. Article 9 was crafted to work without any change 
in the deal documents, but risk-averse attorneys retained the Article 3 
indorsement-and-delivery provision because of the uncertainty of 
Revised Article 9 jurisprudence. 
Yet there were also good business and legal reasons to continue 
using Article 3 as the transfer mechanism. First, Article 9 transfers do 
not create holders in due course. Only Article 3 negotiations can do 
this. The resultant avoidance of assignee liability and freedom from 
defenses are important benefits that MBS investors would have 
wanted to retain. 
Second, Article 9 says nothing regarding the enforcement of 
notes. This suggests that for negotiable notes, at least, Article 3 still 
controls. If so, then the trust cannot enforce the notes unless it is a 
person entitled to enforce under Article 3, which, in most cases, 
requires indorsement and delivery. Article 3, in other words, creates a 
statutory standing requirement that Article 9 does not excuse. 
Third, the requirement of indorsement and delivery is necessary 
to ensure that the securitization trust takes the mortgage notes free 
from competing claims. Article 9 provides that an Article 3 sale has 
priority over an Article 9 security interest.257 It is not clear if this 
provision is meant to apply only to true security interests and not 
sales included under the Article 1 definition of security interest. The 
provision largely tracks one in prerevision Article 9 that only covered 
the contest between an Article 3 negotiation and a true security 
interest.258 
Yet if we take seriously the Article 1 definition of “security 
interest” to include a “sale” of promissory notes, then an Article 3 
sale has priority over an Article 9 sale. Therefore, if a note is first sold 
under Article 9 without delivery and then sold by the same seller 
through an Article 3 negotiation to a party that becomes a holder in 
due course, the subsequent Article 3 purchaser would actually take 
 
 257. See U.C.C. § 9-331(a) (granting priority to Article 3 holders in due course); id. § 9-
102(a)(47) (defining “instrument” as a “negotiable instrument or any other writing that 
evidences a right to the payment of a monetary obligation”). 
 258. See U.C.C. § 9-309 (1951).  
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free of the Article 9 purchaser’s claim.259 The Article 9 purchaser 
would have no rights in the note; at most, the purchaser would have a 
litigation claim against the seller. Thus, the only way the MBS 
investors could be completely sure that the securitization trust has no 
competing claimants would have been to insist on Article 3 transfer. 
Fourth, even if Article 3 sales do not trump Article 9 sales, there 
would still be a logic for requiring Article 3 negotiation, namely, that 
the Article 9 transfer method is too easy to consummate and hence 
does not lend itself to easy proof, unlike Article 3. Under the basic 
commercial-law rule of nemo dat, a transferor cannot transfer rights it 
does not have; I cannot sell you the Brooklyn Bridge. For Article 3, 
this is not a problem. Because of reification, the seller only has 
something to transfer if the seller can deliver the physical note, and 
the chain of title is built into the note itself through indorsements.260 If 
there is no delivery, there is no transfer, so it is easy to verify if rights 
have been transferred. 
Article 9 codifies the nemo dat rule by requiring the seller to 
have rights in the property sold for the transfer to be effective.261 
Unlike Article 3, however, determining if a seller has rights to 
transfer is difficult. It ultimately requires proving up a chain of title 
from the originator to the seller to the depositor or ABC. If this 
chain cannot be proven, then the transfer from the depositor to the 
trust (CD) is a manqué transaction. 
The lack of solid evidence of transfers is particularly important 
given the occurrence of “warehouse fraud,” wherein the same 
mortgage might be sold multiple times to different buyers by the 
same seller.262 If the originator A already sold the mortgage, then the 
hapless subsequent buyer B has no rights in the mortgage to pass 
along, making the BCD transfers meaningless; B, and therefore 
C, have nothing to transfer. 
 
 259. See U.C.C. § 9-331 cmt. 2 (2011) (explaining that “priority” contextually means taking 
“free” of the Article 9 security interest).  
 260. The 2002 revision to UCC section 3-309’s lost-note provision undermines reification by 
enabling enforcement of notes that were lost in a mediate, rather immediate, transfer. As of 
2012, only ten states have adopted this revised provision. See supra note 84. 
 261. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2) (requiring the seller to have rights in the collateral or the power to 
transfer rights in the collateral). 
 262. See e.g., Provident Bank v. Cmty. Home Mortg. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 558, 562 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); Charles L. Armstrong, Thomas H. McNeill & James E. Reynolds, Warehouse 
Lending Losses Under the Financial Institution Bond, 12 FIDELITY L.J. 1, 2 (2006); Brian F. 
Corbett, Beware of Warehouse Lending Fraud, POYNER SPRUILL (Nov. 19, 2008), 
http://www.poynerspruill.com/publications/Pages/BewareofWarehouseLendingFraud.aspx.  
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Using negotiation as the method of transfer shields against this 
problem in all cases except those in which the borrower signed 
duplicative original notes.263 If there is only one original negotiable 
note, it can be transferred only once by any party through 
indorsement and delivery, and the party that takes physical 
possession with proper indorsement for value and in good faith will 
be a holder in due course and free from competing claims, thereby 
avoiding the warehouse-fraud problem. 
Thus, there was a good business reason, at least from the 
perspective of MBS investors, to want transfers to occur through 
Article 3 negotiation rather than Article 9 contracts. That PSAs could 
also qualify as Article 9 transfers added a cherry on top of zipless 
automatic perfection, thereby relieving concerns about 
recharacterization of the transfers as unperfected secured loans which 
would be vulnerable to avoidance by the FDIC or a trustee in 
bankruptcy should the sponsor or depositor become insolvent. Article 
9, then, it would seem, was never really meant to operate as the 
transfer mechanism, but as a shield against the FDIC and bankruptcy 
trustees. 
Yet Barnes, Cully, and Schwarcz, the latter two of whom were 
involved in structuring MBS, insist that Article 9 was the real transfer 
method, and that Article 3 negotiation was optional. Failure to 
properly negotiate the notes264 would create only a breach-of-contract 
claim for the trust, but leave the trust with standing to foreclose on 
the strength of the Article 9 transfer. And indeed, it appears from 
reported decisions that the securitization industry’s own practices 
were often to ignore indorsement and delivery requirements. 
Frequently—although it is not clear how frequently—notes were not 
indorsed at the supposed time of the transfer and indorsed, if at all, 
only after litigation began.265 Moreover, the official Rule 30(b)(6) 
 
 263. 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, supra note 240, § 6.03[B][2].  
 264. There is a separate issue about whether a transfer by negotiation would be valid if it 
complied with Article 3 but not with the particular indorsement sequence required in the PSA. 
This issue, which involves questions of New York trust law and REMIC status, is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 265. See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 07CV2560, 07CV2602, 
07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950, 
07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007) (dismissing 
foreclosure actions for a lack of standing because the plaintiff-mortgagees did not have valid 
assignments of the notes and mortgages at the time the complaint was filed); U.S. Bank v. 
Coley, CV076001426, 2011 WL 2734603, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 2011) (dismissing 
foreclosure for lack of standing because the mortgage assignment was four months subsequent 
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deponent of Countrywide Financial, the largest mortgage lender in 
the country during the housing bubble, testified in a bankruptcy case 
that it was customary for the securitization sponsor to remain in 
possession of the note and for indorsements to be prepared only 
when necessary for litigating foreclosures.266 Postdefault indorsement 
makes it impossible for the securitization trust to be a holder in due 
course,267 so the Article 3 benefits of freedom from claim and freedom 
from defenses are lost. 
What, then, are we to make of this situation? On the one hand, 
we have a situation in which MBS investors would have had good 
reason to want Article 3 transfers and deal documents that seem to 
require Article 3 transfers. On the other hand, however, we have 
former securitization attorneys insisting that Article 9, rather than 
Article 3, was the operative transfer mechanism and evidence that the 
securitization industry frequently ignored the indorsement and 
delivery requirements of Article 3 and the deal documents. To make 
sense of this apparent tension, it is necessary to first ask why the title-
system conflict was not resolved as part of the reforms undertaken to 
facilitate securitization. 
D. The Political Economy of Title Systems 
The creation of MERS and the revision of UCC Articles 1 and 9 
show that the securitization industry spent considerable effort and 
political capital attempting to reshape the legal landscape in which 
 
to the foreclosure suit’s initiation); McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 79 So. 3d 
170, 174–75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing a grant of summary judgment for the 
foreclosure plaintiff when the assignment of a mortgage occurred three days after the suit was 
initiated and the assignment of the note was undated); Lasalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ahearn, 875 
N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that a mortgagee’s assignee lacked standing to 
foreclose because the assignee did not own the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed); 
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Jordan, No. 91675, 2009 WL 625560, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 
2009) (affirming the dismissal of a foreclosure action for a lack of standing because the putative 
mortgagee could not prove it owned the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed); 
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Byrams, 275 P.3d 129, 132–33 (Okla. 2012) (reversing and 
remanding summary judgment for the foreclosure plaintiff because standing did not exist at the 
time the action was instituted); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087, 1093 (Vt. 2011) 
(upholding the denial of standing to foreclose because the bank could not demonstrate that it 
was the holder of the note at the time the foreclosure action was initiated).  
 266. See Kemp v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 440 B.R. 624, 628 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010); 
Transcript of Hearing at 15–17, Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (No. 08-18700), available at http://www.
americanbanker.com/media/pdfs/CountrywideDiMartini112910.pdf.  
 267. See U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2) (2011) (requiring a holder in due course to have taken 
“without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored”).  
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securitization operated. Why, then, was the title-system conflict not 
resolved instead of muddied? 
The answer might simply be that no one recognized the problem 
and thought to fix it. The relative rarity of foreclosures prior to the 
bursting of the housing bubble and the fact that they were typically 
default judgments meant that no problem had really emerged in 
practice. The prevalence of default judgments created a type of legal 
“leverage” for the mortgage industry, much the way debt creates 
financial leverage, enabling greater returns on equity. The assumption 
of lack of foreclosure litigation was fundamental to the mortgage 
industry’s business model. Indeed, the ability to obtain default 
judgments in almost all debt-collection matters is essential to the 
business models of consumer credit in general. When this assumption 
failed in the aftermath of the housing bubble, the industry was ill-
equipped to deal with it.268 
The conceptual framework for UCC Article 3 also discouraged 
recognition of conflicting title systems. UCC Article 3 speaks in terms 
of enforcement rights, not ownership, so it is not generally thought of 
as a title system (when it is thought of at all). 
Part of the answer may also reflect the increasingly specialized 
nature of legal practice: the attorneys who arrange securitizations are 
not the same as those who do mortgage foreclosures. The former are 
engaged in transactional work at large, white-shoe law firms; the 
latter are litigators working as little more than debt collectors, far 
down on the profession’s prestige ladder.269 The securitization 
 
 268. By analogy, one might compare this situation to that of prosecutors’ offices and police 
forces that are used to having almost all cases result in plea bargains and are therefore sloppy 
with the tendering of exculpatory evidence or with the custody of evidence. This sort of 
sloppiness is not a problem for the prosecutors as long as prosecutions result in plea bargains, 
but when a crack defense team chooses to litigate, these bad habits can seriously complicate the 
prosecution.  
 269. For a sense of just how different the nature of the legal practice is in the foreclosure 
bar, the case of In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 655 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 
2011), is illustrative. In Taylor, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s reversal of a 
bankruptcy court’s sanctions on a foreclosure law firm. In re Taylor, 655 F.3d 274, 288 (3d Cir. 
2011). The law firm had no personal contact with or phone number for the client, or the ability 
to communicate with the client about the case. Id. at 279. Instead, the firm received its work 
orders via a computer system along with the supporting documents that the client deemed 
necessary for prosecuting the foreclosure. Id. The law firm was required to file particular legal 
documents on a preset time line or have its compensation docked. Id. Although it is not clear if 
the lack of communication ability is unusual, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have state-by-state 
foreclosure time lines that servicers (and hence servicers’ attorneys) must meet to avoid 
financial penalties, and these time lines are often used as industry standards. See generally 
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attorneys who contributed to the creation of MERS and Revised 
Article 9 were focused on getting the securitization deals done and, 
secondarily, achieving bankruptcy remoteness—freedom from claims. 
Enforcement of the mortgages was someone else’s dirty, untoward 
problem, especially as none of the myriad opinion letters involved in 
securitization put the attorneys on the hook for enforceability issues 
regarding the mortgages.270 In a nutshell, the development of MERS 
and Revised Article 9 is captured by a Tom Lehrer couplet about 
Wernher von Braun, the infamous rocket scientist: “‘Once the rockets 
are up, who cares where they come down? That’s not my 
department,’ says Wernher von Braun.”271 
Yet there is also a consistent political-economy story that 
explains the developments of MERS and UCC Article 9. Different 
property-rights verification regimes benefit different parties in 
securitizations. The securitization industry has a myriad of different 
players, but they can largely be characterized as sell-side and buy-side 
institutions. Some institutions are active on both sides, but with little 
apparent coordination.272 Securitization deals are assembled and sold 
by the sell-side institutions, whereas the buy-side institutions are 
fixed-income investors that generally treat MBS as one of many 
potential investments. 
MERS and UCC Article 9 were attempts to shift property-rights 
verification regimes away from public, demonstrative regimes replete 
with formalities toward simple, bilateral contractual allocation of 
 
Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-Litigation, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 867 (2013) (describing the structure and 
economics of foreclosure mills).  
 270. The opinion letters that accompany the SEC shelf registration for securitizations 
typically note that the opinions expressed are based on the attorneys having “assumed . . . the 
truth, accuracy and completeness of the information, representations and warranties contained 
in the records, documents, instruments, and certificates [they] have reviewed.” Opinion Letter 
from Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP to Residential Asset Mortgage Products, Inc., (Jan. 20, 
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099391/000106823806000048/ 
exhibit5-1.htm; see, e.g., Opinion Letter from Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP to Residential 
Asset Mortgage Products, Inc., Re: Residential Mortgage Products, Inc. Registration Statement 
on Form S-3 (Nov. 12, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099391/ 
000109939103000337/exh52.txt (“In rendering this opinion letter, . . . we . . . assume no 
responsibility with respect to (a) the accuracy of and compliance by the parties thereto with the 
representations, warranties and covenants as to factual matters contained in any 
document . . . .”). Securitization opinion letters thus do not typically express any opinion about 
the enforceability of the underlying mortgage loans; enforceability of the mortgages is an 
assumption on which opinion letters are founded. 
 271. TOM LEHRER, Wernher von Braun, on THAT WAS THE YEAR THAT WAS (Reprise 
Records 1965).  
 272. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 27, at 18–19.  
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rights. Shifting from more formal to less formal and from more public 
to less public verification regimes had the advantage of lowering 
transaction costs for putting together securitizations. Lower 
transaction costs benefitted sell-side institutions. Sell-side institutions’ 
revenue is largely fee based and thus depends not on deal 
performance but on deal volume.273 Lower transaction costs enable 
greater deal volume. Accordingly, “contracting” regimes for rights 
verification were more attractive for the sell-side financial institutions 
and their attorneys who assembled securitizations. The sell-side was 
not concerned about fraud costs, uncertainty costs, and adjudication 
costs—the costs reduced through the “paperization principle”274—
because they are all borne by the buy-side. 
MERS was a creation of and is owned by sell-side firms. The 
Article 9 drafting process is harder to characterize, but the push to 
make the world safe for securitization appears to have been a sell-
side, rather than buy-side, initiative; by definition the buy-side has 
other investment options, so it is not focused on facilitating 
securitization. 
From the buy-side’s perspective, a critical feature of what makes 
MBS attractive is the apparent security of property rights in the 
underlying mortgages—freedom from claims and freedom from 
defenses. Buy-side institutions bear the risk of any problem in 
mortgage title, most notably the risk of the securitized assets getting 
pulled into the bankruptcy estate of the transferor, the risk of being 
subject to two levels of taxation because the mortgages are treated as 
property of the transferor, rather than the pass-through securitization 
Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMIC) vehicle,275 and 
the risk that standing cannot be proven for enforcement purposes. 
Accordingly, from a buy-side perspective there is a strong interest in 
ensuring absolute certainty in the property rights transferred. All of 
this militates toward the buy-side preferring public demonstration 
regimes like Article 3 and land records because they lend themselves 
to easier verification of rights than bilateral contracting regimes. 
In a transparent, well-functioning market, MBS buyers would 
have demanded a discount for the use of the contracting regime and 
 
 273. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 151, at 1230. 
 274. See Clark, supra note 32, at 476 (“By requiring a writing between the parties to a 
transaction, unfixity [i.e. uncertainty] costs are significantly reduced. Fraud costs ought also to 
be reduced, in that fraud by one of the parties on the other is made somewhat more difficult.”).  
 275. See supra note 146.  
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its heightened risk for both bankruptcy remoteness and enforcement 
of mortgages.276 But this would have required MBS investors to see 
the problem and anticipate its impact. 
Accordingly, we might hypothesize a lulling story: Investors need 
to feel sufficiently confident about the rights they are receiving if they 
are to be induced to buy MBS. The MBS market was established 
using negotiation and land-record recording. Although expensive, 
these methods of transfer established a high degree of certainty about 
freedom from claim and ability to enforce. Once the market was 
established in the 1990s, however, MBS investors stopped being 
concerned with the technical details of transfers, relying on rating 
agencies—compensated by the sell-side—to flag any problematic 
legal changes via ratings. Just as the rating agencies failed to flag 
problems in the mortgage underwriting, they also failed to flag 
problems in the legal structure, which enabled the sell-side to shift to 
less formal and less expensive systems like MERS and UCC Article 9 
that benefitted them, not the MBS investors. The cost-shifting 
implications became apparent to investors only after the bubble burst 
and foreclosures became difficult to prosecute because of standing 
problems. 
Even now, it is impossible for MBS investors to gauge the impact 
of the regime shift. MBS investors receive very little information 
about deal performance. They receive monthly reports from MBS 
trustees that detail delinquency rates and realized losses but not the 
factors involved in the losses. Therefore, absent further investigation, 
it is impossible for MBS investors to determine whether losses are 
caused by poor underwriting, property value declines, or delayed or 
prevented foreclosures due to inability to prove standing. 
The representations and warranties that accompany most 
securitized loans can reasonably be read to warrant the enforceability 
of the mortgage and the completeness and appropriateness of the 
documentation.277 Enforcement of these representations and 
 
 276. It is not clear how much, if any, of the transaction-cost savings were captured by 
homeowners.  
 277. Common representations and warranties include a representation and warrant from the 
seller to the depositor, master servicer, and trustee that “[i]mmediately prior to the 
assignment[,] . . . [the seller] had good title to, and was the sole owner of, [the loan] free and 
clear of any pledge, lien, encumbrance or security interest and had full right and authority . . . to 
sell and assign the [loan] pursuant to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.” Pooling and 
Servicing Agreement, Alternative Loan Trust 2005-35CB, supra note 203, sched. III-B(1). Other 
typical seller representations and warranties to the depositor, master servicer, and trustee are 
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warranties, however, depends upon MBS trustees and servicers. This 
is a problem because neither trustees nor servicers are looking out for 
MBS investors. MBS trustees do not represent the investors’ interests 
in any meaningful way. 
MBS trustees are a distinct type of trustee. They are not donative 
trustees. They are not (usually) indenture trustees,278 but like 
indenture trustees, their duties are primarily contractually defined 
rather than springing from a fiduciary penumbra. MBS trustees are 
compensated only for ministerial functions; they are typically paid 
less than a basis point annually on the outstanding principal balance 
of the mortgage loans held by the trust.279 MBS trustees are not 
required to undertake anything more than their normal ministerial 
functions unless an expressly defined event of default has occurred.280 
When an event of default occurs, however, the trustee is held to a 
prudent-person standard of care.281 As a result, the trustee may have 
to assume additional duties. Additionally, if prudence or a requisite 
 
that “[e]ach Mortgage is a valid and enforceable first lien on the Mortgaged Property,” and that 
“[t]here is no valid offset, defense or counterclaim to any Mortgage Note or Mortgage, including 
the obligation of the Mortgagor to pay the unpaid principal of or interest on such Mortgage 
Note.” Id. sched. III-A(4), (6). 
  The depositor makes more limited representations and warranties, namely that “[t]he 
Depositor hereby represents and warrants to the Trustee with respect to each [loan] . . . that as 
of the Closing Date, and following the transfer of the [loans] to it by each Seller, the Depositor 
had good title to the [loans] and the Mortgage Notes were subject to no offsets, defenses or 
counterclaims.” Id. § 2.04.  
 278. Some MBS are issued pursuant to indentures, and, even when not, MBS trustees may 
still be subject to the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–bbbb (2012), and state 
trust indenture laws, but unlike a classic bond indenture trustee, an MBS trustee does hold title 
to an actual trust corpus and typically has different duties than an indenture trustee, such as 
ensuring that the required mortgage loan documentation has been delivered to the trust, 
protecting the trust corpus, supervising the servicer of the loans, and acting as a financial 
backstop to the servicer.  
 279. See, e.g., Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Alternative Loan Trust 2005-35CB, supra 
note 203, Article I (“Trustee Fee: As to any Distribution Date, an amount equal to one-twelfth 
of the Trustee Fee Rate multiplied by the sum of (i) the Pool Stated Principal Balance plus (ii) 
any amounts remaining in the Supplemental Loan Account (excluding any investment earnings 
thereon) with respect to such Distribution Date.”); id. (“Trustee Fee Rate: With respect to each 
Mortgage Loan, 0.009% per annum.”). 
 280. See, e.g., Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Alternative Loan Trust 2005-35CB, supra 
note 203, § 8.01 (“The Trustee, prior to the occurrence of an Event of Default and after the 
curing of all Events of Default that may have occurred, shall undertake to perform such duties 
and only such duties as are specifically set forth in this Agreement.”). 
 281. See, e.g., id. (“In case an Event of Default has occurred and remains uncured, the 
Trustee shall exercise such of the rights and powers vested in it by this Agreement, and use the 
same degree of care and skill in their exercise as a prudent person would exercise or use under 
the circumstances in the conduct of such person’s own affairs.”).  
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majority of investors requires the termination of the servicer (often 
called the “master servicer”), then the trustee is typically required to 
assume the duties of the servicer.282 The trustee thus serves as a 
backup servicer, placing it in a potentially costly guarantor role 
should the servicer fail to fulfill its duties and be terminated. 
MBS trustees have three major adverse incentives to being 
proactive and investigating losses. First, trustees risk being held to a 
higher standard of care (and possibly losing their indemnification 
from the servicer283) if they are proactive prior to an expressly defined 
event of default. Second, a trustee’s diligence may result in an event 
of default and the trustee being subject to a prudent-person standard 
of care and greater duties (including potentially the assumption of the 
servicer’s duties). And third, trustees do not want to jeopardize their 
business relationships with sell-side firms because trustees receive 
their business from from sell-side firms affiliated with servicers rather 
than from MBS investors.284 These sell-side firms face representation 
and warranty liability to the trust on the quality and enforceability of 
the loans sold, and the servicers themselves face servicing covenant 
liability if they fail to enforce these representations and warranties. 
As a result, MBS trustees are willfully blind to representation and 
warranty problems, including those relating to mortgage loan 
documentation, lest they notice that servicers are not providing notice 
 
 282. See, e.g., id. §§ 7.01–7.02 (“If an Event of Default . . . shall occur, then, and in each and 
every such case, so long as such Event of Default shall not have been remedied, the Trustee 
may, or [if directed by a group of Certificate Holders with two thirds of the voting rights in the 
trust] shall . . . terminate all of the rights and obligations of the Master Servicer under this 
Agreement and . . . all authority and power of the Master Servicer hereunder, whether with 
respect to the Mortgage Loans or otherwise, shall pass to and be vested in the Trustee. . . . On 
and after the time the Master Servicer receives a notice of termination . . . the Trustee shall . . . 
be the successor to the Master Servicer in its capacity as master servicer under this Agreement 
and the transactions set forth or provided for herein and shall be subject to all the 
responsibilities, duties and liabilities relating thereto placed on the Master Servicer by the terms 
and provisions hereof and applicable law including the obligation to make Advances . . . .”). 
 283. See, e.g., id. § 8.05 (“The Trustee and any director, officer, employee or agent of the 
Trustee shall be indemnified by the Master Servicer and held harmless against any loss, liability 
or expense (including reasonable attorney’s fees) (i) incurred in connection with any claim or 
legal action relating to (a) this Agreement, (b) the Certificates or (c) in connection with the 
performance of any of the Trustee’s duties hereunder, other than any loss, liability or expense 
incurred by reason of willful misfeasance, bad faith or negligence in the performance of any of 
the Trustee’s duties hereunder or incurred by reason of any action of the Trustee taken at the 
direction of the Certificateholders . . . .”). 
 284. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 199, at 58–63. 
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of breaches of representations and warranties and are violating their 
servicing covenants, which could be the basis for an event of default.285  
Securitization investors face significant obstacles to forcing 
trustees to fulfill their obligations. Investors in securitizations 
typically have the right to enforce the duties of the servicer or the 
representations and warranties of the sponsor through a demand on 
the trustee to act. Such a demand, however, typically requires 
compliance with a collective-action clause that mandates that it be 
supported by 25 percent of the voting rights of the MBS certificates, 
sometimes in each class of certificates. The trustee controls the list of 
the certificate holders who are otherwise anonymous to each other, 
unless the requisite number of certificate holders gather to demand 
the list from the trustee. The certificate holders must also offer the 
trustee indemnity for its actions taken in response to their direction. 
Only if the trustee refuses to act for sixty days following notice and 
indemnity may a certificate holder bring suit itself to enforce the 
securitization contract, and even then, the certificate holder cannot 
easily remove the recalcitrant trustee: the trustee is usually removable 
only upon the action of certificate holders representing 51 percent of 
the voting rights of the certificates. Securitization trustees are usually 
do-nothing entities that are not inclined to look out for MBS 
investors. Accordingly, they are unlikely to take any action to 
determine why losses are occurring on mortgages. 
MBS servicers, in contrast, may very well know why losses are 
occurring. MBS servicers are loath to enforce representations and 
warranties because they are frequently affiliates of the sell-side 
firms.286 Servicers do not want to force their affiliates to pay out on 
representations and warranties, particularly because MBS include 
liquidated damages clauses for breaches of representations and 
warranties that require the sponsor to repurchase the loan from the 
trust for its remaining balance, rather than for the diminution in the 
 
 285. See Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual 
and Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1063–64 (2002) (noting the trustee’s lack of 
incentives to function as an “effective representative” for the bondholders); Steven L. Schwarcz 
& Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
1037, 1042–43 (2008) (advocating that the business judgment rule for corporate directors should 
be superimposed over the indenture trustee’s prudent-man standard to correct deficiencies in 
the current system); Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: The Conflicted Trustee Dilemma, 54 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 707, 708–09 (2009) (discussing the dilemma faced by trustees who represent 
groups of investors that have conflicting interests).  
 286. See supra note 162. 
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value of the loan.287 Accordingly, even though MBS investors 
purchased mortgages that were represented and warranted to be 
properly documented and enforceable, they have little recourse when 
servicers are unable to foreclose because the investors cannot prove 
standing due to documentation problems. The investors lack 
information on individual loans and cannot easily obtain it, much less 
force trustees and servicers to act. Doing so requires the investors 
typically holding 25 percent of the voting rights in a securitization 
deal to notify the trustee of an event of default and indemnify the 
trustee before the trustee undertakes any actions in response to an 
investor demand. The former requirement is a problem because 
investors do not know the identity of each other; most MBS do not 
have publicly available bondholder lists, so achieving the threshold to 
make a collective demand on the trustee can be difficult.288 Investors 
then need to have sufficient facts to credibly allege an event of 
default—but investors generally lack this information. Moreover, the 
indemnification can then be costly, and, because of credit tranching, 
many investors may not especially care about representations and 
warranty violations in any particular deal because the losses are borne 
by other investors in lower-priority tranches. 
Investor action has resulted in what is proposed to be the largest 
private settlement in history, an $8.5 billion proposed settlement 
between the Bank of New York Mellon as trustee for some 530 MBS 
trusts and Bank of America, covering, among other things, loan 
documentation issues.289 Yet it was difficult for investors to even get 
Bank of New York Mellon to act once they alleged an event of 
default, and Bank of New York Mellon still never performed a 
substantive investigation of any of the documentation problems 
alleged, but merely settled them.290 The private-label securitization 
 
 287. The liquidated damages clauses are known as “putback” provisions because a loan that 
fails to conform with the seller’s representations and warranties is put back to the sponsor. 
Technically the putback is “enforced” by the trustee after receiving notice from the servicer, 
seller, depositor, or itself of the breach of representation or warranty, but the servicer’s notice is 
the key to the action. Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Alternative Loan Trust 2005-35CB, 
supra note 203, § 2.03(c). 
 288. Some PSAs entitle groups of investors (but not single investors) to obtain information 
about the identity of other investors. E.g., id. § 5.05 (requiring trustee to provide the most recent 
certificateholders list in response to a petition by at least three certificateholders). 
 289. See Verified Petition at 1, In re Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 651786/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
June 28, 2011), NYSCEF Doc. No. 1. 
 290. Full disclosure: I am retained as an expert witness on behalf of American International 
Group (AIG) as an intervenor opposing court approval of the proposed settlement. Although 
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market turns out to have been a lemons market not just on mortgage 
underwriting but also on legal transfer regime.291 
Today, the more sophisticated buy-side firms understand that the 
enforcement problem exists, even if they do not fully understand why. 
This is one reason why the private-label securitization market 
remains moribund. After the bubble, investors are understandably 
concerned about the probability of default on securitized mortgages. 
They also cannot estimate loss-given-default because of legal 
uncertainty. Accordingly, they are staying away from any deals in 
which they bear credit risk because it cannot be priced.292 The only 
securitization that is now occurring is with the federal government 
bearing all credit risk. The collapse of the securitization market is 
exactly what Professor George Akerlof’s model of the lemons market 
predicts, and as long as it remains a lemons market, including for legal 
transfer regime, private-label securitization will not be resurrected. 
IV.  THE REFORM OF MORTGAGE TITLE SYSTEMS 
A. Existing Reform Proposals 
The existence of a problem in the enforcement of mortgages has 
been widely recognized by scholars as well as practitioners. None of 
the scholarly treatments of the issue, however, has recognized the 
enforcement difficulties as being driven by a problem of conflicting 
title systems. Though some of the scholarship has recognized that 
there is a tension between the UCC and real-property systems,293 none 
has identified this as the core problem. 
 
UCC issues have not been specifically raised in the proposed settlement, it does cover some 
issues related to the documentation of notes and security interests to the securitization trusts. 
See Exhibit B at 34, In re Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 651786/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 29, 2011), 
NYSCEF Doc. No. 3. Loans registered on MERS are excluded from coverage in this provision 
of the settlement. Id. at 29.  
 291. See generally Akerlof, supra note 148 (hypothesizing lemons markets). 
 292. Adam J. Levitin, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, The Dodd-Frank Act and 
Housing Finance: Can It Restore Private Risk Capital to the Securitization Market?, 29 YALE J. 
ON REG. 155, 157–58 (2012).  
 293. See, e.g., Whitman & Milner, supra note 19, at 60 (“[I]n a number of nonjudicial-
foreclosure states, the requirements of UCC Article 3 and the corresponding statutory 
foreclosure procedures seem to exist in different universes.”); John Patrick Hunt, Richard 
Stanton & Nancy Wallace, Rebalancing Public and Private in the Law of Mortgage Transfer 29 
(UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 327, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117555 (“Article 9 [of the UCC] and real property recording law may 
be in conflict, at least in some states.”).  
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Instead, the existing scholarship tends to focus on either the 
mortgages or the notes, but not on their interaction. Thus, proposals 
have been made to reform land recordation systems,294 require record-
of-ownership requirements to foreclosure statutes,295 fix MERS so 
that it tracks296 or holds notes,297 create a national lien registry,298 
eliminate negotiability,299 or merge the note and mortgage into a 
single document.300 
1. Reformation of Land Recordation Systems.  All of these 
proposals have shortcomings, but their fundamental problem is that 
they diagnose the problem with mortgage title too narrowly. Land 
recordation systems could stand to be modernized, but their 
antiquated features are not the cause of the problems relating to 
foreclosure. Similarly, requiring records of mortgage ownership 
would help clarify standing for nonjudicial foreclosures, but by itself it 
does not resolve how ownership records are to be established. 
2. Reformation of MERS.  A reformation of MERS so that it 
would either definitively track or hold notes would bring it closer in 
line with the DTC model of immobilized title for both notes and 
mortgages.301 MERS, however, previously rejected holding notes,302 
 
 294. See Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title Recording 
System, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 19, 19–21 (2011) (“An ideal system will deal with the 
fundamental problem with the American land title system. It is a paper-based system that has 
been awkwardly translated to computers.”); Hunt et al., supra note 293 (proposing upgrading 
local recording systems to handle electronic mortgage assignments). 
 295. See Timothy A. Froehle, Note, Standing in the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis: Why 
Procedural Requirements Are Necessary To Prevent Further Loss to Homeowners, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 1719, 1740–41 (2011).  
 296. See Robert Hockett, Six Years on and Still Counting: Sifting Through the Mortgage 
Mess, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 373, 406 (2013) (suggesting “reform of the current mortgage and 
note recording system, ideally in the form of a readily accessible and editable electronic registry 
system—e.g., a fully generalized MERS system”); Dustin A. Zacks, Standing in Our Own 
Sunshine: Reconsidering Standing, Transparency, and Accuracy in Foreclosures, 29 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 551, 600–09 (2011). 
 297. Whitman, supra note 49, at 757–66. 
 298. Hunt, Stanton & Wallace, supra note 293.  
 299. Whitman, supra note 49, at 769. 
 300. White, supra note 168, at 498.  
 301. Such a reformation could also involve a nationalization of MERS; private recording 
databases will inevitably suffer from questions of credibility and reliability to the extent they are 
relied upon for judicial evidence. See Langin, supra note 20, at 7–8 (discussing a case in which 
testimony and evidence regarding the global debt-registry process was admitted by a court to 
establish chain of title to a debt). Unlike recording systems for consumer debt, DTC and other 
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which would vastly increase its duties and liabilities. More 
importantly, there is a stronger public interest in clarity and 
transparency of mortgage title than for securities; holding mortgages 
in “street name” can cause many greater problems than doing so for 
securities. And given the current state of the law on MERS, a 
statutory framework equivalent to UCC Article 8 would be necessary 
for a revamped MERS to operate. 
3. Creation of a National Lien Registry.  A national lien registry, 
especially one operated by the government, rather than by a private 
party like MERS, is a sensible idea, but a lien registry alone is 
insufficient to solve the standing problem, and raises other operative 
and legal questions. Although there are problems with the accuracy 
of MERS’s database, the fundamental problem is a question of which 
title system controls. A national lien registry could work if the right to 
foreclose were determined by lien registration; that would have the 
effect of essentially choosing mortgage recordation in a public system 
as controlling over other title systems. This is a sensible approach, but 
it would require major law revision and would face a political-
economy problem of shifting recording revenue from local 
governments to the federal government. There is also a question 
about whether there is constitutional authority for the federal 
government to interfere with real-estate recordation, which is 
traditionally a local right. 
Federal housing-finance reform legislation proposed in 2013 
contemplates creating a privately operated national registry for 
consensual mortgage liens.303 The logic to a national mortgage title 
system is that it would match the national housing-finance market. 
 
book-entry systems for investment securities are not frequently used to provide evidence in 
judicial proceedings.  
 302. See generally R.K. Arnold, Yes, There Is Life on MERS, PROB. & PROP., July–Aug. 
1997, at 33 (describing the decisions involved in the creation of MERS). 
 303. Such a registry has been proposed in two housing-finance-system reform bills pending 
in Congress: the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013, H.R. 2767, 
113th Cong. §§ 331–335 (2013), and the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act 
of 2013, S. 1217, 113th Cong. §§ 224–225 (2013) (the “Corker-Warner bill”). Although as a 
generic matter a national lien registry makes some sense, I have criticized these legislative 
proposals on account of their motivation and their inadequate consideration of the complexities 
of making a national system fit with local real-property law. See A Legislative Proposal To 
Protect American Taxpayers and Homeowners by Creating a Sustainable Housing Finance 
System: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 113th Cong. 3–4 (2013) (statement of 
Professor Adam J. Levitin), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-
113-ba00-wstate-alevitin-20130718.pdf.  
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There are several problems, however, with the idea as proposed in 
the legislation. 
First, clarity of real-property title is a public good and should be 
provided by the government, rather than by private parties, as is 
already done by the federal government for other types of property, 
such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, broadcast spectrum, aircraft, 
and some nautical vessels. 
Second, it is not clear how the national system would interact 
with local land records. Currently, a variety of types of property 
interests are recorded in local land records, including deeds, 
consensual liens, and involuntary liens. The fact that all of these 
interests are recorded in one system enables the law to easily 
prescribe priority among them and for someone investigating title to 
have a relatively simple search. The MERS system, for all of its flaws, 
does not fundamentally reject this common system, as MERS is 
inserted in the local land records as a type of a bookmark. Thus, if 
there were a MERS mortgage, it would show up in the local land 
records and give a title searcher notice of an encumbrance. The 
searcher would have to then look in the MERS database to determine 
the identity of the parties with an interest in that mortgage. At that 
point problems might ensue, but it would be clear to the title searcher 
that there was some sort of voluntary encumbrance on the property 
that needed to be further investigated. 
This process would not work with a separate national mortgage 
registry. The national system would contain recordations of a subset 
of voluntary liens—those granted to institutional lenders. Other 
voluntary liens, all involuntary liens such as tax liens, homeowner-
association liens, construction liens, and judgment liens, and all other 
property interests would remain in the local land records. Creating 
two parallel systems would raise a host of thorny questions about how 
the systems would interact.304 Which law would control, federal or 
state? And how would the property interests in the two systems be 
reconciled? How would priority of interests be determined? How 
would legal requirements from title-theory states apply to mortgages 
in a federal system? Absent serious work reconciling fifty state real-
property systems with a federal registry, local land records would 
cease to provide definitive sources of clear title but would also 
 
 304. Neither the Supremacy Clause nor federal-preemption doctrine provide much guidance 
because there is not a conflict between federal and state law, so much as a question about the 
priorities of the mortgages recorded under these laws. 
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continue to exist and be relevant for determining title. The result 
would undermine the very goal of a national system, as it would only 
add a title system, rather than consolidate existing ones. 
A simpler solution to lack of consistency of mortgage title 
procedures among the states would be to recreate a federally owned 
and operated MERS-type system that would sit as a superstructure on 
local land records. Such a system would easily interface with existing 
land records, local real-property law, and lien-priority rules. Further, 
with any federal MERS system, it would be simple to correct the 
major failings of the MERS system: failure to properly and timely 
register transfers could have definite legal effects, thereby ensuring 
the accuracy of the database; foreclosures could be required to be 
undertaken in the name of the real party in interest; and transfers 
within the database could only be made by properly registered and 
vetted agents of lenders, rather than by MERS’s poorly supervised 
and much-criticized system of “signing agents,” none of whom 
actually work for MERS.305 
A farther-reaching approach would involve the federalization of 
all land records in a Torrens-type registry, such as that used in several 
states and other countries.306 This approach would make sense if 
designing a land record system on a blank slate, but it would be an 
expensive undertaking with questionable constitutional authority. 
4. Elimination of Negotiability.  Elimination of negotiability 
raises a range of potential problems. It would expose mortgage 
investors to the risk of double selling (warehouse fraud),307 thereby 
undermining the freedom from claims that is a basic assumption for 
most MBS investment. Indeed, warehouse lending, which provides 
the financing for most mortgage banks, relies on negotiability: many 
warehouse-lending arrangements involve a bailment of mortgage 
notes with the bailee (such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac) having the 
option to purchase the notes. This option can be easily executed if the 
notes held by the bailee are indorsed in blank. The ambiguous nature 
of title to a bailment of bearer property is precisely what lubricates 
the system. 
Eliminating negotiability would also eliminate the possibility of a 
mortgagee being a holder in due course, again affecting freedom from 
 
 305. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra note 118. 
 307. Whitman, supra note 49, at 768–69.  
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claims and freedom from defenses. Although assignee liability might 
not be a bad thing,308 elimination of negotiability also makes 
enforcement more difficult—the terms of a mortgage would need to 
be proven separately from the note. In any event, the market could 
abandon negotiability by itself if the benefits outweigh the costs. Yet 
the market has cleaved to what it believes to be a negotiable 
instrument for the note. 
5. Merger of Note and Mortgage.  The idea behind merging the 
note and mortgage into a single instrument is to eliminate the 
possibility of the noteholder being different from the mortgagee. By 
itself, however, all merger accomplishes is to make the mortgage-
follows-the-note doctrine literal. It does not resolve how the 
instrument is supposed to be transferred and therefore who has 
enforcement rights. Moreover, a merged instrument would present 
privacy problems for borrowers. Not all individuals want their 
neighbors to know that they have bad credit and can only get a 
subprime loan. The current separation of the note and mortgage 
means that only the mortgage is a public document. The terms of the 
note stay private, protecting the borrower’s (and the lender’s) privacy 
interest in the terms of the loan, which may reveal the borrower’s 
overall financial condition. Merger of note and mortgage into a single 
instrument would come at the expense of borrower privacy absent 
some way of splitting the recorded instrument into a public portion 
and a portion available only to litigants and the recording-office 
officials. 
* * * 
Ultimately, the deficiencies of existing reform proposals all stem 
from the overly narrow nature of their diagnoses of the problem as 
either one of real-estate recordation systems,309 negotiability,310 or 
consumer protection.311 The mortgage-title-system problem implicates 
all of these issues, but it is fundamentally a problem about competing 
title systems. Once the nature of the problem is recognized, a 
 
 308. See Kurt Eggert, Not Dead Yet: The Surprising Survival of Negotiability, 66 ARK. L. 
REV. 145, 171–73 (2013) (identifying the holder-in-due-course doctrine as the real problem with 
negotiability).  
 309. See Marsh, supra note 294, at 19–24; Zacks, supra note 296, at 551–55.  
 310. See Whitman, supra note 49, at 741–54.  
 311. See White, supra note 300, at 494–96.  
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solution—reconciling title systems—readily presents itself. 
Importantly, however, system reconciliation would only help 
prospectively; it would not solve the legacy problem of existing 
mortgages. 
B. Reconciling Title Systems 
There are several possible ways to reconcile mortgage title 
systems. As an initial matter, however, it is important to note that the 
standard property-law move for dealing with competing claims, 
namely, establishing a system of priorities, is inapplicable to a 
problem of competing systems used to establish rights against 
nonclaimants. The issue is one of system validity, not priority. 
Were one creating a mortgage title system from scratch, it is 
likely that such a system would be integrated with land records. It 
would also be a federal-level system; only historical development 
explains why state and local law still shape a national (and 
international) real-estate finance market. There also would be no 
particular reason for having mortgage title separate from other types 
of security interests. In short, if working on a blank slate, a unified 
federal system for recording of a range of intangible and tangible 
property interests might make sense; realistically, however, any 
reforms must work within the existing institutional framework of 
county-level land records and state-level law. 
Working within the existing institutional framework, the simplest 
approach would be to pick a system and have it be the sole 
determinative system. Thus, we could decide that Article 3 
negotiation, Article 9 sale, MERS, or land records control. If the 
concern is establishing clarity of property rights, then public 
recordation—land records—would seem to be the optimal system 
because it gives the best evidentiary certainty, and because virtually 
all mortgages are recorded as a matter of practice.312 But mortgage 
recordation is not mandatory, and the mortgage is an ancillary right 
to the note—a mortgage without a note has little meaning. State real-
property law would need to be amended in some cases to make such a 
system work well. 
Alternatively, we could create a hierarchy among existing title 
systems, in which all would be valid ways of creating title, but title in 
 
 312. One could envision a grace period for transferring mortgages recorded in MERS’s 
name to the name of the real economic lender. 
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one system would trump title in another system if there were a 
conflict. For example, we could have a system in which Article 9 sales 
trump MERS, negotiation trumps Article 9 sales, and mortgage 
recordation trumps negotiation. Thus, if there were a conflict 
between, say, Article 9 and recordation, the recorded title would be 
treated as controlling. There is a potential recursivity problem here as 
long as recordation can be done in MERS’s name. To wit, in the 
example above, if recordation trumps Article 9, but the mortgage is 
recorded in MERS’s name, then what has really happened is that 
MERS has trumped Article 9, which upends the intended hierarchy. 
But conceptually, the idea of establishing a hierarchy is another way 
to deal with competing property-title regimes. 
A further approach would be to return to presecuritization 
systems, which worked well in terms of keeping title clear. This could 
be done via a partial repeal of the UCC Article 1 and 9 revisions and 
a prohibition of property recordation in the name of agents, thereby 
making MERS inoperable. This approach would require recordation 
of every mortgage transfer in a securitization, as well as cumbersome 
indorsement and delivery of thousands of notes, but these 
demonstrative formalities would be the price tag for clear property 
rights. 
Another approach would be that adopted by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in Eaton, namely, requiring that note and 
mortgage systems match as a prerequisite for foreclosure.313 A party 
would need to prove that it was both the owner (or holder) of the 
note and the mortgagee in order to foreclose. Although such an 
approach clarifies foreclosure standing issues, it does not clarify the 
ownership of notes or mortgages, which is important for mortgage 
financing markets. 
An alternative approach would be to create a county- or state-
level system for registering ownership of mortgage notes that would 
be linked to land records through unique identifiers. A note registry 
would not establish conclusive title to the note.314 But it would provide 
strong presumptive evidence of title, much like mortgage recordation. 
It could also establish priority of claims to notes, thereby avoiding 
warehouse-fraud problems. Note registration could then be combined 
with the Massachusetts approach by making matching registration of 
 
 313. For discussion of Eaton, see supra notes 10, 16 and accompanying text. 
 314. One could imagine a Torrens registration system for notes, cf. supra note 118, but it 
would add significant costs. 
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the note and recordation of the mortgage prerequisites for 
foreclosure. The result would be reduced fraud costs, uncertainty 
costs, and adjudication costs.315 Moreover, a note registration system 
would not require the recording of the actual notes, as registration 
would not be evidence of the terms of the notes, only of ownership of 
the note. A note registry need only be a grantor-grantee index and 
could be adopted by local governments at comparatively low cost 
given their existing mortgage recordation systems. This means that 
registration could preserve borrowers’ privacy interest in the terms of 
the note. 
Note registration and a requirement of matching notes and 
mortgages for foreclosure would solve the problem of which title 
system controls while leaving undisturbed the operation of either land 
records or UCC Article 3 or Article 9. Registration would be required 
only for mortgage notes and only as a prerequisite to foreclosure. 
UCC Articles 3 and 9 would still operate as before for nonmortgage 
notes, whereas mortgage notes would simply require an additional 
formality for foreclosure, which could also be used as a type of notice 
filing to achieve extra security for those lending against the security of 
mortgage notes. Similarly, a note registry does not interfere with the 
operation of the current land recordation system, which enables 
prospective lenders to engage in tract searches to find out if there are 
any existing encumbrances on the property. 
Adopting a note registration system is the most natural outcome 
of the increased transfers of mortgage loans. Registration systems are 
frequently used for other types of readily traded debt instruments 
because of concerns such as problems of lost or forged instruments, 
the costs of physical delivery and indorsement, and interest in 
reducing litigation by clarifying rights. Treasury securities are tracked 
in a central registry maintained by the Federal Reserve Banks known 
as a “book-entry” system.316 Fannie and Freddie MBS are also issued 
using a book-entry system.317 Some cross-border trades of goods use 
 
 315. See Clark, supra note 32, at 478 (discussing the benefits of recordation).  
 316. See Book-Entry Procedure, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/
aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed05.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (noting the difficulties in making 
actual physical deliveries of securities and that “[s]ecurities in book-entry form are less 
vulnerable to theft and loss, can’t be counterfeited and don’t require counting or recording by 
certificate number”). 
 317. Id.  
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the Bill Of Lading Electronic Registry Organization (BOLERO).318 
And most corporate and municipal debt and equity securities utilize 
the DTC.319 
MERS represented another type of registration system for debt 
instruments, albeit one that was poorly designed and executed. 
MERS’s legitimacy suffered because of the errors in its database and 
abuse of corporate formalities. But the concern with MERS is also 
acute because the public policy interest in land title is different than 
the public policy interest in securities, and yet MERS lacks a statutory 
framework comparable to the UCC Article 8 and SEC regulation 
framework in which the DTC operates. Clouded property title affects 
neighboring properties and household balance sheets in a way that 
ownership of securities or bills of lading do not. 
The technical work of creating a note registry that interfaces with 
land records should not be a particularly onerous undertaking. The 
expense of operating such a system should be fairly modest, and much 
of the work could be automated. Although the system would be built 
around bright-line rules permitting foreclosure only to registered note 
owners-mortgagees, some standards-based safeguards need to be 
built to provide flexibility to the system, particularly to deal with 
problems of mistake or abuse.320 
A note registration system could obviously process mortgage 
notes executed after the registry’s operational date. Legacy mortgage 
notes—those executed before the registry’s operational date—would 
present a challenge, however. Registration of existing mortgage notes 
would be expensive and would upset parties’ settled expectations 
about cost frameworks in mortgage lending. There would also be the 
question of how to prove ownership of mortgage notes that have 
already been transferred. Although optimally all legacy mortgage 
notes would be registered, a more feasible and fairer solution would 
be to permit, but not require, registration for legacy notes. Legacy-
title problems will have to be resolved slowly and messily, as courts 
 
 318. See generally Miriam Goldby, Electronic Bills of Lading and Central Registries: What Is 
Holding Back Progress?, 17 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 125 (2008) (noting that central registry 
systems like BOLERO have not been widely adopted because of membership requirements, 
confidentiality concerns, and liability for system malfunction). 
 319. Responding to Wall Street’s Paperwork Crisis, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/about/
history (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
 320. See Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1369, 1420–35 (2013).  
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experiment with ways of upholding the law while limiting the systemic 
effects. 
Ultimately, the key question with a mortgage note registry is 
whether it is worthwhile. The costs and benefits are hard to 
immediately quantify in dollar terms. On the one hand, the costs are 
operation costs of creating and maintaining a registry and the cost to 
mortgagees of registering the notes. For local governments that 
already operate mortgage recordation systems, the costs of creating 
and operating a parallel note registration system seem fairly low—
registration is not a particularly complex task. Requiring matching 
registration and recordation as a prerequisite to foreclosure would 
increase the costs of mortgage lending, and those costs might get 
passed on to mortgage borrowers in part or in whole. 
Against these costs we must weigh the benefits. Registration 
benefits the homeowner in the event of a foreclosure by ensuring that 
procedural rights will be respected. Requiring matching registration 
and recordation is in essence a form of mandatory insurance for 
borrowers.321 
 
 321. In theory, private title insurance would serve as a solution to questions about mortgage 
title. If mortgage title is in doubt, private title insurers will assume the risk in exchange for an 
acceptable premium, and, if risks become too great, then title insurers simply will not insure. In 
practice, however, private title insurance is incapable of dealing with the mortgage chain-of-title 
problem. This is because private title insurers have already written numerous policies on 
properties in which title may not be clean. The title insurers’ business model anticipates only 
unique, one-off insurable events. See Joyce D. Palomar, Bank Control of Title Insurance 
Companies: Perils to the Public That Bank Regulators Have Ignored, 44 SW. L.J. 905, 928–29 
(1990) (explaining why an attorney or abstractor is only expected to exercise reasonable care in 
conducting a title search, and may not be held liable for failing to detect a title defect that would 
be undetectable by a reasonable search); David E. Woolley & Linda D. Herzog, MERS: The 
Unreported Effects of Lost Chain of Title on Real Property Owners, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 365, 
393–94 (2012) (discussing scenarios presenting unique problems to title insurance). Accordingly, 
they are simply not capitalized to be able to handle a systemic title problem. See JOYCE 
PALOMAR, Limits on Size of Single Risks Assumed, in 2 TITLE INSURANCE LAW § 18:34 (2012), 
available at Westlaw TITLEINSL (examining statutory limits on liability that title insurance 
underwriters may assume, as well as related exceptions to that rule); Suzanne M. Garcia, A 
Glance at the Impact of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis on the Title Insurance Industry, 30 PACE 
L. REV. 233, 235–41 (2009) (discussing the impact of the subprime mortgage crisis on title 
insurance companies); Quintin Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 502 (1957) (noting 
the small or nonexistent reserves maintained by most title insurers). If such a problem exists, 
title insurers are functionally insolvent and have nothing to lose by continuing to write new 
policies. Indeed, even if there were a systemic title problem, title insurers would have to 
continue writing new policies in order to continue operating because they are usually paid in 
single, up-front premiums, so if they cease writing new policies, their cashflow, and hence their 
ability to operate, will cease. See H. Lee Roussel & Moses K. Rosenberg, The High Price of 
“Reform”: Title Insurance Rates and the Benefits of Rating Bureaus, 48 J. RISK & INS. 638, 642–
43 (1981) (noting that title insurance, unlike other types of insurance, depends on a single 
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Registration also benefits the courts by preserving their 
jurisdictional integrity and creating adjudicative efficiency. 
Foreclosure is a severe remedy that invokes the coercive power of the 
state to deprive a resident of his or her home—a property interest 
that receives particular solicitude in the law. This is precisely the sort 
of circumstance in which there is a societal interest in ensuring that 
the coercive machinery of state is used appropriately, which 
necessitates adopting a more reliable source for verifying property 
rights. 
There are also positive externalities on society at large from 
clarity of title that registration helps capture. Clarity of title enables 
greater alienability of realty, including of neighboring realty. Absence 
of title clarity conversely creates negative social externalities. 
Registration would help create the positive externalities and avoid 
the negative ones. 
Registration could also lower the cost of mortgage lending. 
Warehouse lenders would have to do less diligence, resulting in cost 
savings in the financing system that might benefit borrowers. More 
importantly, registration could ultimately reduce foreclosure costs by 
reducing uncertainty in the legal system and reducing litigation costs. 
Lower foreclosure costs might result in lower mortgage rates and 
greater credit availability.322 
The cost-benefit tradeoff from mandating note registration as a 
prerequisite to foreclosure is not quantifiable and is ultimately 
uncertain, as are its distributional impacts. Yet there is a plausible 
case that it would create a more efficient mortgage financing system 
from a Kaldor-Hicks, if not a Pareto, perspective, which is sufficient 
given the ability of parties in the mortgage finance system to 
reallocate costs among themselves. Even if registration did not create 
a more efficient system, however, the distributional adjustments and 
jurisdictional integrity benefits might themselves be sufficient to 
make the system appealing. Indeed, we already impose similarly 
mandated procedural insurance through existing foreclosure 
 
purchase to raise revenue); Peter Soskin, Protecting Title in Continental Europe and The United 
States—Restriction of a Market, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 411, 425–33 (2011) (examining the history 
and characteristics of title insurance policies). Therefore, unless title insurers constantly 
underwrite new policies, they have no ongoing source of revenue. This means that private title 
insurers cannot be relied on to either bear the costs for or screen against systemic problems in 
title.  
 322. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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procedures and the existence of the bankruptcy system.323 Mandating 
this type of procedural insurance reflects the societal interest in 
ensuring clarity in real-property rights.324 
Note registration is not the only possible way to reconcile 
competing mortgage title systems, but it would create the greatest 
certainty-of-rights benefits relative to its invasiveness. Adopting a 
registration-based, property-rights verification regime to govern 
mortgage notes and linking it to a public recording system for 
mortgages might also ultimately result not only in greater certainty of 
mortgage title, but also in more efficient mortgage lending, and even 
if not, may protect against potentially severe negative public 
externalities. 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of mortgage title stands as a lesson to the 
commercial-law community of getting away from the fundamentals of 
commercial law. This is not simply a doctrinal point, although part of 
this story told here is a perversion of doctrine in the service of a 
particular interest group. Nor is it even a point about the need to see 
the entire forest of commercial law instead of an atomized view that 
can quickly lead to conflicts within commercial law. Instead, it is 
about the fundamental purpose of commercial law, which is to 
facilitate transactions between parties by providing a legal framework 
for the transfer of property, be it goods or payment rights. 
The standard move in the commercial-law playbook for 
transaction facilitation is Coasean: reduce transaction costs. Yet this 
move overlooks the importance of ownership and title in commercial 
law, perhaps, in part, because the UCC generally eschews these 
terms. Commercial-law semantics aside, however, parties’ bargains 
are based on what is being transferred. Even if all other transaction 
costs are eliminated, parties will not transact if they do not know what 
it is they are buying or selling. Reduction of transaction costs is 
ultimately a second-order move for commercial law. The first-order 
move, so elemental it is easy to forget, is clarification of the property 
 
 323. See generally Joshua Goodman & Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Law and the Cost of 
Credit: The Impact of Cramdown on Mortgage Interest Rates (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Working 
Paper No. RWP12-037, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128841.  
 324. Note that the argument for mandatory “insurance” here is not because of adverse 
selection but because of externalities.  
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being transferred.325 There are certainly moves in this direction within 
commercial law, such as implied warranties of merchantability.326 
Property law too moves in this direction through the numerus clausus 
principle.327 Ultimately it is a property-law lesson that commercial law 
needs to internalize, namely, that certainty of property rights is a 
precondition for investment.328 In a viable commercial-law system, the 
reduction of transaction costs cannot come at the expense of certainty 
of property rights. 
The mortgage title system also presents a particularly vexing 
version of the too-big-to-fail problem. The legal questions raised by 
foreclosure standing litigation were not ones that were unanswered 
historically, but the answers were ones that were inconvenient for the 
housing-finance industry and ones that the industry chose to 
disregard. Normally, parties disregard the law at their own peril, but 
the calculus is different for a too-big-to-fail industry like housing 
finance. When a too-big-to-fail industry disregards the law on a wide 
scale, courts are faced with the choice of upholding the law and 
causing economic chaos or ignoring the law for the sake of economic 
stability. 
Typically too-big-to-fail crises have economic or natural-disaster 
triggers, such as a slowing of expected housing price increases or a 
tsunami. They are not typically triggered by court decisions. Yet with 
mortgage title problems, courts are put in the position of being 
themselves the potential trigger for a too-big-to-fail crisis. In a case 
like mortgage title, in which there is seldom any question about the 
“right” result on the merits—the homeowner has defaulted on the 
mortgage—courts may be inclined to ignore the law and opt for 
economic stability. Doing so, however, ignores that procedural 
protections are part of the economic bargain of the mortgage loan, 
and also deprives a particularly vulnerable population of the 
procedural rights that are intended to protect them. 
 
 325. UCC Article 2, for example, will tolerate an open price term, an open delivery date, an 
open payment date, open delivery terms, and quantity terms based on outputs or requirements, 
U.C.C. §§ 2-304 to -310 (2011), but it does require agreement on what is being sold, see id. § 2-
204.  
 326. Id. § 2-314.  
 327. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 9–11 (2000) (explaining that both 
civil and common-law courts treat classes of previously recognized property as modifiable only 
by the legislature). 
 328. See supra note 26.  
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The mortgage-title-system problem could, like all too-big-to-fail 
legal problems, be solved by enforcing the law and then letting the 
political system address the results. Courts, however, might shy from 
economically disruptive rulings, particularly if they have doubts about 
the ability of the political system to fix the ensuing chaos. This might 
well be the case in the aftermath of the bailouts of 2008–2009 and the 
federal debt-ceiling crises in 2011 and 2013. The mishandling of one 
round of crisis creates consequences for the next; bailouts are not 
single-stage games.329 
Courts’ behavior should not surprise legal realists. Courts are 
ruling with one eye on the economic consequences and accordingly 
are finding ways to preserve legal principles without triggering crises. 
The mortgage title issue’s complex and arcane nature makes it 
especially easy to find ways to dispose of cases without issuing 
definitive rulings about which system of title-and-transfer controls, 
and it is easy to ignore compliance problems as isolated exceptions, 
rather than the rule. Moreover, because the subject of the litigation is 
standing, it is possible to dismiss cases without prejudice, theoretically 
enabling mortgagees to get their paperwork in order and restart the 
dismissed foreclosures.330 Other courts have been more explicit about 
what they are doing. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, for 
example, heeded the pleas of the real-estate bar about the risk to 
clouded title if past foreclosures were subject to its ruling in Eaton 
and accordingly made its ruling prospective only, a sharp departure 
from its usual practice.331 One way or another, cautious courts are 
likely to muddle through the legacy problems of existing mortgages. 
Cautious muddling might be the best we can hope for in a bad 
situation, yet it is not clear that this is how we should want our court 
system to operate. The potential perversion of the law to 
accommodate too-big-to-fail industries, rather than the risk of 
financial bailouts, is perhaps the most threatening part of the too-big-
to-fail phenomenon because of its corrosive institutional effect. Too-
big-to-fail can hold all branches of government hostage. 
Ultimately, the confusion over how mortgages are transferred 
represents a breakdown of our commercial-law and real-estate-law 
system. The mortgage title disaster represents “the greatest failure of 
 
 329. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 447 (2011).  
 330. E.g., Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ohio 
2012); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Moore, 278 P.3d 596, 601–02 (Okla. 2012). 
 331. Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1120–32 (Mass. 2012). 
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lawyering in the last 50 years.”332 The law reforms pushed by the 
securitization industry in the name of efficiency undermined the legal 
foundation for a critical part of the economy. Going forward, 
rebuilding the U.S. housing-finance system must begin by reinforcing 
its legal infrastructure. 
  
 
 332. Gretchen Morgenson, A Tornado Warning, Unheeded, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2012, at 
BU1 (quoting U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain).  
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APPENDIX 
This Appendix is meant to provide an illustrative range of 
foreclosure-standing cases as of June 2013, rather than a complete 
listing of all such cases. It is organized by the state law being applied. 
 
Alabama 
• Congress v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 98 So. 3d 1165 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2012) (holding that a mortgagor could prevail in a wrongful-
foreclosure action by showing lack of standing to foreclose if it 
could prove on a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard that 
the allonge to the mortgage note was fabricated, and 
remanding for trial on that basis) 
 
Arizona 
• In re Tarantola, 4:09-bk-09703-EWH, 2010 WL 3022038 
(Bankr. D. Ariz. July 29, 2010) (denying a motion for relief 
from stay for lack of real interest in the property when the 
plaintiff could not prove valid assignment of the note) 
• Varbel v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0263, 
2013 WL 817290 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a 
nonjudicial foreclosure sale did not require the production of 
the note or its chain of custody) 
 
California 
• In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757, 765 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) 
(holding that the noteholder plaintiff must join the owner of 
the note, the real party in interest, before it could seek relief 
from a stay), rev’d, 438 B.R. 661 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
• In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) (denying a 
motion for relief from a stay for lack of real interest in the 
property when the plaintiff could not prove valid assignment of 
the note) 
• In re Urdahl, No. 07-07227-PB7, 2008 WL 8013408 (Bankr. 
S.D. Cal. June 9, 2008) (denying a motion for relief from stay 
for lack of real interest in the property when the plaintiff could 
not prove valid assignment of the note) 
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Connecticut 
• U.S. Bank v. Coley, No. CV076001426, 2011 WL 2734603 
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 2011) (dismissing a foreclosure for 
lack of standing because the mortgage assignment was four 
months subsequent to the foreclosure suit’s initiation) 
 
Florida 
• In re Canellas, 6:09-bk-12240-ABB, 2010 WL 571808 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010) (finding no evidence of a proper 
assignment of the mortgage or the note to the foreclosing party 
prior to foreclosure) 
• McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 79 So. 3d 170 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing a grant of summary 
judgment for a foreclosure plaintiff when the assignment of a 
mortgage occurred three days after the suit was initiated and 
the assignment of the note was undated) 
 
Idaho 
• In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (denying a 
motion for relief from stay for lack of real interest in the 
property when the plaintiff could not prove valid assignment of 
the note) 
• In re Sheridan, 08-20381-TLM, 2009 WL 631355 (Bankr. D. 
Idaho Mar. 12, 2009) (same) 
 
Kansas 
• U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. McConnell, 305 P.3d 1 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2013) (holding that the formal assignment of the mortgage 
after the commencement of the foreclosure action did not 
vitiate standing because the mortgage follows the note) 
 
Massachusetts 
• In re Jones, 07-15662-JNF, 2008 WL 4539486 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
Oct. 3, 2008) (holding a putative mortagee lacked standing 
because the mortagee did not provide proof of valid 
assignment of the mortgage) 
• In re Hayes, 393 B.R. 259 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (same). 
• Nosek v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 286 B.R. 374 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. In re Nosek, 
406 B.R. 434 (D. Mass. 2009) (sanctioning the attorneys for the 
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putative mortgagees when the attorneys had claimed to be the 
holders of the mortgages and notes but had actually sold them 
five days after origination) 
• In re Maisel, 378 B.R. 19 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (finding no 
evidence of a proper assignment of the mortgage or the note to 
the foreclosing party prior to foreclosure) 
• In re Schwartz, 366 B.R. 265 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (finding 
no evidence of a proper assignment of the mortgage to the 
foreclosing party prior to foreclosure and no evidence that the 
note was assigned) 
• Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (Mass. 2012) 
(holding that a foreclosure sale was invalid because the 
foreclosing entity did not hold the promissory note at the time 
of sale) 
• Bevilacqua v. Rodrigues, 460 Mass. 762 (Mass. 2011) (holding 
that an invalid foreclosure sale was ineffective to transfer title) 
• U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n. v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (Mass. 2011) 
(holding that a foreclosure sale was invalid because the 
foreclosing entity was not the mortgagee of record at the time 
of sale) 
 
Michigan 
• Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA, 739 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a foreclosure must be vacated 
when the bank “did not yet own the indebtedness that it sought 
to foreclose”) 
• Residential Funding Co, L.L.C. v. Saurman, 490 Mich. 909 
(Mich. 2011) (holding that MERS had standing to foreclose 
nonjudicially) 
 
Nevada 
• Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Medina, No. 2:09-CV-
00670-KJD-GWF, 2009 WL 4823387 (D. Nev. Dec. 4, 2009) 
(finding no evidence that the plaintiff was the agent of the 
owner of the note and therefore was not a real party in interest 
with standing) 
• Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Chong, Nos. 2:09-CV-
00661-KJD-LRL, BK-S-07-16645-LBR, 2009 WL 6524286 (D. 
Nev. Dec. 4, 2009) (same) 
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• Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281 (Nev. 2011) 
(holding that nonjudicial foreclosures could not proceed under 
the Nevada foreclosure-mediation statue when a party seeking 
foreclosure was neither the holder of the note nor the assignee 
beneficiary of the deed of trust) 
• Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275 (Nev. 
2011) (same) 
• Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 286 P.3d 249 (Nev. 2012) 
(holding that the party seeking to foreclose must demonstrate 
that it was both the holder of the promissory note and the 
beneficiary of the deed of trust) 
 
New Jersey 
• In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (sustaining an 
objection to a proof of claim when the plaintiff could not prove 
an enforceable right to the note under state law) 
 
New York 
• In re Minbatiwalla, 424 B.R. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing a 
mortgagee’s claim without prejudice for failure to provide 
documentation establishing the mortgagee’s proof of claim 
upon a debtor’s objection) 
• Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532 (App. Div. 2011) 
(“[F]oreclosure of a mortgage cannot be pursued by one who 
has no demonstrated right to the debt.”) 
• Countrywide Homes Loans, Inc. v. Gress, 888 N.Y.S.2d 914 
(App. Div. 2009) (holding that a mortgagee’s assignee lacked 
standing to foreclose because it did not own the mortgage at 
the time the complaint was filed) 
• Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione, 887 N.Y.S.2d 615 (App. 
Div. 2009) (finding no evidence of a proper assignment of the 
mortgage to the foreclosing party prior to foreclosure) 
• Lasalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ahearn, 875 N.Y.S. 2d 595 (App. 
Div. 2009) (holding that a mortgagee’s assignee lacked standing 
to foreclose because it did not own the mortgage at the time 
the complaint was filed) 
• JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Butler, 2013 WL 
3359283 (Sup. Ct. July 5, 2013) (releasing the proceeds from a 
home sale to the defendant-mortgagor because the plaintiff 
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bank never owned the note and mortgage and therefore never 
had a right to foreclose) 
• Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo, No. 31648/2009, 2013 WL 
1831799 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (denying a motion for summary 
judgment in a foreclosure because the assignment of the note 
and mortgage were void when they did not comply with the 
PSA) 
• Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Stevens, 911 N.Y.S.2d 691 
(Sup. Ct. 2010) (holding that a mortgagee’s assignee lacked 
standing to foreclose because the assignee did not hold the 
promissory note at the time the complaint was filed) 
• JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. George, 910 N.Y.S.2d 762 
(Sup. Ct. 2010) (same) 
• Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. McRae, 894 N.Y.S.2d 720 
(Sup. Ct. 2010) (finding no evidence of a proper assignment of 
the note to the foreclosing party prior to foreclosure) 
• Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp. v. Randolph Bowling, 
906 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (holding that a mortgagee’s 
assignee lacked standing to foreclose because the assignee did 
not hold the promissory note at the time the complaint was 
filed ) 
• HSBC Bank U.S.A. Nat’l Ass’n v. Miller, 889 N.Y.S.2d 430 
(Sup. Ct. 2009) (same) 
• Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Abbate, 901 N.Y.S.2d 905 
(Sup. Ct. 2009) (same) 
• HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Valentin, 873 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup. 
Ct. 2008) (dismissing a foreclosure action without prejudice 
due to discrepancies in affidavits as to the date of the 
assignment of the mortgage and failure to provide an affidavit 
from someone with a valid power of attorney regarding the 
assignment) 
• Countrywide Home Loans v. Taylor, 843 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. 
Ct. 2007) (holding that a mortgagee’s assignee lacked standing 
to foreclose because it did not own the mortgage at the time 
the complaint was filed) 
 
Ohio 
• Novastar Mortg., Inc. v. Snyder, No. 3:07CV480, 2008 WL 
4560794 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2008) (dismissing a foreclosure 
action without prejudice for lack of standing because there was 
LEVITIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2013  5:55 PM 
732 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:637 
no evidence that the mortgage had been transferred from 
MERS to the foreclosing entity) 
• Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Steele, 2008 WL 111227 
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 8, 2008) (ordering a plaintiff to produce 
evidence that the plaintiff owned the note and mortgage when 
the complaint was filed before summary judgment could be 
granted) 
• In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 07-cv-166, 07-cv-190, 07-cv-226, 
07-cv-279, 07-cv-423, 07-cv-534, 07-cv-536, 07-cv-642, 07-cv-706, 
07-cv-727, 07-cv-731, 07-cv-963, 07-cv-1047, 07-cv-1119, 07-cv-
1150, 2007 WL 4589765 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2007) (dismissing 
foreclosure actions for lack of standing because the plaintiff-
mortgagees did not have valid assignments of the notes and 
mortgages at the time the complaint was filed) 
• In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 
07CV2560, 07CV2602, 07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 
07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950, 
07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 
2007) (same) 
• Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 
1214 (Ohio 2012) (reversing a foreclosure judgment because 
the foreclosing party received the promissory note and 
mortgage after the commencement of foreclosure and 
therefore lacked standing, which could not be corrected by 
subsequent transfers of the note and mortgage) 
• CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Patterson, 984 N.E.2d 392 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2012) (holding that a bank had standing to foreclose despite 
not being the mortgagee at the time of foreclosure because it 
held the bearer paper note)333 
• U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Duvall, No. 94714, 2010 WL 5550257 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2010) (holding that a mortgagee’s 
assignee lacked standing to foreclose because the assignee did 
not own the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed and 
was therefore not the real party in interest) 
• U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Perry, No. 94757, 2010 WL 5238626 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2010) (overturning summary judgment 
because the plaintiff’s affidavit did not state that the plaintiff 
 
 333. The court did not address why holding a note gives standing to foreclose the 
homeowner’s equity of redemption via a forced sale, rather than simply standing to sue for 
monetary damages. 
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owned both the note and the mortgage at the time the 
complaint was filed and a genuine issue of material fact 
remained as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to foreclose) 
• Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan, No. 91675, 2009 WL 625560 
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2009) (affirming a dismissal of a 
foreclosure action for lack of standing because the putative 
mortgagee could not prove that mortgagee owned the 
mortgage at the time the complaint was filed) 
• Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 897 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2008) (same) 
 
Oklahoma 
• U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Moore, 278 P.3d 596 (Okla. 2012) 
(reversing a foreclosure judgment for lack of standing because 
the plaintiff was not the holder of the note and therefore not a 
person entitled to enforce the note) 
• Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Byrams, 275 P.3d 129 (Okla. 
2012) (reversing and remanding summary judgment for a 
foreclosure plaintiff because standing did not exist at the time 
the action was instituted) 
• Deutsche Bank v. Brumbaugh, 270 P.3d 151 (Okla. 2012) 
(reversing a grant of summary judgment to a foreclosure 
plaintiff because material issues of fact remained regarding 
standing to foreclose) 
 
Oregon 
• Niday v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 284 P.3d 1157 (Or. Ct. App. 
2012) (holding that a deed-of-trust beneficiary that used MERS 
could not undertake a nonjudicial foreclosure) 
 
Vermont 
• U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087 (Vt. 2011) 
(upholding a denial of standing to foreclose because the bank 
could not demonstrate that it was the holder of the note at the 
time the foreclosure action was initiated) 
 
Washington 
• In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009) 
(holding that a servicer for a holder of a note, which had no 
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beneficial interest in the note, was not the real party of interest 
and thus was not entitled to relief from stay) 
• Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 285 P.3d 34 (Wash. 2012) 
(holding that MERS could not utilize the Washington 
nonjudicial foreclosure procedure because it was not the lawful 
beneficiary of a deed of trust because it did not hold the note) 
